Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

5. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, January 12, 1961, 8:22 p.m.

1273. You should approach SYG soonest with view obtaining his full assessment current situation in Congo. In course discussion you should make following points:

US greatly concerned that situation in Congo has seriously deteriorated despite fact UNGA has accepted Kasavubu authority and UN has nearly 20,000 troops stationed in Congo. Pro-Lumumba elements, with outside support contrary to UN resolutions, extending their influence to substantial part of Congo territory. We are especially disturbed at reports, as yet unconfirmed, that participants Casablanca Conference secretly agreed there should be coup d’etat in March in which their troops would be used outside UNOC framework to assist in restoring Lumumba to power, confronting UN with fait accompli. We believe SYG should be reminded strongly that if Congo falls under Communist domination while UN sharing major responsibility for security of country, the results in US public and Congressional opinion likely to be extremely damaging to UN. We therefore request he consider taking all necessary steps to rectify situation. Following are concrete suggestions we hope he will consider urgently:

1. Replace Dayal soonest. As result series of incidents, we have no doubt Dayal’s sympathy for return Lumumba and that his conduct of UN operations reflects this bias. We believe his removal too long delayed, and that Dayal’s activities have contributed substantially to deterioration of situation in Congo.

2. Now that Guinea has requested withdrawal its troops from UN Command, we believe SYG should consider encouraging withdrawal of those other contingents who have proved most unreliable and who threatened withdrawal anyway. In particular, Ghana, the UAR and perhaps even Morocco.

3. To fill future requirement, believe SYG should again consider urgently requesting troops from more reliable countries, such as French-African States, Latin America, etc. and increasing contingents from reliable countries already furnishing forces.

4. Any unreliable forces that would remain should as far as possible be placed in less strategic positions. In particular we have in mind urgent need to transfer UAR troops from present critical location in Equateur Province.

5. We also believe stiffer and more precise instructions should be issued ONUC forces to prevent recurrence such incidents as kidnapping of Kivu political leaders and indifference to local acts of violence.

6. Responsibilities UN forces in Katanga must be clarified so that their position does not continue to redound to benefit of Lumumba group. Either they must assure against incursion of neutral zone as was provided in initial agreement as recorded in Dayal’s Second Progress Report (A/4557, pp. 25–26)² or they should not contemplate restraining Tshombe in his legitimate efforts to counter such takeover (Deptel 322 to Léopoldville, repeated USUN 1264).³

We are continuing our efforts with President Kasavubu to bring about cabinet government along lines of our earlier discussions with SYG. We regret that this has not already been achieved.⁴

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–1261. Secret; Priority. Drafted by William I. Cargo, Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (UNP), Joseph J. Sisco, Deputy Director of that office, and William B. Buffum, Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs; cleared by Deputy Under Secretary of State Raymond A. Hare and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph C. Satterthwaite; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Woodruff Wallner. Repeated to Léopoldville.
2. Dated November 2. The reference is to an October 17 agreement between the U.N. Command and Katangan authorities providing for a neutral zone in northern Katanga.
3. The reference should be to telegram 322 to Elisabethville, January 11, also sent to Léopoldville, which instructed the Consulate and the Embassy to inform U.N. authorities of the U.S. view that the U.N. Command should either prevent violation of the neutral zone by advancing forces from Stanleyville or permit Tshombe to take such action. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–1061)
4. Telegram 1930 from USUN, January 14, reported a joint U.S.–U.K. approach to Hammarskjöld, in which Representative to the United Nations James J. Wadsworth set forth the views contained in this telegram. Hammarskjöld’s attitude was antagonistic but telegram 1930 noted that “knowledge from time to time of fairly stiff attitude on our part continues to help counter pressure he is receiving from others.” (Ibid., 770G.00/1– 1461)