278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations1
380. From Ball for Secretary and Stevenson. Re: New York’s 467.2 Not clear from reftel whether SYG would propose to publish as “U.S. Plan” the paper on internal Congolese constitutional arrangements entitled [Page 553] “Proposal for National Reconciliation” or the paper on steps to be taken to persuade Union Miniere and Tshombe to accept it, entitled “Course of Action”. In either case, publication by SYG in a report to the Security Council is simply impossible, and it is essential to restrain SYG from any such intention.
“Proposal for National Reconciliation” is useful as a document to be floated by the UN (Gardiner) with Adoula and Tshombe. It would represent the UN’s judgment, after the consultations SYG has now had with all relevant members, regarding what kind of deal Adoula and Tshombe should make with each other. For this proposal to become officially the U.S. Plan would be surest way to kill it in a hurry.
Our briefing of some twenty CAC and other ambassadors in Washington convinces us that they readily accept characterization of proposal we submitted UN August 9 as suggestions we have presented to UN in response to Thant appeal. Out of this and other advice he has solicited, SYG is to develop a UN espoused plan. But if SYG publishes “U.S. Plan” and then delivers it to Adoula and Tshombe with a UN label on it, he presents himself and the UN as merely an appendage or vehicle of U.S. policy, which is certainly not a good thing from his point of view or from ours.
Any suggestion that “Course of Action” paper might be published by UN as U.S. Plan is possibly even more fantastic. The thing to do about “Course of Action” is to start taking the measures for which it provides, not publish an official list of them to which everybody can start to object as being either too much or too little. Moreover, Bunche suggestion that “UK reservations” to “U.S. Plan” should be published by UN would simply advertise, confirm, and freeze the differing attitudes of two close allies on this major question of policy.
Believe best way to get this back on track would be for you to make U.S. position perfectly clear to Thant personally at your luncheon Thursday.3 UN Secretariat need not be so sensitive to press treatment intergovernmental discussion on Congo. It is not even clear to us that Thant needs to report to Security Council at all until Gardiner has tried out on Adoula and Tshombe the “Proposal for National Reconciliation” and has something to report. Next steps, then, are (a) for SYG to instruct Gardiner to discuss “Proposal for National Reconciliation” first with Adoula and then with Tshombe within next very few days; and (b) after it has been discussed with Tshombe, to begin taking the graduated measures of persuasion which are contained in “Course of Action” paper. See no reason why this process could not begin forthwith, i.e. this weekend.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1562. Confidential; Niact. Drafted and approved by Cleveland; cleared by Fredericks, Buffum, and Ball; and initialed by Cleveland for Ball. Repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, London, and Paris.↩
- Telegram 467 from USUN, August 15, reported a conversation the previous evening with Bunche, who had stated that Thant intended to issue a report to the Security Council on steps being taken on the Congo following his July 31 appeal for support. In view of the widespread publicity given to U.S. consultations with the Belgians, British, and French, including press references to a “U.S. plan,” Thant felt he must include a copy of the plan and the British paper of reservations as annexes to the report. He planned to state in the report that he agreed with the U.S. proposals and was therefore instructing Gardiner to proceed. (Ibid.)↩
- August 16. No record of the discussion has been found.↩