Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

390. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, December 29, 1962, 8:38 p.m.

1770. For Stevenson. We have two somewhat separable problems to solve in next discussion with SYG.

1. We need to be clear just how far UN Force presently intends to move, assuming Katanga resistance continues to be unimpressive. Our impression from your contacts in New York and fragmentary reports from Leo and Eville is that local commanders have discretion to take as much advantage of situation as they readily and safely can. Thus, although UNNY speaks of completing only Phase One of preexisting military plan, AmConsul Eville reports UN senior officer as predicting substantial move all the way to Jadotville.² Similarly, yesterday we had indication from field of air strike on Kolwezi while UNNY was still telling USUN that strike was only contingency plan in event of hostile action by Katangan air force.

We can understand a certain amount of confusion and contradiction, given the fast-moving situation on the ground. But SYG, who has direct and personal responsibility for whatever is actually done by UN Force, must have clear idea from hour to hour under what instructions his Force Commander is operating, and degree of discretion he has delegated to them. Our commitment to and participation in this enterprise is so large, and so crucial to its success or failure, that UNNY must regard it as high priority assignment to keep us fully and currently informed, and to “come clean” with USUN on the probable military developments. They should not worry, as Bunche may perhaps be worried, that we will balk at reasonable action designed to secure freedom of movement and protection for UN troops.

Beyond these general considerations, we now need, urgently and in detail, guidance from SYG on how the timing and nature of current military developments affect the logistical arrangements that are in train or have been contemplated.

You should ask SYG what UN’s military intentions are after enlarged Elisabethville perimeter has been secured. Without clearer picture of what sort of operation we are being asked to support, we are having difficulty in reaching decision on supply US fighter aircraft, although of course we are going ahead with preparations to airlift the APC’s, the trucks, the de-mining equipment and with the stationing in Leo of the transport and tanker aircraft. Here again, however, the degree of urgency of these deliveries can be affected by the new situation.

2. Reports from USUN indicate that U Thant’s instinct is not to make until Monday any statement on political content of current operation, and that meanwhile Gardiner will make a preliminary appeal for restarting action under the UN reconciliation plan.

It seems to us that the United Nations cannot be in the position of prosecuting for several days a military operation, for which much of world opinion is unprepared, without a rather explicit public statement of what the UN is trying to do and what its political objectives are. We have therefore drafted the kind of statement we believe it would be useful for U Thant to make, on Sunday if possible, stressing the reconciliation objectives while completing the military operation along present lines.

Text of draft statement contained in next following cable.³

We believe it essential that SYG make statement along these lines soonest. It would put UN action in perspective and within political framework acceptable to broad majority of UN. It is particularly important to US since it would provide us with the opportunity to relate our continuing support of UN to clearly defined political aim of peaceful reintegration of the Katanga into the Congo. SYG should understand that importance we attach to statement such that it would probably be necessary for us to make similar statement on our own in the event SYG should delay issuance. We would hope that SYG statement would also be circulated to SC members for their information.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–2962. Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by Cleveland and cleared in draft by Williams, Davis, McGhee, Stevenson, and Rusk. Kaysen sent the text to the President in Palm Beach in a telegram stating that Rusk and Stevenson had talked to Bunche and received assurances that U.N. military plans were limited and that Thant was willing to make a statement of political objectives. (Telegram CAP 5676–62, December 29; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo)
2. Reported in telegram 1020 from Elisabethville, December 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–2962)
3. Telegram 1771 to USUN, December 29. The draft statement declared that the U.N. purpose was not to destroy Tshombe or his provincial government but to give the Congolese people the opportunity to maintain the Congo’s territorial integrity and political independence. It appealed to Tshombe to initiate the UMHK payments plan, deport all foreign mercenaries, order a cease-fire, turn all Katangan planes over to the United Nations, and instruct the gendarmerie’s senior officers to take an oath of allegiance to Kasavubu. It also urged Adoula to take various steps in response. (Ibid.)