339. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
1954. Eyes only Secretary and McGhee. Eyes only Ambassadors. Re: Congo. Fol is our impression of current situation at UN concerning Congo.
Casablanca powers have for some time believed that UN presence in Congo, rather than serving to bring about unification, has in fact been serving to protect Tshombe, by UN refusing under pressure Western powers to take effective action itself and by denying to GOC means for doing so. As recent demarches from UAM, Nigeria and others indicate, this belief is now more and more widely shared among other Africans who are demanding insistently either that UN, with essential and promised cooperation of Western powers, exercise economic pressure necessary to bring Tshombe to terms, or that UN withdraw and GOC with African assistance take on job of reunification. SYG, under African pressure but also deeply disillusioned by lukewarm support of reconciliation plan by Western powers, likewise harassed by ever-impending UN bankruptcy and withdrawal Indian and other forces, is tending in same direction.2
There remain probably no more than 2 or 3 weeks to convince him and Africans that Belgium and U.S. really mean business, that Tshombe can be brought to heel and Congo reunited by peaceful economic pressures. If genuine Belgian fear of Tshombe’s retaliation and genuine U.S. and UK fear of hostilities prevent effective economic pressures from being decided and applied within this time, SYG will himself attempt to apply more risky measures and, if these are blocked by West, will report to SC failure of Congo operation. If latter should be unable to act, as seems probable, UN would probably have no recourse but to withdraw from Congo and leave solution to Africans, with U.S. and Sovs each backing its own horse.
[Page 686]It would not seem that this alternative would serve to avoid chaos in Katanga, to preserve Belgian position throughout Congo or to protect Rhodesia from dangerous infection. Far lesser risk would seem to be to push through UMHK payment of taxes and foreign exchange to GOC or stronger economic measures if necessary, to make absolutely and unanimously clear to Tshombe that these measures will be backed by superior force if he tries to resist them, and to apply this action before mid-December.
It is to be hoped Spaak and Home can be convinced of relative moderation of this course. It would appear that Spaak is already so convinced but he must follow through. Tshombe may or may not resist but if he does there is far better chance that he can be curbed by full power of united UN, than that Congo can be spared from civil war and destruction of all Western interests if UN fails and withdraws. There is no longer any easy innocuous middle course. This is probably last chance for UN solution and we believe choice must be firmly faced and firmly supported.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2662. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:58 p.m. and repeated to London, Brussels, and Léopoldville.↩
- Telegrams 1945 and 1952 from USUN, November 25 and 26, reported comments by Gardiner along these lines. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–2562 and 611.70G/11–2662, respectively)↩