Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, February 22, 1961, 4:40 p.m.

1886. Paris pass USRO. Ambassador should inform Kasavubu and Ileo at earliest opportunity that while SC resolution sponsored by UAR, Ceylon and Liberia just passed was not entirely satisfactory from our point view, we convinced UN mandate needed strengthening if UN to be of any use in Congo, threat to world peace avoided, and UN itself preserved as a useful instrument for settlement international disputes. As background should explain necessity obtaining reasonably broad African support if any constructive resolution not to be vetoed by Soviets. We believe resolution can be interpreted usefully from our viewpoint in terms future UNOC activities on basis statements made by US and other representatives in SC. We feel GOC can live with this resolution. You may inform them confidentially, we had certain reservations about resolution since it had no explicit reference to authority SYG, to consultation with GOC and to prohibition outside material in addition personnel assistance (which would have constituted sanction against UAR assistance Gizenga). To get desired strengthening of UN mandate in sufficient time however we needed SC resolution and any explicit reference to consultation with GOC would probably have been unacceptable UAR and Ceylon, particularly since news Bakwanga executions arrived New York at most inopportune time.² Further any explicit reference authority SYG might have induced Soviet veto. Re material aid, Stevenson made clear in speech explaining US vote that material aid was to be excluded, that the UN was in Congo to assist GOC maintain sovereignty independence Congo, that although use force authorized as last resort, solution was to be negotiated, not imposed, and that the authority of SYG carry out resolution was to be recognized. No member objected any these caveats. Also should note operative section resolution explicity reaffirms previous SC and GA resolutions, all which remain valid, affirming UNOC role based on cooperation with GOC; thus principle GOC sovereignty in effect re-affirmed.

You should assure Kasavubu and Ileo USG continues recognize them as legal central government and all others as dissidents, will do all possible prevent build-up Gizenga and will work for practical recognition by UNOC of GOC sovereignty in conduct future operations Congo. It important however that GOC not relax efforts achieve political reconciliation all Congolese leaders and parties.

Should emphasize however that reprehensible acts like Bakwanga executions make it extremely difficult for friends GOC render support. Our understanding is prisoners were sent South Kasai during Mobutu regime, not Ileo, however present GOC should be advised in strongest terms not turn over any prisoners to splinter governments. We realize, of course, execution Songolo³ and other anti-Lumumbistes equally reprehensible and Songolo was mentioned in earlier Stevenson speech.⁴ You should suggest to Kasavubu and Ileo it would be helpful if they write privately SYG express willingness consult with him on implementation new SC res. This would assist establishing point with SYG that they consider UN must consult GOC in new program, and would assist us in effecting removal Dayal.

Other addressees may draw on above presentation at discretion in talks with local officials.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/2–2261. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Woodruff; cleared by Sisco and in draft by Ferguson, United Nations Adviser for African Affairs Donald Dumont, and Jerome Lavallee of the Bureau of African Affairs; and approved by Penfield. Repeated to Paris, Elisabethville, Brussels, USUN, Brazzaville, Yaounde, Abidjan, Tananarive, and Dar es Salaam for Williams, who was visiting several African countries.
2. A February 23 memorandum for the files by Wallner states that Lebel asked him on February 21 why the United States had supported the resolution after Rusk had assured Alphand on February 20 of U.S. opposition unless the resolution was amended. Wallner told him that the report of the Kasai executions had radically changed the atmosphere in the Security Council and that Stevenson had therefore requested and obtained authorization to proceed differently. (Ibid., 332.70G/2–2361)
3. The execution of Alphonse Songolo, a member of the Congolese Parliament, and 14 other prisoners in Stanleyville was reported on February 22.
4. In the Security Council on February 15; for extracts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 766–771.