Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

408. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, January 9, 1963, 7 p.m.

1756. Policy. Congo. Deptel 1054.²

1. Immediately upon receipt of reference telegram I called upon Bunche and had two hours with him, during which Gardiner was intermittently present. I went over all points in reference telegram privately with Bunche and also left with him aide-memoire based on reference telegram.

2. In summary, I report that:

A) UNOC does not intend to seek contact with Tshombe, at least until his role is confirmed by Central Government, nor had it as of noon received any instructions to do so.

B) It considers that any support Tshombe had is rapidly dissolving and that UNOC should do nothing to restore his prestige.

C) UNOC says it has nothing to discuss with Tshombe. It has already asked and notified Tshombe to provide UN freedom of movement in letters from the Secretary General. If Tshombe indicates his acceptance so much the better, but UN would proceed anyhow.

D) Bunche did, however, agree that it might be helpful if the “people who arranged for Tshombe return”, i.e. Belgians and British, got from Tshombe a letter addressed to Secretary General confirming freedom of movement; or a certified interpretation of Tshombe’s latest statement indicating categorically that he concurred in freedom of movement. UNOC does not, however, consider Tshombe’s word good and, even if it were, does not believe he has control over gendarmerie and mercenaries.

E) UNOC considers that negotiations between Tshombe and it on its initiative would be gross interference with prerogatives of Central Government. There may become possibility of getting ball rolling if Tshombe approaches GOC.

3. In addition to points in reference telegram, I developed following:

A) Situation with respect to public and Congressional opinion and its importance for US support of UN, and the indispensable character of that support.

B) UNOC ought not to be in position of victor who had his assailant down but refused to let him give up and kept on pummelling him.

C) Further variants of so-called third party formula.

4. Bunche replied in detail to points drawn from reference telegram. He said that he had just received telegram from U Thant instructing UNOC not to take initiative in talking to Tshombe.

5. Bunche denied he had received (as of about 1100 local) any instructions urging him to find a formula whereby UN would contact Tshombe after receiving assurances via a third party that he would cooperate with UN.

6. Re Tshombe’s arrival at Elisabethville “of his own accord,” Bunche remarked that Tshombe had also left of his own accord—his return was managed by our side powers, and UN did not oppose, despite all complications it would cause, because it had pledged itself not to interfere.

7. What the Department seemed to contemplate, according to Bunche, was a new negotiation with Tshombe. Tshombe could not be trusted, as any record showed. More recently on night of December 27 and 28, while Tshombe was trying to impress Prem Chand and Mathu with his efforts to halt gendarmerie fire, he had telephoned from adjacent room to Kolwezi asking mercenary planes to attack. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Moreover, Tshombe no longer had any power to deliver on his word even if it were good. Tshombe bound to play for time and UN could not fall into trap. If UNOC started talking with Tshombe about how and when its force could move freely, that whole force would be demoralized and dispersed.

8. Department’s suggested “agenda” was not subject to discussion, but negotiation on a series of points. UN could not commit GOC to any such negotiation. In fact, glaring omission, he said, from my presentation was any reference at all to role of Central Government except to indicate it might be brought in on a negotiation in which it had pledged itself not to engage. There was no suggestion of seeking Tshombe acceptance to freedom of movement which the Secretary General had repeatedly notified Tshombe would be exercised. If Tshombe stated he would not oppose—well and good—but Secretary General was not going to bargain for it nor share that authority.

9. Whether or not Tshombe controlled “detonator switches” was problematical. In any case, it was blackmail, which should not be rewarded.

10. Bunche found completely unrealistic assumption that Tshombe was “unchallenged leader of Katanga” and preposterous that his prestige would be built up by refusing to deal with him. Tshombe only sought negotiations to salvage something. Gendarmerie defecting in quantities; Katangese officials in Elisabethville were cooperating well with those from Léopoldville; Tshombe power was dissolving.

11. Bunche rejected idea that UN was standing on protocol. It was, in fact, placing principle before protocol. It should not anticipate decisions of Central Government nor take steps which would reverse progress.

12. Bunche denied vehemently that threatened resignation of Gardiner had anything to do with UN rejection of US’s course of action which he said he and U Thant had endlessly considered. He thought Department’s apparent view of situation now existing in Congo was unrealistic and out of touch with facts. He had, however, always made it a principle that if USG thought he was giving bad advice to the Secretary General, he would withdraw immediately.

13. The Secretary General had already had difficulty with delegations in NY over permitting Tshombe’s return at all. All UNOC officials, civil and military, as well as all of GOC had thought return a great mistake, but Bunche had insisted UN could not prevent his coming and that he be treated with correctness. He had, for example, insisted that he be allowed to occupy palace.

14. Already, however, admission of Tshombe had created great difficulties with Central Government and complicated its international relations. He and Gardiner had done their best throughout last night, he hoped successfully, to head off these complications (which I describe in my immediately following telegram).³

15. I said it was my duty to avert deterioration of relations between US and UN. Bunche said that also his goal. I asked what would happen if US decided not to supply equipment now being requested and en route. Bunche said this would be highly regrettable but UN would proceed anyway with mission which has now become of utmost importance for protection of life and property, although it would take somewhat longer.

16. During meeting with Bunche, he received text of Tshombe communique on basis of which I tried to find some formula for an entente. Bunche agreed that it would be helpful if the “people who brought Tshombe back” would get from Tshombe clearcut statement he would not oppose UN freedom of movement and would halt sabotage. I got impression that this might be letter to Secretary General, or some other certified interpretation by Tshombe of the statement he had made. Bunche thought that statement itself was ambiguous and inadequate. I also got impression, not categorically confirmed, that an approach by Tshombe to the Central Government might be a way to get the ball rolling. The British Ambassador has told me that Gardiner had said that this was move which was now up to Tshombe.

So far as Bunche is concerned he would still regard such statement at less than face value and of merely collateral value to course of action UN intends to pursue.

17. Bunche’s attitude was firm, calm and confident. Gardiner was more relaxed [than] in some weeks.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–963. Secret; Niact. Received at 8:25 a.m. on January 10 and repeated to Elisabethville, USUN, Brussels, London, Lagos, and New Delhi.
2. Document 405.
3. In telegram 1757 from Léopoldville, January 9, Gullion reported that when Adoula heard of Tshombe’s return to Elisabethville, he had protested vigorously to Gardiner and Bunche. They had told Gullion that they had persuaded Adoula not to denounce the operation publicly at least for 24 hours. Gullion had not been able to see Adoula and he thought the Congolese were becoming suspicious of the U.S. role. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–963)