Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

425. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, August 13, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Policy Problems regarding which Ambassador Gullion is Returning on Consultation

Ambassador Gullion is returning to Washington for consultation August 13 for a period of approximately ten days. The following is a brief statement of the policy problems which we believe he will wish to discuss with you and with other senior officials of the Department.

Future US Role in Congo

The fundamental question on which policy clarification will be sought during the Ambassador’s consultation is the question of the role of the US in the Congo over the next one to two years. As a result of its policy of forthright support of the central government and of support to the United Nations, the US plays a leading role in Congolese affairs. American funds, personnel, and prestige have been heavily committed in the Congo, and the degree of success which had been achieved to date can be very largely ascribed to the great effort the US has made to restore the unity and stability of that troubled land. The Congo continues to be plagued with serious difficulties. Rampant tribalism, the division of the country into 21 provincettes, a nearly runaway inflation, a costly defense establishment which contributes little to law and order, a central government with little authority in outlying areas, an incompetent bureaucracy—all contribute to a situation which can again easily become a matter of profound international concern.

It is consonant with US policy, however, that Belgium should take primary responsibility and play a leading role in the rehabilitation in the Congo. Since Spaak became Foreign Minister in April 1961, Belgian relations with the Congo have undergone a steady improvement. Belgium is presently providing over 2,000 technicians in the Congo and has undertaken to retrain the Congolese Army. The recent agreement between Adoula and Spaak on the division of the Congolese public debt may open the way to greater Belgian financial assistance to the Congo. With its large economic stake in the Congo and approximately 30,000 Belgian nationals there, not to mention the moral obligation of helping assure the future of its former colony, Belgium should be expected to provide a large proportion of the technicians and aid which the Congo desperately needs.

On the other hand, Ambassador Gullion and other observers question the extent to which Belgium can and will assume this responsibility. They note the lack of any substantial aid to date and the narrow view Belgium has heretofore taken of its role. The history of Belgium’s relations with the Congo can lead one to the conclusion that while Belgium will defend its financial interest in the Congo, there can be considerable doubt whether it has sufficient foresight to pursue policies which will be in the best interest of the US in this important part of Africa. An increase of Belgian influence, in place of the US and the UN, could involve real strains on Belgian-Congo relations and on Adoula’s ability to manage radical policy elements.

It is obvious that a clearcut decision cannot be made on this matter, and indeed no one is recommending that the US should commence a large-scale reduction of its commitment in the Congo. It is understood that the US must continue its aid and PL–480 programs and will participate meaningfully in the retraining of the Congolese Army. There is, however, a basic question as to the desirability of increasing our commitment and influence, as to the degree to which we should reconcile our policies to Belgian interests, and as to the criteria which should govern any steps to diminish our commitment in the Congo in order to increase the Belgian commitment.

Future Role of the United Nations in the Congo

Ambassador Gullion and virtually all diplomatic observers in the Congo, with the exception of the representatives of the Bloc, believe that the premature withdrawal of the UN may easily result in renewed outbreaks of violence in the Congo and the deterioration of the situation there, which could return the Congo to the situation prevailing in 1960.

The situation is particularly acute in the South Katanga, where the Congolese Army fears and mistrusts the local population and where the army has committed a series of brutal crimes. Only approximately 1,200 Katanga gendarmes have turned themselves in, and gangs of armed gendarmes have resorted to banditry. It is not unlikely that they are only waiting for the UN to withdraw to renew the struggle against the central government. In addition, the Congo financial crisis and the planned devaluation of the Congolese franc may contribute to general unrest owing to the decline of the purchasing power of the franc. In sum, there are storm clouds ahead on the Congo horizon which make the retention of UN forces, at least until the army retraining program is well under way, extremely desirable unless an adequate substitute can be found.

On the other hand, the Secretary-General feels strongly that the UN forces should be completely withdrawn by December 31. He believes that the Congo’s security problem has become primarily a matter of internal rather than international concern. He is worried about the UN’s precarious financial condition and does not wish to see the UN’s potentialities handicapped by funding problems. Our mission in New York believes that it would be extremely difficult to obtain the necessary two-thirds support for an extension in the General Assembly and that in any financing formula adopted the US would have to pay a larger share of costs than the 37% which we are paying for the UN operation through the final six months of this year.

The Department has sent a circular instruction to the African capitals and to the capitals of countries who have participated in UNOC in an attempt to establish to what extent these countries are prepared to support the extension of UNOC until mid-1964.² All of the replies are not in, but, as might be expected, a large number of countries have as yet taken no position on this issue.

Prime Minister Adoula has publicly stated that he hopes the UN will remain until mid-1964. The UK, Belgium, Tanganyika, Ireland, Nigeria, and Ghana all believe the United Nations should not withdraw, and Nigeria has expressed its willingness to maintain forces in the Congo on a bilateral basis, provided the necessary financing and GOC support can be provided. France, Norway, Sweden, Tunisia, Sudan, and several other states have shown either outright opposition to extending UNOC or very serious reservations. We do not know at this time whether the maintenance of military contingents in the Congo outside the framework of the UN would be acceptable to the Congolese Government. The financing, support, and control of such contingents present obvious difficulties.

Although the level of discipline of the Congolese Army has improved in the past year, it is far from an effective instrument for maintaining internal security, particularly in the light of the continued unsettled conditions which prevail in the Katanga. As the first increment of Belgian officers who are to train the ground forces are only just arriving in the Congo, it is unlikely that training can begin before October. This program will, therefore, barely be under way by the end of the year, the time at which the Secretary-General has said he would like to withdraw the remaining UN forces. It will be difficult to speed up this training program, as the Belgians are faced with the serious possibility that the return of Belgian officers will not be welcomed by the rank and file of the Congolese Army. It will therefore require time as well as tact to introduce an effective training program.

In the light of the above, the problem we face is whether the US should press the UN to defer the withdrawal of UNOC and, if such pressure is not likely to be successful, whether some alternate plan to retain foreign forces in the Congo can be developed that will be workable as well as acceptable to all concerned.³

Other Problems

Other problems such as the retention of a USAF unit in N’djili, the role of the US in the retraining program of the Congolese Army, the steps which should be taken to provide the Congo with an air transport capability, etc., can be resolved following clarification of the basic questions posed above.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, PER-Gullion, Edmund A. Confidential. Drafted by Whitehouse. The memorandum was apparently not sent to Rusk until August 15, according to an August 15 covering note from Williams to Rusk. The initials “DR” on the note indicate that the memorandum was seen by Rusk. (Ibid., POL 23–9 The Congo)
2. Circular telegram 149, July 24. (Ibid., POL The Congo USUN)
3. The August 15 note from Williams to Rusk cited in the source note above stated that a meeting the previous day among Gullion, Stevenson, Yost, and representatives of IO, EUR, and AF concerning the U.N. role in the Congo had resulted in a telegram approved by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Harriman indicating U.S. willingness to support the retention of a reduced U.N. force in the Congo until mid-1964. The reference is to telegram 189 to Léopoldville, August 14, which also transmitted the text of a letter from Williams to Adoula urging him to send a message to Thant confirming his view that U.N. forces should remain in the Congo for at least 1 year. (Ibid., POL 27–4 The Congo/UN)