295. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
884. Eyes only for Ambassador. Stevenson and McGhee saw Lord Home today2 to discuss McGhee’s possible trip to Congo. Stevenson pointed out Congo reaching crisis stage, and failure of UN conciliation plan could lead to both bankruptcy of UN and unpoliced civil war in Congo, with central gov’t asking help from wherever it can get it. Stressed importance resolving Katanga problem now. We cannot expect [Page 583] Tshombe buy pig in poke, nor expect Adoula stay in office if no solution forthcoming. Need solution now, therefore. If UK, Belgium and we exert influence, we could get Tshombe agree to reconciliation plan on grounds Constitution fair and reasonable, and on grounds if he refused he would face our united opposition. McGhee added Constitution being drafted by UN people, who taking into account views Tshombe and others. We and UK perhaps give impression of being further apart than we are in fact. We have not taken decision yet to enforce sanctions, nor have Belgians. In fact, we are not greatly involved, nor is UK. We already oversupplied with cobalt, major product we import from Katanga. Only country really involved is Belgium, and this not question of sanctions, as normally defined. Proposal would be for SYG, at request Adoula govt, request Belgium have Union Miniere close its mines, which would be operating in violation central Congo Govt laws. This not sanctions, and though Spaak did not give commitment, we convinced he will agree to this.
Home agreed there is now chance of getting solution, but expressed skepticism over Constitution, wondering if it would really be federal, and expressed flat opposition to sanctions. Moreover, he convinced Belgians would not agree; Belgian Govt would not be able call for closing of Union Miniere mines. Thought problem of possible bankruptcy of UN was poor reason for doing something bad in Congo.
Stevenson stressed importance of getting question resolved as soon as possible. Said needed good Constitution, and need make rejection of it by Tshombe dangerous or unpalatable. Therefore, need some step we willing to take at end of road. If we agree on this, convinced Tshombe would accept.
Home said he convinced Tshombe would refuse, and would rely on his ability to run Katanga. Was unconvinced when Stevenson said Belgians would pull out technicians. Stressed that if sanctions applied, next step would be for UN to vote sanctions against UK re Southern Rhodesia.
McGhee explained that if he went out, his purpose would be to express to Tshombe our determination see reconciliation plan through, stress that this is last opportunity for agreement, reassure Tshombe of our friendly intentions, and stress we will see to it anything agreed upon will be carried out. Noted to Home we criticized domestically as not being friendly to Tshombe. Mentioned that Spaak and U Thant said today they thought exercise would be useful. Hoped we could, without naming any sanctions, let Tshombe take negotiations more seriously. At same time, he hoped he could persuade Adoula he has to be more forthcoming with Tshombe on Constitution.
Home repeated British objections to sanctions; said British have had to speak against sanctions because mention of sanctions was in air. [Page 584] When asked if he could agree be silent, and not state opposition, said he could not, since he had already opposed, and could not go back on what British had said. He did point out he had told Welensky that while UK could not support sanctions, it was probable majority of UN would support them, and therefore British advice to Tshombe was to accept reconciliation plan. Welensky said he had reinforced this and told Tshombe he must cooperate. McGhee stressed importance of not letting Tshombe think UK would save him, and Home replied they had told Tshombe exact opposite. He willing ask Welensky make another approach, but did not think now was appropriate time. Perhaps after McGhee trip.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–2562. Confidential. Received at 3:48 a.m. and repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, and Léopoldville.↩
- The conversation, which took place at 7:15 p.m. on September 24, is recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Valdes. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2153)↩
- Home made similar comments to Rusk in brief private discussions of the Congo and other subjects, one on September 23 or 24, recorded in a September 24 letter from Davis to Tyler, and the other on September 27, recorded in Secto 32 of that date. In the earlier conversation, Home said he had talked to Welensky and had been encouraged by his attitude: Welensky was afraid of chaos in Katanga and would be satisfied with a federal solution for the Congo. On September 27, Home told Rusk that the British would urge Welensky to put pressure on Tshombe and that they would not “get in the way” of any steps the Belgians might take, including economic sanctions. (Both ibid.)↩