391. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
2530. Congo. Bunche assured Stevenson today that entry of UN forces into Kipushi had not been approved in advance by UNNY. Moreover, UN does not plan move to Jadotville at this time.
Bunche showed Stevenson message sent Gardiner today, saying UNNY had understood Kipushi not to be entered and demanding explanation. Situation with regard to airstrike by UN aircraft was different. There has been no misunderstanding here between UNNY and UNOC. UN had been leisurely considering draft of letter to Tshombe demanding removal road-blocks and grounding of aircraft when events overtook them. Letter would have demanded end offensive air activity on terms to be agreed upon between Gardiner and Tshombe. However, UNOC had acted perfectly within its understanding with UNNY in attacking Katanga aircraft on morning December 29 long after ANC had started firing evening December 27 in Eville. On morning 29th first plane encountered by UN aircraft was Katanga Harvard in air. UN aircraft had attacked this plane and then continued on to attack Kolwezi.
In response Stevenson question what were next military steps, Bunche said phase one, in effect, over. U Thant would now try again to [Page 796] get reconciliation plan implemented, especially with regard to gendarmerie oath, integration of armed forces, UMHK payment talks in Leoville, and talks in Leoville on constitution, although latter might have to await reconvening Parliament. Amnesty was already in effect. If within reasonable time, say fortnight, no progress with Tshombe on talks and gendarmerie oath, UN would tell Tshombe it demanding freedom of movement to Jadotville and Kolwezi. Would tell him if he did not agree, UN would march on Jadotville and Kolwezi.
When Stevenson again asked especially whether UN going to Jadotville now, Bunche showed him short cable of Dec 30 addressed to Gardiner and General Kebede. Text this cable follows:
“Now that phase one completed, further military action in Katanga, other than required by immediate self-defense, will, as matter of course, be undertaken only after consultation with and clearance by UN headquarters.”
When Stevenson sought ascertain whether above message meant there would be no further air strikes by UN, Bunche said UN had destroyed six of forty planes known to be in Katanga before fighting began. There were apparently no more targets. Thought Katanga planes might have taken refuge in Angola and Rhodesia. However, UN would attack any Katanga aircraft which it saw on ground at Kolwezi.
While meeting in progress Bunche received press report that UN forces moving out from Kamina air-base. He knew nothing of this and said he would immediately query UNOC.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–3062. Confidential; Priority. Received at 6:30 p.m. and repeated to Léopoldville, Elisabethville, Brussels, and London.↩
- Telegram 2531 from USUN, December 30, reported on Stevenson’s efforts to persuade Bunche to include as much as possible of the text in telegram 1771 (see footnote 2, Document 390) in the statement that Thant planned to issue the next day. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–3062)↩