177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo1
1160. Following is partial report of Bermuda talks between Sec and Lord Home bearing on Congo based on uncleared memcon:2
“Lord Home stressed that UN had gotten itself in bad way in Congo. Thing was to get UN troops out, and to substitute advisory, training and administrative UN personnel, with Congolese police to keep order led and advised by white, French-speaking elements. He said that this should be emphasized at expense of present military functions of UN. He said UN could never have attempted carry out its present role without US support. It was due to US planes and transportation [Page 339] facilities that UN was carrying out its military operations. He asked how long USG intended continue playing role. Unless agreement between Tshombe and Adoula was reached and observed, fighting would be renewed and UN forces would then have to be strengthened even more. The situation was very disquieting. For example, the Ethiopian troops had been running amok and shooting people. What was needed was kind of “pro consul” such as the British had established in last 5 years in Nigeria. Such official was responsible for establishing effective chain of command and seeing to it law and order were preserved. Ormsby Gore also spoke along foregoing lines and asked how long the US thought UN should stay on after danger of secession by Katanga had subsided. He thought it not possible for UN troops to stay on permanently to maintain law and order.
The Secretary pointed out that large proportion of reported violent incidents had been manufactured on paper by interested parties, and that actual number of people killed was of order of 18 or 20. He asked Lord Home who could be expected to have influence on Tshombe. Lord Home said he thought no one. Tshombe had wealth behind him and resources on which rest of Congo depended. He thought Tshombe would not agree to terms he didn’t like. He felt UN would not be able to settle things and US would be on spot and would have to face prospect of increasingly supplying UN troops indefinitely.”
Following are highlights Congo discussions President’s meeting with Macmillan Bermuda December 21–22, as communicated other posts via cirtel. “UK reiterated concern at possible prolongation UN military involvement which they believed should be replaced soonest by purely civil affairs training role. We reiterated view Katanga must remain part of Congo, that there must be agreement between Tshombe and Adoula and that fundamental Congo unity must be preserved in framework permitting suitable local powers. We believe role of UN is to keep open path to conciliation and not to impose a political solution.”3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–2861. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Officer in Charge of U.N. Congo Affairs Charles S. Whitehouse; cleared by Tyler, Vance, and Cutler; and approved by Fredericks.↩
- Drafted by Tyler. The discussion was held during a luncheon given by Lord Home on December 21 at 1:45 p.m. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2021)↩
- No other record of discussion of the Congo at Bermuda has been found. Telegram 3375 to London, December 21, stated, “British have agreed at Bermuda to continue exercising pressure on Tshombe to implement Kitona agreement and to continue UK representations to Welensky in same sense.” (Ibid., Central Files, 770G.00/12–2161) Notes by General Taylor’s assistant Colonel Lawrence Legere of a White House staff meeting on December 26 record a summary of the Bermuda talks by Bundy, which describes the Congo discussions as follows: “Bundy described the Congo discussion as having indicated ‘submerged disagreement.’ The British said they were skeptical of the Kitona agreement, and seemed to feel that the UN was a damned nuisance. The President countered by saying that we (presumably the US) could only keep the heat on Adoula if the others (presumably the dirty imperialist powers) kept the heat on Tshombe.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 24, Daily Staff Meeting)↩