Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

376. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at Nassau¹

Washington, December 20, 1962, 8:02 p.m.

31. For President from Secretary.

1. On Tuesday, you decided that we should consult U Thant, Spaak, and Macmillan regarding our plans for next steps on the Congo. The returns are now in. Thant agrees with our assessment that time is running out, and he has asked for and wants military equipment, including planes, which we have already informed him, pursuant to your decision, that we are prepared to supply. Our military people discussed the details yesterday and we should within the next 24 hours have a clear picture regarding the specifics of military equipment which we can and should provide to the SYG in support of the UN Mandate and Reconciliation Plan.

2. However, it is clear that, with the Soviet Union in the wings and already having indicated to SYG its desire to make a military contribution to the UN operation, that Thant is unlikely to accept, for the time being at least, direct US military involvement in the form of a US air squadron and a small engineering unit. As indicated in USUN’s 2426,² Thant clearly is sensitive on this question of Big-Power involvement, and I believe that he will remain firm against direct US participation.

3. Spaak, who has been cooperative, is running into difficulty at home. His major concern is that nothing be done over the next few days at least to upset the UMHK payments plan. He has, therefore, asked us to defer any final decision regarding the US air squadron. He is continuing to press the UMHK in a forthright and constructive manner.

4. While we have not heard whether you have had opportunity to discuss this matter with Macmillan, we are fully aware of the reservations that the British have regarding the UN operation in Congo.

5. It is clear, also, from yesterday’s conversation that the SYG is cool, to say the least, to the idea of a US military mission to the Congo and he hopes that it will be limited in duration as well as in scope.

6. Moreover, the French and a number of our other allies are unclear as to the steps we are contemplating, and there is need for full consultations with them very soon. In talk with McGhee this afternoon, French Counsellor said GOF welcomed UMHK payments plan, deplored publicity given Truman Mission and felt emphasis on possible Soviet involvement would lead to very situation we are attempting avoid.

7. Finally, the press has played our decision to give additional support to the UN in a variety of ways, some of which have already stimulated the USSR to a counteroffer to the SYG and to open up a propaganda campaign tabbing the latest move as another “American Imperialist” attempt to take over the Congo. While it was probably inevitable that the press, so shortly after Cuba, would begin to draw unhelpful comparisons, I believe there is need to provide some guidance which will put our present decision in a balanced perspective.

8. In light of the above developments, I wish to proceed on the following steps subject to your approval.³

A. We should press ahead within the next 24 hours and come to an agreement with the SYG on the list of hardware and other military equipment which he has requested in support of the UN operation. I would include in this list not only the armored cars, trucks and other equipment which Thant has included, but also a certain number of American military aircraft with American ground crews on same basis as US internal airlift, which would be flown by a small number of non-American pilots. I believe this will help to build up the kind of psychological deterrent which we are after and which will be conducive to negotiations between Adoula and Tshombe which, hopefully, will bring about practical reintegration of the Katanga into the Congo by about February of next year.

B. We should also inform the SYG that we have agreed to defer any decision regarding participation of an American air squadron for the time being. We are also now in a position to suggest to SYG a suggested change in Rules of Engagement for UN aircraft which would neutralize Katanga air capabilities by permitting UN aircraft to eliminate Katanga air force in air or on ground after appropriate notification and if Katanga aircraft continue hostile action.

C. We should inform Spaak that we support him fully in his continuing efforts to get the UMHK to make payments directly to GOC and that we are prepared to press Adoula to negotiate reasonably on the question of division of foreign exchange and taxes. We should also inform Spaak that we have deferred any decision on the US air squadron. This should help him with his difficulties back home.

D. We should proceed expeditiously with Truman Mission to the Congo but it should be of a few days in duration and we should decide on what additional military help, if any, we should provide to the UN in light of Lt. Gen. Truman’s recommendations and SYG’s further views. As you know, SYG feels he can wind up this matter by February without direct US military participation and on the assumption that we will provide the equipment that he has already asked for. While we have believed that this is an optimistic assessment, we should for at least the next several weeks make every effort to get this equipment into the Congo.

E. We should instruct Gullion to see Adoula soonest to give him present appraisal of the situation and the reasons why we believe that time is running out and that we are trying to inject new elements in situation designed to bring quick progress on reintegration of the Katanga and significant bolstering of Adoula. We should not get into the question of an American air squadron or more direct US military involvement in the Congo with Adoula at this time. At the same time, we must not pull any punches with Adoula. While reaffirming strongly our confidence in this continuing leadership, he must realize that our willingness to make further major military contributions in support of the UN effort will depend on his willingness to show considerably more flexibility in reaching a peaceful agreement with Tshombe than he has demonstrated in the past months. In short, the US cannot justify any of the additional military help which we intend to make available to the UN and which is designed to bring about early practical reintegration unless we have a clear-cut commitment from Adoula on main elements of agreement with Tshombe. There are two principal elements of leverage we have with Adoula which we should use: (a) all unfulfilled promises of economic and other assistance for which we should get something in return; and (b) our willingness to provide additional military support of UN so that Katanga secession can be terminated soon.

F. We would assure Tshombe that we do not wish to destroy the Katanga but wish to bring his province back into the Congo under his own leadership. But we would expect him to take important specific steps which would: recognize Congo sovereignty, abandon those elements of control which permit him to maintain secession (e.g., military planes and mercenaries), agree to fair division of tax revenues and foreign exchange with the GOC, and to take meaningful steps of economic and military integration.

G. We should expand our consultations with our NATO allies and other friends to explain our positions. Consultations with a number of Africans in Washington have already been held and reflect full understanding and sympathy for our current approach.

H. We should make a major effort over the next 48 hours to straighten out the press. Our US support should be characterized primarily in terms of support for the UN and the UN Reconciliation Plan. We should avoid any impression that we believe there is an imminent Communist takeover in the Congo, but rather the emphasis should be that, as long as Katanga’s secession continues, conditions will exist in the Congo conducive to extremism and possible increase in Communist influence.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–2062. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Cleveland, Williams, Andrews, and McGhee; and approved by Rusk. An attached note from the Department of State duty officer to Brubeck states that Rusk had directed that the telegram should not be repeated to USUN for Stevenson and to Léopoldville for Gullion, as the telegram had indicated.
2. Document 374.
3. The President’s approval was apparently given by telephone. Telegram 934 to Léopoldville, December 21, also sent to USUN, Brussels, London, and Elisabethville, listed the steps that he had approved in language identical to paragraphs A–H, except for changes in a few pronouns and removal of the last two sentences in paragraph D. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–2162)