Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

57. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, April 6, 1961, 6 p.m.

2141. Abbas yesterday presented Nigerian Police compromise proposal on Matadi² to Kasavubu requesting reply by noon April 7. Following discussion last night with Abbas I saw Kasavubu for over an hour today. I can assure Department and USUN I left no stone unturned, no argument unsaid, in effort convince Kasavubu accept latest compromise.

While Kasavubu did not reject Abbas proposal out of hand “in interests of good diplomacy”, he clearly gave me impression at outset of conversation he had no intention allowing any non-civilian UN force, including Nigerian Police, in Matadi. He particularly irked by UN deadline and initially took position Matadi population will react violently to return any UN military or Police. Launching bitter attack on UN he accused them of coming to Congo to help but only causing trouble. They bypassed his Government at every step and even supported secession of Katanga by sending letters directly to Tshombe on Tananarive conference.³ If UN persisted in bypassing Government and creating trouble both UN and Congolese would go their separate ways. In fact it might be good thing if UN troops withdrew.

I told him refusal to compromise on Matadi presented danger that entire UN mission might withdraw. Aside from resulting in departure of badly needed technicians this would leave Congo wide open to vagaries of cold war, an outcome which I was sure Kasavubu wished avoid. Far from promoting Katanga secession UN was now facing angry demonstrators in Katanga because of its insistence on unified Congo. Since Kasavubu showed little awareness need maintain his posture in New York I particularly emphasized need make conciliatory gesture to avoid a new SC meeting on Congo which would provoke renewed attacks on his policies. Only by compromising could he allow his friends at UN to defend him and avoid disaster for his country and himself.

To his claim that he was always bailing UN out of difficult situations resulting from failure to consult his Government I replied that Abbas had brought about a change in this policy and had consistently consulted with him and his Ministers. Now he, Kasavubu, had a unique opportunity to develop close working relationships and avoid future incidents. At one point he came near to agreeing, with the reservation that if Nigerians went to Matadi and caused any incidents this would be the end of any relations with UN. His people, who would watch Nigerians closely, would feel that the Chief of State had betrayed them. I replied that all leaders have to take certain risks. His real responsibility to his people was to avoid a prolonged dispute with UN which would result from adamant position on Matadi. He could best serve them by accepting a compromise and working in harmony with UN.

Time and again whenever Kasavubu seemed on verge of accepting compromise he returned to Dayal. Even if he accepted a compromise Hammarskjöld would continue to ignore wishes of Congolese and send Dayal back. Everyone had told him to trust Dayal but Dayal had consistently deceived him. Now he wondered if he had any friends left in UN. I reiterated the assistance we had provided in seating his delegation, our gesture in sending food to Congo and our consistent efforts to prevent Dayal’s return. Each time Dayal’s name arose I emphasized that he should trust Abbas. The best way to insure that Dayal would not return was to show the world he could work out a compromise with Abbas. This would give his friends a talking point with SYG. In absence of an agreement on Matadi his friends would find it difficult to stand up to Communist onslaughts in UN.

If Nigerian Police were to enter Matadi, Kasavubu said, they must be under control of Congolese authorities. I replied this principle unacceptable to UN. How then, he wondered, could Congolese control situation. After all UN had allowed arms to come into Lisala and Katanga. I stated UN making strenuous efforts control arms flow into Katanga and Lisala affair was isolated incident instigated by UAR. His best assurance in matters of this nature was to develop working relationship with UN. Once again I emphasized that he now had a unique opportunity to do this. He could deal with Abbas and Nigerians were his best friends in Africa. I appealed to his stature as a leader and urged him to explain this by radio to Matadi population before Nigerians arrive.

While Kasavubu may not have been fully convinced by my arguments I believe I gave him food for thought. At least he came around from a flat refusal to conceding he would again take matter up with his Government. However, Friday, he said, was much too short a deadline. I believe if UN continues to talk about deadlines it will push Kasavubu into refusal, whereas by patient negotiation it may be able to convince him of need to compromise. Although I could not have presented a stronger case than I did today I will continue to support Abbas’ efforts at all levels.

On other points I found Kasavubu amenable. He appreciated agreement for Cardoso⁴ and has in mind accrediting him both to US and UN. He recognizes Bahizi shortcomings and plans appropriate action. He received favorably idea of an economic round table conference to discuss provincial needs in light of US offer supply surplus food through UN. He recognized possibilities this offered for political reconciliation, a principle which he seems to accept. I urged him to extend a formal invitation to the Orientale provincial government economic del which has been prepared to come to Léopoldville for several weeks.

I outlined danger of Communist shipments to Orientale through Sudan under Licross auspices. While, typically, he uninformed on proposal send barge containing PL 480 flour to Stanleyville he appreciated this useful gesture to forestall Communist moves through Licross. Providing Government and Mobutu agreed he saw no objection to sending barge.

Timberlake

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/4–661. Confidential; Priority. Received at 2:23 p.m. and repeated to Brussels, Elisabethville, and USUN.
2. This U.N. proposal was to send approximately 100 Nigerian police to Matadi to maintain order in lieu of U.N. troops. The text was transmitted in telegram 2714 from USUN (repeated to Léopoldville as 275), April 3. (Ibid., 770G.00/4–361) Telegram 2058 to Léopoldville, April 4, instructed Timberlake to support Abbas by urging Kasavubu to accept the proposal. (Ibid., 770G.00/4–461)
3. The reference is not clear. A March 2 message from Hammarskjöld to Tshombe concerned the implementation of the February 21 Security Council resolution. (U.N. doc. S/4752/Add.1; also printed in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. V, pp. 381–384)
4. Mario Cardoso was representing the Congolese Government at the United Nations. He opened the Congolese Embassy in Washington as Minister and Charge on June 28, 1962.