Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

54. Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister Nehru and Secretary of State Rusk¹

New Delhi, March 30, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Congo

During our conversation the Prime Minister expressed his concern about the United Nations effort in the Congo. He was distressed about the attitude of various Congolese leaders toward the UN and expressed himself in strong terms about Belgian military and political personnel, as distinct from Belgian technical personnel and private citizens engaged in economic and other pursuits. He was distressed about the facts [attacks] on Mr. Dayal and hinted that some of these attacks were coming from U.S. sources.

I expressed great appreciation for India’s strong support of the UN effort in the Congo and reaffirmed our own view that it was important that the UN succeed in its effort there. I told him that we very much hoped that UN and Congolese forces would not come to direct military clashes but that patience and negotiation should develop a cooperation between the UN and Congolese authorities which would open the way for the retraining of Congolese forces and the restoration of law and order in the country. As for Mr. Dayal, I reminded him of the extreme difficulty of the situation in which Mr. Dayal and others had found themselves. The principal source of difficulty had been an uncertain UN mandate, under which the Secretary General had not felt himself able to adopt clear UN policies in the Congo and to give his civilian and military representatives clear guidelines about UN objectives. I pointed out that it was always unsatisfactory to employ armed forces without being clear about their mission. I told him of Ralph Bunche’s comment that he had learned in the Congo that “you cannot describe anarchy, you can only experience it.” I said that it was not surprising that tempers had worn thin, given the frustrations, the dangers, the uncertainties, the inadequate information, the lack of clear policy, the ineptness of the Congolese and all the other factors with which the UN and other representatives in the Congo have been working. I was quite sure that on all sides, impatience and frustration had led to remarks which might have been later regretted. I told Mr. Nehru that I did not know what his judgment was about Mr. Dayal—whether he felt that Mr. Dayal’s patience had been exhausted and that he might wish to suggest someone else; if so, we would have no objection to an Indian in that responsible position.²

Mr. Nehru did not pursue the point but our Charge, Mr. Maffitt, commented afterward that he thought Mr. Nehru had got the point, without my leveling charges against Dayal directly, that the latter’s own performance and sharp tongue had led to difficulties.

I explained to Mr. Nehru our attitude toward the Belgians and said that we were doing everything we could in Brussels to get the irresponsible Belgians out of the Congo. I pointed out that there seemed to be a gap in authority between Brussels and their representatives in the Congo and that it has not been easy for Brussels to obtain the actual removal of some of the more troublesome Belgian elements. I believe that we and Mr. Nehru see the Belgian problem in the same broad terms, although he might prefer more sweeping removals and thinks of Belgian influence as a fatal contamination of such Congolese leaders as Tshombe, Kasavubu and Ileo.

I was interested that, as he and I left his office to go to luncheon, Mr. Nehru told the waiting press that we had discussed Laos and the Congo and were in “general agreement.”

Dean Rusk³

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Dictated by Rusk, according to a handwritten notation by Swank. Except for the reference to Minister-Counselor Edward P. Maffitt, the source text does not indicate others who may have been present. Secretary Rusk visited New Delhi briefly on his return from a visit to Bangkok, where he attended the SEATO Council Meeting March 27–29.
2. Hammarskjöld told Stevenson in a March 27 letter that he could not remove Dayal at that time because it would encourage further lack of cooperation from the Congolese authorities, he would appear to be yielding to U.S. pressure, and it would embarrass Nehru and might lead to the reversal of his decision to send Indian troops to the Congo. (Filed with a March 31 memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk; ibid., Central Files, 325.70G/3–3161)
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.