Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

424. Memorandum From the Acting Department of State Executive Secretary (McKesson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, August 6, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Status of Retraining of Congolese Army

The retraining of the Congolese Army (ANC) has long been recognized as one of the imperatives of establishing an acceptable level of security in the Congo. It will be recalled that it was the mutiny of this force in July 1960 which led to widespread disturbances in the Congo. Although the level of discipline has improved in the past year, the ANC is far from an effective instrument for maintaining internal security, particularly in the light of the continued unsettled conditions which prevail in the Katanga.

The Government of the Congo requested the US, Belgium, Israel, Canada, Italy and Norway to assist the Congo in the “modernization” of the armed forces. Responses to this request and the actual implementation of a retraining program have been delayed by a variety of causes, commencing with prolonged discussion of the proposed program by the Congo Advisory Committee in New York in April 1963.²The upshot of this meeting was the decision of the Secretary General of the United Nations not to allow United Nations participation in the retraining program.³

As of this date the United States, Belgium, and Israel have signified their willingness to participate. Canada, Norway, and Italy have not replied. Prime Minister Adoula is currently in Rome, and it is not unlikely that the Italian Government will agree at least to undertake the training of Congolese pilots.

The United States has concluded a bilateral military assistance agreement with the Congo⁴ and has assigned the chief of a small United States military mission to the Congo. Two additional officers will depart in mid-August. The necessary actions have been taken to assemble military equipment principally vehicles for shipment to the Congo in mid-September.

Israel has undertaken to train Congolese parachutists, and a first group of 100 men have been scheduled to fly to Israel in early August for training.

Although both Norway and Canada agree that the retraining of the ANC is a matter of great importance and urgency, they appear to be most reluctant to participate. The Norwegian Government notes that it has military personnel in UNEF, UNOC, Kashmir and New Guinea and that it is training the Ethiopian navy. It lacks the French-speaking non-commissioned personnel qualified to train a Congolese river patrol force. Canada also has many commitments for its French-speaking officers and has shown no inclination to provide a senior Canadian officer with a small staff to coordinate the program.

Belgium has negotiated a military agreement with the Congo and has had the chief of its military mission, Colonel Logiest (formerly Belgian Ambassador to Rwanda) in Léopoldville since early July. The arrival of other officers has been delayed by Congolese procrastination in reviewing the names of the officers proposed and by inter-agency squabbles in Brussels regarding their salaries and other administrative questions. We understand from our Brussels Embassy that this log jam is broken and that the first officers are leaving for the Congo at once. As the first increment of Belgian officers will have to draw up detailed plans for the retraining program and will also have to assess the degree to which the return of Belgian officers is acceptable to the rank and file of the ANC, the delay in the arrival of these officers makes it unlikely that training can begin before October. The program will, therefore, barely be under way by the end of the year, the time at which the Secretary General has said he would like to withdraw the remaining UN forces.

Ambassador Gullion, who is returning to Washington on or about August 9, is deeply concerned that the premature withdrawal of the UN may result in renewed outbreaks of violence in the Congo and a deterioration of the situation there, which could return the Congo to the situation prevailing in 1960.

On the other hand, the Secretary General feels strongly that the UN force should be completely withdrawn by December 31. Our Mission in New York believes that it would be extremely difficult to obtain the necessary two-thirds support for an extension in the General Assembly and that in any financing formula adopted the United States would have to pay a larger share of the cost than the 37 percent which we are paying for the UN operations through the final six months of this year.

The UN withdrawal and the ANC retraining program are so closely related that we will shortly be faced with the difficult policy decision of whether to seek an extension of UNOC. At the same time we will of course press the other participating countries to expedite the ANC retraining schedule.

Grant G. Hilliker⁵

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. Confidential. The source text does not indicate a drafter. Filed with a covering memorandum from Brubeck (who had become a member of the NSC Staff) to Bundy, stating that he understood the President had asked General Clifton about the status of Congolese army retraining. The source text bears a handwritten note stating that it was taken from the President’s weekend reading dated August 9.
2. Secretary-General Thant’s statement to the Advisory Committee on the Congo on April 23 is printed in part in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. VI, pp. 309–311.
3. See Thant’s April 29 letter to Adoula, printed in U.N. doc. S/5240/Add.2, Annex VII, and in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. VI, pp. 311–312.
4. For texts of notes exchanged in Léopoldville on June 24 and July 19, see 15 UST 142.
5. Hilliker signed for McKesson.