338. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
1955. Eyes only Secretary and McGhee. Eyes only Ambassadors. Congo. Spaak, accompanied by Rothschild, Loridan and Davignon, called on Stevenson immediately after seeing U Thant this morning. Also present were Yost and MacArthur.
Spaak said he had been surprised to discover that SYG had not rejected “McGhee plan” as he had understood. Situation was quite different. [Page 683] UN refused to have Gardiner approach Adoula first and would not accept playing any part in plan. However, SYG perfectly agreeable give US and Belgium two weeks to try to execute plan. Would take no action meanwhile.
Spaak said most important aspect of plan was political, not financial. If Tshombe should agree that foreign exchange and revenues from taxes be paid directly to GOC, that would be most important. If Adoula objects to IMF determining how much should be returned to UMHK and Katanga, Spaak would not object to having Monetary Council make determination. If Adoula agreed to do something about Constitution and amnesty, Belgium could go ahead with plan. Belgium could tell UMHK that it must make payments to GOC. Agreement must also be reached with UN as to what it can do protect UMHK. (SYG subsequently told Stevenson and Yost that Spaak had not raised question of UN protection UMHK and Belgian citizens with him this A.M.) There would still be danger that if Tshombe said no and UN took action against him, Tshombe might react by nationalizing UMHK and “mobilizing” Belgians. However, Spaak believed that there was chance that if US and GOB could go together to Eville with concessions from Adoula on amnesty and Constitution it might be possible convince Tshombe to go along.
MacArthur pointed out that if too much dependence placed on constitutional aspect of problem too much time might elapse. Tshombe might be able to hide behind Constitution. There might be better way than trying to bring provincial presidents together again. Yost agreed and suggested that if it were possible to get Adoula to give assurances to Tshombe, latter might accept these. This would avoid prolonged negotiations over Constitution for which there no longer sufficient time. As for amnesty, it appeared that Kasavubu and Adoula were seriously considering proclaiming one shortly.
Spaak said important question was this: Are US, Belgium and UMHK ready to present plan to Adoula without official blessing or backing of UN but with its agreement that we go ahead and that UN would withhold action for two weeks? Spaak said it had been his impression that McGhee had insisted on having UN support. Stevenson and Yost said they thought not. It had only been important that UN not object to our attempting plan.
Spaak said that it was important to find members of US, Belgian and UMHK team who were acceptable both in Leoville and Eville. While McGhee was best US representative to deal with Tshombe, he was not in case Adoula. Yost pointed out reverse true of Gullion. Stevenson wondered whether team could have single GOB and UMHK members but different US representatives for negotiations in Leoville and Eville. He suggested that either Williams or Cleveland might be satisfactory. [Page 684] He wondered whether it essential US have same man approach Adoula and Tshombe. Spaak felt that it was; that US representative should speak with same voice to each man. Rothschild said that if he were Belgian member of team he would like to have same man go with him to see both Adoula and Tshombe. It was necessary that American member know from own knowledge exactly what was said in both Leoville and Eville.
Spaak said that if Adoula should agree to plan, then Tshombe must be made to see that GOB was really serious and that US would be “angry” if Tshombe held back. Tshombe should also know that UN would be likely to impose sanctions.
Yost pointed out that U Thant was in a difficult position. Spaak replied that if he had not realized this he would not now be involved in internal Congo affairs. Spaak said that he was seeing Bomboko this evening and was inclined to test latter’s reaction to plan. One reason he wished do this was that Adoula had always refused any Belgian suggestion that GOB talk to Tshombe. Spaak suggested that team might tell Tshombe that payment system could be given “one month trial.” If it did not work, UMHK could stop making payments to GOC.
Spaak said that he had to justify his position with Belgian Government and people by explaining if plan not undertaken UN might take action leading to hostilities. It was important however that there be economic guarantees for UMHK in case it should suffer damages because of its cooperation in plan. He indicated that US might be expected help in this respect and that he would take up this aspect of question in Washington.
Stevenson suggested that UK should be invited to support sponsors of plan but not be allowed to veto it. Main immediate problem as he saw it was to find new American member of team. MacArthur said he seeing Secretary this afternoon and would advise him of problem.
Spaak said he would return to New York Wednesday2 morning after seeing President previous afternoon. He thought US and Belgium should then go together to see U Thant, tell him what we propose to do and ask him to withhold action for two weeks. Spaak said he was anxious to confront Tshombe with Robiliart in order convince Tshombe that plan was economically feasible. They would tell Tshombe that if he did not accept, Belgium would support UN and sanctions to limit. Main difference of opinion he had with UN was that it seemed think sanctions would bring Tshombe to his knees within week. Katanga leaders might very well take to bush and create situation requiring UN presence much longer than now imagined.
[Page 685]Meeting adjourned with tentative agreement that, if indicated by Washington conversations, joint US-Belgian approach would be made to U Thant on Wednesday, November 28.