Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

348. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, December 6, 1962, 7 p.m.

1321. Re Embtels 1313² and 1314³. Following conferences with Belgians, I called on Adoula late last night after he had met with Gardiner. I showed him texts described reftels⁴ and gave him copy of paper on instituting Greene plan which Mobutu had approved.⁵

Adoula glanced hurriedly at text of proposed communique about his visit to New York. Said it was preposterous. He then launched into long emotional description his position partly I think intended for benefit his wife who had just returned from hospital and resting on couch beside him.

He said he had never been so discouraged as at present. He had been idiotically patient sticking with UN and U Thant plan. He had not been consulted on plan but had given his consent on understanding that it would be carried out promptly and in good faith by UN and sponsor nations, but circumstances intervened and it now too late for him and Congo. Idea that he should now go to New York with his government in ruins and security of country at stake, was out of question. Moreover he could see nothing in propositions made to him by Belgians and me which required his presence in New York.

He complained about ineptitude and hypocrisy of UN; said it had not been able to deliver on anything and now could not even keep his people from being arrested.

(Allegedly Tshombe had arrested some of the customs and immigration officials whom he had had standing by in Elisabethville.)

Tshombe was bombarding his troops and villages daily and US and UN seemed powerless. Meanwhile Cuban pilots appeared under wraps and US was delaying delivery of rockets.

Adoula went on to say that US must bear heavy responsibility for state of affairs since US dominant in UN. UN had been brought into Congo at US suggestion and US controlled tempo of its actions; now he was having to pay for all the delays which had been imposed upon him. He found it nearly impossible to defend himself before Parliament on this ground.

When I suggested that he might consider Parliamentary vacation this touched off new explosion. He declared that US visitor after US visitor had pressed set quorum on Parliament so it could consider constitution and amnesty and had urged virtues of Parliamentary system. Results bid fair to hand victory to Tshombe or to communists. He found himself powerless to prevent release of Gizenga because if he did not let him go under some conditions Parliament would let him go under no conditions. He found it misplaced that I should now speak to him about adjourning Parliament.

Adoula then with tears in his eyes began to talk of reports and rumors of Soviet offer of aid and aircraft. He said he would always resist the offers but they would be made whether he was in power or not. If they were made to him he could only let them be passed to Parliament and he would resign. He feared visit at any time from Soviet Ambassador. He was confident that both Parliament and the army would accept Soviet offer. All of this he claimed was result of US and UN hesitancy and timidity on UN plan. He feared that latest offer on UMHK payments was only another delay especially since it seemed to be a pretext to lure him to New York to start new negotiation.

He had told Secretary General he was going to resign by January 1, 1963. He did not believe he could last out next 10 days. Comment: Adoula outburst represented an abrupt change in mood of 24 hours previously but as Department is aware his nervous strength has been rapidly draining as time passed and Thant plan not applied. I believe return of Bomboko and Bomboko first contacts with political crisis here have been a main factor in working Adoula to this pitch. Reported arrest of GOC officials was also major irritant. I told Adoula that it was ridiculous as well as tragic not to go the last mile with the UN which was now obliged to succeed. I cited to him all of strong indications of US preparedness “to see the plan through” which had manifest in last two weeks. I said I would expect him to let me know of any offers from Soviet bloc, which might lead his country to disaster. However state he was in, I doubt if he even understood or heard me.

Following this talk I met with Gardiner, Davignon and Kerchove at latter’s residence. I told them that in my opinion we should be thinking not about getting Adoula to New York but about real danger of dramatic reentry of Soviet Union in picture. This is I believe Kerchove view. Davignon and Kerchove thought of possibility of getting Bomboko to New York but I believe even this dubious.

It may still be possible however to send a very high-level mission to Adoula. He did interrupt his jeremiad slightly to heed the suggestion that perhaps Spaak or U Thant might come here. Gardiner says latter unlikely.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–662. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to USUN, Brussels, London, Paris, and Elisabethville.
2. Telegram 1313, December 6, reported that the Embassy believed the Soviet Embassy might be about to make a concrete offer of military aircraft and other supplies to the Congolese Government. Adoula had told Gullion the previous evening that there were “reports” and “rumors” that the Soviets would make such an offer and that if they did, he could not refuse it but would inform Parliament and resign. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1314, December 6, recommended immediate provision of rockets, military technicians, and at least one fighter plane to the Congo, stating that the possible Soviet provision of aircraft seemed to warrant consideration of “drastic measures.” (Ibid.)
4. The reference telegrams did not transmit any texts. Gullion was apparently referring to telegrams 1310 and 1312, both dated December 5. Telegram 1310 transmitted the text of a Belgian draft of a possible Congolese request to the United Nations for U.N. provision of three fighter bombers. Gullion had agreed to discuss it with Adoula; he thought it was significant that the Belgians favored such a move. (Ibid., 332.70G/12–562) Telegram 1312 transmitted the text of a Belgian draft of a communique that would be issued by the Congolese Government announcing that Adoula would go to New York. (Ibid., 033.70G11/12–562)
5. Telegram 1303 from Léopoldville, December 5, reported that Mobuto had accepted a revised draft of a Congolese statement requesting the United Nations to implement the Greene plan. (Ibid., 770G.5/12–562)