432. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo1

497. Eyes only—for Ambassador. Dept has impression that, as result Washington trip, attitudes expressed on future aid (Embtel 901)2 [Page 882] and other matters, Adoula and others in Léopoldville may believe that USG is withdrawing support from Adoula. Such belief would be unfortunate and could have serious effect on relations within GOC. Ambassador therefore requested reassure Adoula and other key GOC figures in manner Ambassador deems appropriate that USG attitude toward Adoula has not changed. In this connection you may wish recall tone of President’s conversation with Adoula, and Governor Harriman’s expression assurance of our continued confidence in him (Deptel 422).3 Ambassador should also make clear to Adoula and others concerned that USG policy re future aid contemplates continued cooperation with GOC, UN, IMF and other donors in working towards economic stabilization objective. USG prepared consider use of its aid resources (including $22.5 million) support purposeful measures to this end. Although decision re devaluation requires reconsideration modalities US aid, we have no rigid position and are prepared accept decision, and work with others to develop and support reasonable program for future.

Embtel 9254 and other recent Embassy cables raise basic policy questions. Basic US objective continues to be Western oriented Congo governed in such a way as to achieve maximum progress toward economic and political stability. Dept believes that future Government of Congo will continue to be coalition of basic power forces. In past this has been represented by Binza group.5 It is therefore essential to know who as leader can make the coalition function most effectively toward achievement of our basic objectives. In past we have seen no alternative to Adoula in this role. Whether Adoula, Anany, or some other individual can fulfill this role depends in large measure on attitudes toward them of other key figures involved: Mobutu, Nendaka, Ndele, Bomboko, Kasavubu, etc. In connection with any consideration of Anany as potential Prime Minister, would be important to know whether he can [Page 883] and would be willing work effectively with other members Binza group in developing agreed position on constitutional issues and political party. Would appreciate Ambassador’s assessment these basic questions and attitudes these individuals. Would also appreciate Ambassador’s suggestions as to need for and nature of any additional means indicate at this time our continued support for Adoula.

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 9 The Congo. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ford; cleared by Williams, Johnson, and in draft by Richard M. Cashin, Director of the Office of Central African Affairs in the Agency for International Development; and approved by Harriman.
  2. Telegram 901, October 28, reported discussions concerning U.S. financial assistance to the Congo. (Ibid.)
  3. Telegram 422, October 12, summarized the October 11 meeting between Adoula and Harriman (see footnote 3, Document 430). (Department of State, Central Files, FN 17–1 The Congo)
  4. In telegram 925, October 25, Gullion commented that a government dominated by Anany “would make short work of non-alignment policy, would be vigorous, decisive and well-disposed toward U.S. On other hand, it would probably be obscurantist, arbitrary, primitive, totalitarian, willful and [garble—irresponsible?].” He reported that he had expressed to Adoula and the members of the “triumvirate” misgivings on the arrest of the labor leaders, sent them a clipping on the attitudes of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee showing an inverse relation between foreign aid and dictatorial acts, and made clear to them the dangers of commissions usurping the role of the government, hinting that aid to the Congo could be jeopardized; he also suggested further pressures that might be applied. (Attached to the source text; also in Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–2 The Congo)
  5. Reference is to an informal group of Congolese leaders that included Mobutu, Bomboko, and Nendaka.234