Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

279. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 17, 1962, 10 p.m.

501. Policy. Verbatim text. Congo. Following report not cleared with Secretary.

During day we have sought agreement with UN re text of statement Thant would include as part of his report to SC on steps he intends to take in Congo. Fol telecons from Dept this morning, Secretary and Stevenson invited Bunche to USUN to work on final version of text sent Dept ourtel 489² as amended and revised by telecon instructions and Secretary-Ball conversations.

Bunche made several minor editorial suggestions and proposed two additions of substance. One is contained at end of 4th para from bottom in text below³ and relates to interdiction of arms, material and men, incorporating ideas from para I.E.7 of Courses of Action.

Other and crucial addition is last sentence next to last para.⁴

During morning’s discussion of text, Bunche emphasized fundamental concerns of SYG:

(A) Package must contain sufficient elements to make it salable to Adoula. Adoula is in very negative state of mind re UN, and Gardiner verges on being unacceptable to him fol SYG’s instructions to Gardiner to return, in spite of GOC’s opposition, Rhodesian aircraft and crew from Manono to Northern Rhodesia. Bunche stressed Adoula would have to be given in writing both National Reconciliation and Course of Action. (Question of tactics discussed only briefly and inconclusively with Bunche at morning meeting where focus was on text of statement.)

(B) Thant feels a key element in situation is public knowledge in detail of recent negots and two papers. Tactic must be devised therefore to handle problem of public appearance.

(C) Thant must have basis to defend himself against criticism which will inevitably come and has already begun from Casablanca members of Congo Advisory Comte, and Sovs, who insinuate Thant espousal of program, and mystery surrounding question, is somehow sinister and responsive to pro-Tshombe type pressures.

As part of public presentation which will cover press leaks, Thant believes he must go beyond statement of July 31st. Otherwise in face press stories and detailed knowledge by UN reps of recent consultations he will appear to be backing down under Western European pressure, particularly British, from position he took in July 31 statement. He concludes he must therefore say something in public indicating he prepared to move to carry out implications July 31 declaration should the circumstances require.

(D) Thant becoming uncertain and even doubtful of determination behind current attempt to find peaceful Congo settlement. This feeling greatly stimulated by our fear of damage public disclosure Plan of Action and National Reconciliation papers would have.

Fol morning drafting session Bunche returned to Secretariat with draft he considered minimum and discussed it with Thant. Draft below is resulting text incorporating certain editorial changes made by Thant. In handing it to us this PM, Bunche said Thant said it represented absolute minimum he could accept as his own.

At several discussions during day, in which US reps argued vigorously against last sentence in text to last para, we were unable to get it deleted. This evening at Dept suggestion, we presented fol alternative sentence: “In these circumstances I would anticipate that the GOC would request a cessation of illegal trade in major commodities with Katanga and I would wholeheartedly support such a request.”

Bunche said while he would put this to Thant if we requested, he did not believe it should be put to him: (A) he was extremely doubtful that Thant would accept it; (B) he felt Thant increasingly doubtful concerning reality of support he has behind any initiative and does not want to undertake initiatives if it likely to fail since that would leave situation worse both in Leo and New York. US attitude toward sentence tended increase his doubts.

Since effort to get Thant to drop foregoing addition unsuccessful, issue was referred by Stevenson to Secretary who authorized that we have Bunche put alternative language to Thant as our best judgment but indicating we would agree to accept his decision as final if he decided to maintain sentence as drafted. Tonight when this put to him by Bunche, Thant decided to reject US alternative language and maintain sentence as it now stands.

[Here follows the text of the Secretary-General’s draft statement.]

Stevenson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1762. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, Paris, and London.
2. Telegram 489 from USUN, August 16, reported that, as an outgrowth of discussions among U Thant, Bunche, Rusk, and Stevenson, the Mission was preparing a draft statement for Thant outlining the National Reconciliation Proposal and Course of Action paper, which Thant had insisted should be treated as part of one package, and it transmitted the text of the U.S. draft. (Ibid., 770G.00/8–1662) The National Reconciliation Proposal and Course of Action paper are printed as enclosures to Document 274. A few revisions subsequently agreed upon by U.N. officials and U.S., U.K., and Belgian representatives were reported in telegram 511 from USUN, August 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1862)
3. The text of the draft statement transmitted in this telegram, not printed here, was identical in substance to the last 17 paragraphs (numbered 75–91) of Thant’s August 20 report to the Security Council (S/5053/Add.11). Portions of his report, including those paragraphs, are also printed in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. VI, pp. 163–166, and in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 884–888. The sentence under reference reads as follows: “All members of the United Nations should take the necessary measures to assure that there are no unauthorized movements to the Congo of mercenaries, arms, war materiel or any kind of equipment capable of military use.
4. “The sentence reads as follows: “In pursuance of this, a firm request would be made by me to all member governments to apply such a ban especially to Katangese copper and cobalt.”