35. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
2264. Re: Congo. SC vote yesterday giving UN more authority has bought us time in Congo. Am sure Dept realizes better than I how close we have been, and may still be, to collapse UN’s position there. If reminder is needed, it has been supplied by cable sent by President Abboud of Sudan to Hammarskjöld distributed yesterday as UN document S/4731 (pouched Dept) warning that Sudan cannot continue indefinitely in current circumstances cooperate with UN.
Sudan and Nigeria together hold some of main keys to UN—and our own—success in Congo. Both have been seriously shaken by recent events. We are indebted to President Abboud and Prime Minister Balewa for firm and steadfast way they have stood by UN in face of tremendous pressures to contrary. But we cannot count on them forever.
If SYG moves promptly, energetically and intelligently to implement SC’s latest resolution much can be done restore UN’s standing in Congo and thereby justify support our African friends have given it.
We must, however, anticipate trouble from Dayal while he remains in Congo, and, unless we take position of leadership, from other sources as well.
I fear greatest threat to successful outcome in Congo comes from our friends.
Kasavubu, who owes what international standing he has to U.S. success in getting his delegation seated in GA, has gotten himself into position where his usefulness as source of stability and legality has been greatly weakened—at least for time being. We cannot afford for the present to be put in position of defending him internationally when his ultimate responsibility for recent executions is only too apparent. But neither can we afford continued deterioration Kasavubu’s position, since he retains legal position as Chief of State essential to reconstruction in Congo along lines we favor. I believe we must find ways to increase degree of influence we exercise over Kasavubu and that we must give this highest priority. Unless he brings indiscriminate killings to end and cooperates more closely with UN I am afraid his position—and ours—will crumble.
Tshombe is most serious problem in current circumstances. If as seems likely we cannot gain any control over him either directly or through Belgians, we must be prepared to oppose him firmly, and to [Page 77] uphold with equal firmness efforts SYG may have to make to bring Katanga into cooperation with UN.
At root of Kasavubu and Tshombe problems are Belgian and French organizations and individuals responsive in varying degrees to Belgian and French Govts.
I have no illusions that it will be easy get to roots of obvious Belgian and French ambivalence toward U.S. and UN role in Congo. I know it involves great complex of emotional, political, and economic problems. But if we cannot come to terms with problem and specifically convince Belgian Govt it must take action in accord with UN res we will face another crisis shortly and further loss of confidence in SYG with consequences probably fatal to UN operation in Congo. Energetic action on our part to back UN in carrying out new mandate, especially through our diplomatic support in capitals and in Congo, seems from here to be essential to prevent further deterioration, and to movement toward constructive solution.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/2–2261. Confidential.↩