374. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State0
2426. Eyes only Secretary, Acting Secretary, McGhee and Ambassadors. Congo. Reference: USUN 2402.1 General Truman, accompanied by [Page 766] members his mission and by Yost, called on Secretary General this p.m. Also present were Bunche, Gardiner and Rikhye.2 After expressing pleasure at meeting Truman and his colleagues and gratitude for USG assistance, SYG gave Truman background on present UN military situation Congo with emphasis on shortage fighter aircraft. He explained why previous SC decision presented “difficulty in accepting outright US military aid”. Said he had been surprised to learn from Stevenson yesterday that high level team going to Congo. Was further surprised by statement to press in Nassau. Said he had been asked about all this last night by Under Secretary Kiseleve who, although on his staff, was undoubtedly put up to question by Soviets. SYG informed Kiseleve US sending mission to look into UN needs. Kiseleve also indicated that USSR would like to be of help. SYG told him this not necessary.
SYG said that as result he thought say “direct US military participation in Congo”, beyond furnishing equipment and transporting it, was out. He said he had been asked by other delegations whether US had political considerations in mind such as preventing release of Gizenga. He had replied in negative, saying that US was biggest financial contributor to UN operation in Congo and that he imagined President Kennedy wanted to report to next Congress that there would be no further requirement for US purchase of bonds. Further discussion showed SYG to be desirous that Truman hold up his trip, if not cancel it altogether. If Truman should go, SYG preferred he remain in Léopoldville where he could see General Kebede and where General Prem Chand3 could be brought from Elisabethville. Bunche interjected that he thought it would be awkward to have any country send a mission to look into the UN forces in Congo. Question from Bunche to Rikhye brought out point that there was no precedent for this in either UNEF or ONUC history. Only missions had been from countries wishing observe their own contingents.
Bunche said that realistically most useful place for Truman to go would be Elisabethville, “heart of operation that is projected”. It was from Elisabethville, he pointed out, that UN “must move to complete our task”. UN, he said, was not going to start fighting but was going to be “more aggressively defensive”. However, he feared that Truman arrival in Elisabethville might result in Tshombe-instigated riots which would require UN mobilize to protect both Truman and US consulate. [Page 767] Gardiner too thought Truman trip to Elisabethville might set off reaction, although he was not sure that it would.
U Thant then asked what had been President Kennedy’s original idea in deciding send mission. Yost replied that he thought reasons were three-fold. First, because of conflicting reports on military situation, President wanted first-hand military appraisal; secondly, President wanted on-spot appraisal of UN needs in order that we could help more effectively; thirdly, President undoubtedly had in mind psychological effect of visit on Congolese both in Léopoldville and Elisabethville. Truman said he did not believe President had specified where he should go in Congo. He had himself hoped to go to Elisabethville, even if only briefly, in order to get feeling of situation there. Yost suggested that actual movement of mission in Congo could be left to decision by Gardiner, Gullion and Truman after latter’s arrival.
Bunche posed problem of timing. Said UN had held off many times on “military moves” in view of other events which taking place. Truman trip could coincide with efforts get UMHK make direct payments to GOC. Yost thought this was not problem in this instance since Spaak had been consulted by McGhee and agreed personally to value of trip.
Bunche said UN should, in that case, be able to go ahead with some of its own steps in which it had fallen behind. It would make firm demand for freedom of movement. It could also move to Kipushi. Yost said he had thought UN wanted to wait for build-up before taking these steps. Bunche said on contrary, UN ready now. Build-up was for move to Jadotville and Kolwezi. Prem Chand had been ready for long time on freedom movement in Elisabethville area (removal roadblocks) and move to Kipushi. UN had held up in order permit economic measures to work. Yost said we had favored hold-up of these steps. Our hope was that build-up would reduce chances of fighting. Hoped build-up convince Tshombe of uselessness of resistance.
Bunche wondered whether steps to carry out US promised assistance would be deferred until mission completed. Yost said not at all, that we would be moving ahead with all items on which agreement reached. Mission might result, however, in suggestion of new things which could be done or substitution of one item for another.
Bunche stressed necessity for getting additional planes, preferably F–86s to Congo. Said if US would get planes, UN would find pilots. Iranian Ambassador had indicated it would be helpful to him if planes were available, since he might more easily obtain pilots. Also Pakistanis might send pilots if UN had planes. Main point was to get planes first, then it easier to convince others to send pilots.
Yost then asked when Gardiner was going back to Léopoldville. Said we anxious get Truman mission on way and it might precede Gardiner [Page 768] by day. SYG said Gardiner could leave Friday, December 21, arriving Saturday. Truman then suggested he himself leave tomorrow, arriving Friday. Yost said Truman could spend Friday talking to Gullion while waiting Gardiner arrival. Upshot was agreement that Truman and aides would return New York tomorrow morning, meet with Bunche, Gardiner and Rikhye at 10:30 a.m., leaving for Congo evening same day.
Comment: Yesterday’s publicity emphasizing that despatch US military mission to Congo is in part provoked by potential Soviet and local left-wing threat there has revived and confirmed SYG’s earlier uneasiness about further US military presence in Congo. Suggestion by Soviets they should be cut in on any military aid program open to US and opinion expressed by other delegations US is moving in to keep Gizenga out have contributed to his fear that neutral posture of UN operation might be destroyed. Result is that he has firmly backed away from position he took over weekend and today stated categorically to us that there could be no great power military participation in Congo operation. This certainly rules out in his mind despatch, say, US combat personnel, though its application to “technicians” is not clear.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1962. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 10:35 p.m. Repeated to Brussels, Léopoldville, and Nassau.↩
- Telegram 2402, December 18, reported Stevenson’s meeting with Thant to inform him of the decisions taken in Washington the previous day. During the meeting, Thant was given a press report on the statements made in Nassau concerning the military mission to the Congo. According to the telegram, “SYG was much concerned over mention of Sov peril in connection with despatch of mission. He said it was one thing to arrive at such a decision but quite another to put out a press release on it. He did not consider it very helpful.” (Ibid., 770G.00/12–1862)↩
- The conversation is recorded in a memorandum for the record by Truman, dated December 20, and summarized in a memorandum of that date from Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Frank K. Sloan to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric. (Both in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Congo 381)↩
- Major General Dewan Prem Chand, U.N. military governor in Katanga.↩