Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

347. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, December 4, 1962, 5 p.m.

1298. London for Williams. SYG invitation to Adoula.²

1. Saw Prime Minister last night at 10:00 p.m. at his invitation. Belgians preferred I go ahead since they awaiting Brussels reaction to suggested change in text Spaak letter to Adoula.

2. At end of two hours’ conversation in which I pushed all points in reference telegrams³ Adoula affirmed that “there was possibility” he would go to New York if: (A) Secretary General convoked meeting and stated clearly its purpose. Adoula might ask for meeting to check lack of progress on plan but was up to Secretary General to convene other powers. (B) Adoula would wish to know exactly who would be at meeting i.e., what powers and what reps of what powers. He is interested in composition of US Delegation and he would want Robiliart present with Belgians. Also this is means of insuring Tshombe or Tshombe rep not included. (C) Before going he would need most detailed indication of what would be done at the meeting. In other words, he sees himself going to New York not to begin new negotiations but to register decisions. At least he would want full agenda. (He has, of course not been given copy of agreed US Belgian paper.) He has been given copy of letter from Spaak of which we have been promised copy and which is said to trace a program.

3. Adoula said he would discuss with Bomboko and take further advice and probably have an answer Wednesday⁴ evening.

4. Adoula continues suspicious of program and most frequently voices query as to why it would be necessary to go to New York to make arrangements for UMHK payment scheme. My reply was he would be going to New York not merely for UMHK payments scheme, but to consider full plan. Adoula also responsive to argument Spaak seems to require the meeting in New York for political reasons and to pressure UMHK.

5. Adoula still fears UMHK will not actually follow through on proposal and also suspects that payment scheme may be used defer application of other measures of pressure or fulfillment of measures of plan. If this should turn out to be the case after he had gone to New York, he thinks his tour in office would collapse in absurdity. He even said he does not think USG should try to give him assurance on the subject because USG might also be made dupe.

6. Adoula continues to be impressed, however with the amounts of foreign exchange which might accrue to him. I did not discuss the distribution in terms of percentages.

While Adoula did not state categorically that internal political crisis would prevent his going, he conditioned everything on it and said he would have to be judge of this factor. It was still too early for him to say. He seemed to think that a week or ten days would be necessary before he could go if he went. I urged need for haste and did not press date because I thought more important get decision on principle.

7. Belgian Ambassador De Kerchove and Davignon saw Adoula this morning and went over same ground with similar results. Bomboko was present. Adoula principal refrain was why go to New York? And, why was it necessary for Prime Minister to go? Belgians explained that only he capable of sorting out the problem. (Adoula probably deferring to Bomboko in suggesting Prime Minister presence not necessary.)

8. Belgians say Bomboko began by counseling against the visit but became increasingly positive toward it. One possible explanation they say, is fact he worried by his talks in London with Kaunda⁵ and indication that the latter because he needs Nkumbula⁶ support is dickering with Tshombe.

9. Belgians believe they convinced Adoula of intrinsic worth of plan, of their bona fides in offering it and of wisdom of Spaak’s tactics.

10. Belgians did not raise with Adoula subject of amnesty and constitution. Davignon indicated that he believed idea of amnesty should now be dropped in view tense political situation and with respect to constitution, he thought formula in Belgian/American paper was about as far as one could go. It was necessary however for Spaak to say he had carried latter issue to SYG and Adoula in top brass meeting. (Since his visit here both Davignon and Belgian Ambassador have become more impressed with dangers present in local political situation. This has not abated since Adoula narrowly beat vote of no confidence.) In essence danger is that extreme left is close to taking over with Tshombe assist.

11. Belgians say they amended letter from Spaak in sense of paragraph 2.A above. As I understand it SYG would see Adoula first and then other powers would be convened. Davignon also suggested to Adoula meeting might be held in Geneva if New York locale should be embarrassing to him politically.

Belgians and I will make no further representations on plan today unless we are called by Adoula or Bomboko.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.70G11/12–462. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USUN, Brussels, Elisabethville, and London.
2. Telegram 1291 from Léopoldville, December 3, reported that Gardiner had presented Thant’s invitation to Adoula that afternoon and that Adoula’s reaction was negative but not irrevocably so. (Ibid., 033.70G11/12–362)
3. No telegrams are cited. Telegram 797 to Léopoldville, December 1, suggested points that Gullion should emphasize in following up Gardiner’s approach to Adoula. (Ibid., 770G.00/12–162)
4. December 5.
5. Kenneth Kaunda, head of the United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia.
6. Harry Nkumbula, head of the African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia. He and Kaunda had announced plans to form a coalition government.