Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

323. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 5, 1962, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary, Mr. Ball,
• Mr. McGhee, Mr. Williams,
• Mr. Cleveland, Mr. Burdett, Mr. Godley,
• Mr. Fredericks, Mr. Ford, Mr. Beaudry,
• Mr. Rutter, Mr. Hughes²

SUBJECT

• Congo

Mr. McGhee reviewed quickly his October 31 talk with Bomboko (Deptel 669 to Leo).³ He then went on to say that he proposed as the first next step a presidential letter to Adoula and another from him to Tshombe again urging implementation of the Plan but containing no threat of sanctions. We should thus make another attempt to bring about the Plan by voluntary action; if unsuccessful, we should impose a solution. After reviewing the letters⁴ the Secretary said that he did not understand how we could proceed to ratify the constitution in the GOC Parliament until there had been agreement between the parties. He did not think the presence of Katangan deputies in the Parliament, as Mr. McGhee suggested, would serve this purpose. Mr. Ball and Mr. Burdett pointed out Belgian objections to the draft constitution. Accordingly, Mr. McGhee undertook to change the wording in the letter.⁵

Mr. McGhee went on to say that Tshombe would not lose by making 50% payments of his foreign exchange to the Monetary Fund because the account can be balanced in terms of Katangan requirements over a period of months. Mr. Ball interjected that it was unrealistic to ask Tshombe to give up 35% as the letter indicated, but Mr. Fredericks pointed out the importance of establishing the principle of payments to the Monetary Fund.

Re the paper on the Congo Contingency Plan, which Mr. McGhee distributed at the meeting,⁶ Mr. Ball suggested we should mobilize the Africans to urge Tshombe to move. Mr. McGhee agreed we might try this tactic, but emphasized his belief that if the Plan failed there was no difference who caused the failure; we would have no alternative except sanctions against Tshombe. The Secretary said that it makes some difference to us if we are called upon to take such measures. Why not throw more responsibility on the Monrovia powers? Mr. McGhee replied perhaps, but they are not at the “cutting edge” of the issue as are the Belgians. Mr. Burdett commented that the Belgians would not agree to sanctions unless it were shown that Tshombe was clearly at fault.

The Secretary asked, “What’s at the end of the trail?” Mr. Ball and Mr. Cleveland said—“fighting”.

Following Governor Williams’ justification for Adoula’s stance, the Secretary asked if he has done “anything”. Mr. McGhee stated that discussion of the relative blame of the parties was unprofitable. On the other hand, said the Secretary, the Plan is a reconciliation plan, and Mr. Cleveland added “and they are not reconciling”. The Secretary pointed out that the two principals have not been brought into the Plan. Governor Williams interjected that it was not Adoula’s fault if the UN produced an inoperable plan.

Mr. Cleveland stated that he had much difficulty with the contingency plan which would involve action only against Tshombe. Are we really prepared to impose settlement by a third party in the form of the UN? In his opinion, this was possible physically, but not politically. Mr. McGhee pointed out that the contingency plan does not call for the use of force.

Mr. Ball commented that the “marriage contract” (Reconciliation Plan) was “not very sensible”. The draft constitution was not “more propitious” than the Loi Fondamentale. Mr. Fredericks interjected that it was the UN experts who believed a detailed constitution was necessary. Mr. Bell said it was clear to him that the constitution had been drawn up by civil lawyers. At any rate, said Mr. Cleveland, the constitution was not a viable formula; it was not the kind of document, containing provisions for reserved powers, which Adoula had endorsed some time ago.

Mr. Cleveland expressed the view that there had been retrogression recently on both the constitutional and political aspects of the Reconciliation Plan. Adoula manifestly lacks confidence. By saying that only he will do as Prime Minister, isn’t there a possibility that we are tying ourselves to a regime which will in time become Communist because of radical pressures? Mr. Godley stated that Adoula has never been given an opportunity to change the constitution. There was no reply to the Secretary’s question whether anyone thought we can ask Tshombe to accept the present draft constitution.

Governor Williams advocated two U.S. courses:

(1) Don’t keep on trying to arrange a happy marriage, but get on with a tolerable reintegration.

(2) Tshombe will come around when he is sure the U.S. means business (i.e. that we are ready to use force).

Mr. Cleveland concurred but pointed out this had been the situation for over a year. To create a credible deterrent, we would have to start with a large build-up of UNOC. The Secretary asked Governor Williams what he would do if we decided against the use of force in the Congo in favor of a substantial reduction in UN expenditures there. Governor Williams replied, “I would return to Michigan”.

