Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

273. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, August 11, 1962, 7 p.m.

374. Paris eyes only for Ball attention Helen Hanainy. Policy. Deptel 235.² Faithfully described to Adoula purposes your proposed visit as described in reference telegram. Moreover drew extensively upon “proposal for national reconciliation” plus “course action”. Explained these yet to be finalized but agreement on essentials already certain.

In response Adoula will not say “yes” and will not say “no”. He understands fully—and will be prepared to write you to that effect—that your mission is not entreat or solicit Tshombe nor to negotiate with him nor to propose mediation but to describe to him true temper of American people and to make it clear to him that he has no alternative but to accept proposals which will be made to him.

In spite of all this Adoula will not say to you any more than he did to Spaak that you should or should not go. There is no doubt however that he would be much disturbed if you made trip. He did say that it would be “grave error” and would “threaten American position in Congo”. He made these points:

1. He would take my word on what propositions might contain, he knew them only to be US propositions. He did not know how far Belgians and British would go nor when he would see proposal in writing.

2. Tshombe will agree with anything you say but as soon as he gets back to Elisabethville he will do nothing in way he said he would. This he says is history of dealing with Tshombe.

3. Any further actions Tshombe takes will be explained to his people as being forced by American pressure. If he wants to get out of any agreement he will say it was not valid because of American duress. Adoula said this was Kitona pattern.

4. Adoula cannot understand why we would agree to see Tshombe when Tshombe has violently attacked us. It was Tshombe that American President saved in December and yet Tshombe has not ceased to revile him.

5. It is idle to think as I urged that anybody from Department of State could convince Tshombe that Struelens was wrong about American people and Department of State was right.

6. He was incredulous about keeping action secret until after event and very disturbed at idea that UN would not be informed about it.

7. Said best effect he thought on Tshombe was achieved by Spaak’s denial to him of visa and his own measures drawing noose around Katanga. If now Spaak and Ball processioned to Geneva no matter what they told him Tshombe would say these visits vitiated finality and forced decision to end secession.

In response to his queries I explained to Adoula that visit might well take place. In any case you would know his reservations about it. I invited him to give me letter for you but he is reluctant to do so. I have no doubt however that above represents his opinion and that of Congolese. I have already indicated what I conceive to be insofar as it can be judged from Léopoldville (reaction of Belgians and UN).³

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1162. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Also sent to Paris.
2. Document 271.
3. Gullion argued against the proposed visit in telegrams 365 and 370, both August 11. In telegram 365, he reported that Gardiner had heard Tshombe was trying to see a special U.S. representative in Geneva and that Gardiner thought this would be disastrous. In telegram 370, he predicted that Spaak would drop the idea of seeing Tshombe in Geneva in view of Adoula’s refusal to comment on it, and he argued that under the circumstances, it would be a breach of faith to undertake such a mission without giving Spaak advance notice. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1162)