Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

320. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 31, 1962, 4–4:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Mr. Kaysen
• Under Secretary McGhee
• Mr. Cleveland
• Governor Williams
• Mr. Fredericks
• Mr.Hamilton, AID²
• Mr. Hutchinson, AID
• Mr. Sloan, Defense
• Col. Greene, Defense
• Mr. Godley

The President reviewed Under Secretary McGhee’s report of October 22 on his mission to the Congo.³ He also went over the Under Secretary’s supplemental memorandum of October 31⁴ which indicated the developments in the Congo since his report. Mr. McGhee indicated that, although he was not satisfied with the progress made, there definitely had been a move in the proper direction. In reply to an inquiry from the President, he indicated that the slowness of progress could be attributed to both the Léopoldville and Katangese authorities. While Prime Minister Adoula was not as forthcoming as might have been hoped, Mr. Tshombe has not taken many of the steps that are called for in the UN Plan. The President inquired as to Prime Minister Adoula’s present political situation, and Mr. McGhee pointed out that, with Parliament scheduled to reconvene on November 5, the Department believed it essential to take some steps to bolster the Prime Minister’s internal political position at this time. He is currently in a weak political position and is faced with a revolt within his cabinet.

The President indicated that, with the recent developments in Cuba and India and the current political difficulties of Mr. Spaak, which Mr. McGhee has described, there could not be any consideration at this time of military action in the Congo on the part of the United Nations forces. The President said Mr. Adoula should be made aware of this situation.

Mr. McGhee outlined the steps being proposed to bolster Prime Minister Adoula. These included a $25 million contribution to the Congolese import program, a discussion with the Congolese of the “Greene Report” which sets forth certain recommendations and a program for the training and reorganization of the ANC, further PL 480 assistance of $2.7 million and, finally, our assisting the GOC in financing a contract with Panama which would provide an internal airlift capability for the GOC. The President indicated his approval of these steps. Mr. Hamilton said that there were funds available in the Congo program to provide for the Panama Airways contract.

With regard to the implementation of the Greene Report, the President approved its being discussed with the GOC, but indicated the commitment of funds should be subject to the GOC’s reaction to this report and the undertaking of some reasonable steps to facilitate the reintegration of Katanga.

In the general discussion Mr. McGhee reported to the President on his conversation with Senator Dodd concerning Mr. Struelens and his hope that the Senator would assist in arranging that Mr. Struelens discontinue his activities in this country.⁵

The possibility of the President’s corresponding with Prime Minister Adoula and with Mr. Tshombe was also considered, and the President indicated a willingness to write both of them in rather strong terms and request that both get on with the UN Plan for National Reconciliation. This thought was, however, discarded after Mr. Kaysen invited the President’s attention to Tshombe’s most recent communication to the President (Elisabethville’s telegram 697 of October 31) which was couched in offensive terms and which cast aspersions as to the loyalty of certain senior American officials.⁶ The President agreed that this matter should be dropped and that, if the Katangese were to inquire what had happened to the letter, they be informed that the Department would not transmit such a communication to the President.

The President also indicated that he might ask the Under Secretary to return to the Congo. Mr. McGhee said he would be pleased to do so whenever the President wished, but no specific times were indicated, nor under what circumstances such a trip might be desired.⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–3162. Confidential. Drafted by Godley and approved in M on November 2 and in the White House on November 5. The time of the meeting is taken from Kennedy’s appointment book. (Kennedy Library) The meeting is also recorded in a memorandum by Kaysen, November 1. (Ibid., National Security Files, Congo)
2. Fowler Hamilton, AID Administrator.
3. Document 317.
4. Not printed. (Filed with a covering memorandum from Kaysen to the President; Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Congo Security 1962)
5. No record of the conversation has been found. McGhee’s October 31 memorandum to Kennedy cited in footnote 3 above states that Dodd had written to Tshombe urging him to carry out the plan and that Dodd was going to urge both Tshombe and Struelens to discontinue the latter’s activities in the United States.
6. Tshombe’s message to the President declared that Kennedy had “put a stop to the Cuban enterprise of world subversion,” which, it charged, had been facilitated by errors by “certain senior American officials” and their “intimate and secret connections with the Communist world.” It continued as follows: “There is a risk that the same consequences may be produced in our country if the same policy continues in Africa where in the idea of avoiding Communism, certain high American functionaries, in order to satisfy certain powers, support men like Adoula who are responsive to all Soviet pressures against the best friends of the West.” (Telegram 697 from Elisabethville; Department of State, Central Files, 770G.11/10–3162)
7. Kaysen’s memorandum, cited in the source note above, reads in part as follows: “The President indicated that Mr. McGhee should be prepared to go back to the Congo as soon as it appeared useful to him. In going back, he had a double task: to make it clear to Adoula that the UN does not have the force to impose the results that Adoula desired on Tshombe, and the time, far from favoring Adoula, was running out quickly; to Tshombe, unless he moved more rapidly in accepting integration, that the ultimate prospect for him was forcible overthrow by a more radical Léopoldville Government, aided by the Bloc.” It concluded: “The President repeated his view that it was now Adoula’s move and that our first aim must be to get Adoula to move.”