Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

55. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 4, 1961, 10:55 a.m.–1:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• U.K.
  • Lord Home, Foreign Secretary²
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office
  • Lord Hood, Minister, British Embassy
  • The Honorable Peter Ramsbotham, Head, Planning and Coordination Section, Foreign Office
  • Mr. R. T. D. Ledward, Counselor, British Embassy
  • Mr. C. D. Wiggin, First Secretary, British Embassy
  • Mr. A. C. I. Samuel, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary
• U.S.
  • The Secretary; The Under Secretary; Ambassador Bruce; Messrs. Kohler and White, EUR; Mr. Steeves, FE; Messrs. Burdett and Swihart, BNA

Referring to press stories of a crisis between Tshombe and the United Nations, the Secretary suggested a word on the Congo. He said the latest tickers reported an agreement had been reached on control of the Elisabethville airport.³ From the longer range point of view, he thought it desirable to give the Tananarive group a chance to work out its affairs. Relations between this group and the United Nations could hardly be worse. Dayal had not shown the statesmanship the situation called for. Nehru, however, seemed committed to supporting Dayal. It was difficult to do anything. He inquired whether Lord Home saw any possibility of mediation between the United Nations and the Congolese.

Lord Home commented that the United Kingdom had been sending a message once a week to Nehru urging that Dayal be removed. They had also been sending their Ambassador in Léopoldville instructions to urge moderation on the Congolese. The United Kingdom had been reluctant to support the last United Nations resolution for fear the United Nations might use it to impose its will on Katanga. If the United Nations did so, Tshombe would declare his independence. He possesses three-quarters of the wealth of the Congo and could get away with it. General Alexander, who commanded the Ghanaian troops, said that if the soldiers were given a chance they could work things out. Dayal was always interfering. Hammarskjöld was sending a contingent of Nigerian police to Matadi. This was a useful move. According to Lord Home’s latest information, Hammarskjöld had a three-step plan: first, to dispatch the police; secondly, to try to bring the Congolese leaders together; and thirdly, to deal with Katanga. Katanga was the most difficult problem.

The Secretary remarked that the big problem was that Nehru seemed to be pursuing a separate Indian policy rather than merging his effort with the United Nations effort. This was extremely dangerous. It could blow up the United Nations effort. Lord Home agreed.

The Secretary said he had been uneasy at the dispatch to the Congo of the brigade of Indian troops. He feared that the troops would back Indian policy rather than the United Nations. He asked whether it was possible to cool Nehru off. Lord Home replied that Nehru was obsessed by the Belgian presence. He did not know if there was anything the United States Ambassador could do. The British had failed. He emphasized that we must not allow Indian troops to start fighting with Katanga. The Secretary asked who had ordered the Gurkhas to Katanga. He thought this unwise. Lord Home said it must have been General McEoin.

Lord Home pointed out that Nehru is prepared reluctantly to regard Kasavubu as the Head of State. The rest of the Congolese he considers mere brigands responsible for the murder of Lumumba. Nehru thinks that, as in the case of Western opposition to Lumumba, the West is now again backing the wrong horse. Nehru theorizes that there must be a national will in the Congo and that this is bound to win in the end.

The Secretary said that he had talked with Nehru a bit about the Congo. Nehru felt keenly the attacks on Dayal and had stressed the need for patience. The Secretary asked Nehru if Dayal’s patience was exhausted. Nehru did not reply. Nehru’s statement as reported in the New York Times indicated Nehru’s position on Dayal is frozen.

The Under Secretary described a recent conversation with Dayal,⁴ in which he had almost convinced Dayal that he should withdraw. Subsequent press reports criticizing Dayal had induced him to change his mind. The Under Secretary described Dayal as near a nervous breakdown.

Lord Home asked how much longer the United States and the United Kingdom were going to keep on paying the bill without calling the tune a little more. The Secretary said he was worried about that. He asked whether Lord Home thought there was any chance that the French would pay. When we asked France we received in return only a glassy stare. Lord Home said the French policy seemed to be “do nothing, pay nothing, say nothing.”

The Under Secretary commented that, if the Indian troop contingent had not been dispatched, other troop units might have been pulled out. He asked whether Nehru could be persuaded to send some responsible person, in whom he had confidence, to the Congo for several weeks in order to get a first-hand account.

Lord Home described the outburst which Nehru indulged in this week with the British Ambassador regarding the Belgians in the Congo. Nehru kept referring to twenty thousand Belgians. The Secretary thought this must have been temporary impetuousness. Nehru had been more reasonable in talking with him.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs William C. Burdett, Jr., and approved in S on April 11. The time of the meeting is taken from the Secretary’s appointment book. (Johnson Library) Other topics discussed were recorded in separate memoranda of conversation. (Ibid.) Those present not previously identified include Ambassador to the United Kingdom David K.E. Bruce, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs John M. Steeves, and Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs James W. Swihart.
2. Lord Home and Prime Minister Macmillan visited Washington April 4 –8.
3. U.N. forces in Katanga were reinforced in early April by the arrival of the first troops of the Indian contingent. Telegram 690 from Elisabethville, April 4, reported that U.N. forces had occupied the Elisabethville airport before dawn and that at least 1,000 persons, some armed with machetes, had demonstrated in the center of Elisabethville until Tshombe announced an agreement for joint U.N.-Katanga control of the airport. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/4–461)
4. Bowles had lunch with Dayal on March 27. He summarized the conversation briefly in a March 29 cable to Rusk. (Tosec 54 to New Delhi, March 29; ibid., 110.11–RU/3–2961)