Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, October 31, 1962, 11:27 p.m.

669. Bomboko called briefly on the Secretary this afternoon²and outlined Adoula’s political problems and bespoke necessity of obtaining transport aircraft.

Departmental officers subsequently obtained White House concurrence to informing Bomboko later this afternoon³ that USG willing offer GOC following as contribution toward strengthening govt and unifying Congo:

1. Over next six months will contribute $25 million toward UN import program and take initiative in strongly urging other interested govts contribute like amount.

2. IMF at our urging sending team to Congo help bring about integration of currency.

3. After coordination with UN we will support plan for training and modernizing ANC with UN and other nations who can contribute.

4. As quickly as it can be assimilated in modernization process we will furnish substantial items military equipment needed by ANC.

5. We will offer GOC today agreement involving another $2.7 million PL 480 assistance.

6. We will supply ocean transport for 1,800 Indonesians replacing other UN forces leaving Congo.

7. We will provide funds to carry out contract with Panama Airways providing for immediate delivery of number of transport aircraft in addition to those now in Congo for use by GOC and ANC.

McGhee continued:

1. USG strongly supports GOC in its efforts unify Congo. It supports, as best means achieving this objective, UN reconciliation plan and backs GOC in its efforts carry out plan. It has made known to Tshombe its determination see plan carried out.

2. Carrying out plan not automatic process and USG looks to GOC make every possible effort directly with Katangese obtain agreement on steps necessary implement plan. These are matters which can best be decided by the parties themselves.

3. Hope GOC will take into account certain recent events. India, which supplies approximately one-third UNOC forces, in midst life and death struggle. Cuban crisis reflects general heightening of tension which increases necessity of avoiding open hostilities Congo. Spaak’s current political weakness makes it more difficult for him back strong measures.

In light foregoing we must look to GOC assume more of responsibility with our support, for successful execution plan.

McGhee followed with certain specific items on which we would like Bomboko’s assurance that GOC will:

1. take initiative working out plan directly with Katangese. Little evidence that they have taken such initiative last three days.

2. faithfully observe cease-fire and stand-fast appeal of UNSYG.

3. immediately endeavor work out with Katangese means putting tripartite observation teams into field in North Katanga and elsewhere to assure cessation hostilities.

4. issue forthwith amnesty in suitable form in consultation with UN.

5. thereafter facilitate by every means execution oath.

6. through representatives on military commission come to grips with and develop realistic plan for carrying out integration.

7. in foreign exchange and currency commissions adopt realistic and flexible attitude toward problems posed by Katangese.

8. facilitate by every means possible cooperative arrangements with Katangese outside plan re telecommunications, opening Elisabethville airport, shipments both ways over Lubilash bridge, customs and immigration facilities and passport issuance.

9. in public statement make every effort give feeling of confidence re execution plan and ultimate peaceful integration of Katanga.

10. cooperate fully with other free world nations executing broad program of modernization and training ANC.

11. GOC will facilitate in Parliament consideration new constitution.

In lengthy rejoinder⁴ Bomboko analyzed each point in plan where GOC called upon to act and maintained GOC has carried out its obligations under plan and stressed Tshombe lack of good faith. Expressed appreciation action taken by USG, but stated that only by supplying three or so combat aircraft could USG give GOC capability exert pressure on Tshombe. Emphasized that only military pressure would inspire truly conciliatory action by Tshombe. McGhee replied that only UN fighter aircraft could furnish pressure. Bomboko said UN would not attack Katangese and that UN aircraft had not stopped Katangese aircraft bombing ANC North Katanga. Bomboko, returning New York this evening, stated he preparing for CAC meeting Nov. 2.

Leopoldville should inform Adoula soonest of McGhee’s presentation⁵ (this also pursuant Bomboko’s request). London, Brussels and Paris inform FonOffs.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–3162. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Godley, cleared in substance by Buffum and Burdett, and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris, London, Brussels, USUN, and Elisabethville.
2. No record of the conversation has been found.
3. McGhee met with Bomboko after the meeting recorded in Document 320. A memorandum of the conversation by Carlucci is in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–3162.
4. Bomboko’s comments are set forth in more detail in telegram 673 to Léopoldville, November 1. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–162)
5. Gullion reported in telegram 1040, November 2, that he had informed Adoula the previous evening of the measures the United States proposed to take and that Adoula’s reaction was so positive that Gullion read to him all the points McGhee had made to Bomboko. Adoula’s reaction to these points was also generally favorable. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–262)