The Secretary asked why we should not let the “locals” settle the dispute as we had done in the cases of Algeria and West Irian. The Monrovia powers, perhaps together with Ethiopia and the Sudan could do this. Mr. Godley pointed out that these countries were not in a position to use force because they had no air lift; furthermore they had no influence with Tshombe because they all despised him. Governor Williams added that in reality we are serving long-time Belgian interests by trying for a solution because this would preserve their investments. Mr. Ball raised the possibility of sealing off the Congo from Soviet air support. Then a solution would be reached which he admitted might be on the basis of a de facto partition. Our efforts to impose a solution can only result in chronic instability.

The Secretary asked why there had been no effective training of the ANC. Governor Williams and Mr. McGhee replied that the UN does not recognize this as its mission.

The Secretary concluded that the immediate steps proposed (the letters and further efforts to proceed with the Plan) were approved, but he emphasized that he wished nothing done which appeared to mean that we were clearing the decks for armed action.

Governor Williams said that he interpreted the President’s view as meaning that we should disengage in Africa unless we can follow through. It was important to get Struelens out of New York. Mr. Godley felt that the best solution was to face Tshombe with the threat of force. The Secretary stated that at the moment he does not see an issue on which he would feel justified in taking measures which would risk the life of an American.

Mr. Cleveland said that Adoula was operating on the assumption that we would pull his chestnuts out of the fire. Williams and Mr. Fredericks disagreed; they thought Adoula had performed decently—it was the UN which was in “arrears”. The Secretary argued that Adoula would be nowhere without US assistance. Mr. Fredericks expounded on Adoula’s enormous progress since he assumed office.

The Secretary approved the letters to Adoula and Tshombe. He also requested that the Belgians be brought into this problem and that Tshombe should be brought into the constitutional discussions. On the latter point he did not think Gullion can deal with Tshombe without undermining his position with Adoula. Perhaps Dean Griswold of Harvard⁷ might be a good constitutional mediator. Mr. Godley suggested Stavropoulos, the Secretary-General’s legal adviser. Mr. Ball said we needed an Ellsworth Bunker for this situation. Mr. Godley explained the stubborness of the Congolese leaders which made them unamenable to normal negotiating procedures. The Secretary took the position that if they were going to be obstinate, “We are not with them”.

Mr. Fredericks wished to point out the weakness of the UN staff in Elisabethville, especially Mathu for whom a replacement was needed. The Secretary stated that the contingency paper was satisfactory as a basis for discussion at the White House on November 7. There should be further exploration of enlisting the aid of the Monrovia powers in the Congo and negotiations on the constitution should be pressed. Mr. McGhee asked Mr. Cleveland’s assistance in recruiting constitutional advisers to assist Gardiner. Mr. Ball desired an approach to Professor Clements on the constitutional issue. Governor Williams demurred on the grounds that Clements was a “totally unreasonable man”.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–562. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of U.N. Political Affairs Peter Rutter. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
2. Thomas L. Hughes, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
3. Document 321.
4. The drafts are not attached to the source text; the messages were subsequently revised. The message from Kennedy to Adoula, transmitted in telegram 699 to Léopoldville, November 7, urged “even greater initiative” by the Congolese Government in working out the implementation of the U.N. plan. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–762) The message from McGhee to Tshombe, transmitted in telegram 414 to Elisabethville, November 6, urged Tshombe to take a number of steps, including releasing non-military U.N. supplies, instituting provisional payments of foreign exchange and revenues on a regular monthly basis, oathtaking by Katangan military leaders, and closing the Katangan Foreign Ministry and its overseas offices. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–662)
5. The message to Adoula reads in part: “The progress you have made on the constitution is encouraging and I am sure you appreciate the need now to facilitate its orderly consideration by representatives of all the provinces so a final solution can be arrived at which will provide a widely accepted basis for national unity. It is important, not only for a lasting solution in the Congo but for the posture of the government of the Congo in the eyes of the world, that adequate opportunity be granted to Katanga officials to participate in this process.”
6. Not attached to the source text. McGhee subsequently revised the “Proposed Contingency Plan for the Congo;” it was sent to Bundy on November 6 with a covering memorandum from Brubeck. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Congo)
7. Erwin N. Griswold, Dean of the Harvard Law School.