Office of the Historian

234. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1

London, May 16, 1962, 7 p.m.

4223. From Bruce. Department will quite justifiably be disappointed with results conversations here on Congo between representatives of US, UK, and Belgium.2

1.
On two principal points upon which President and Department particularly wished agreement: (A) Support of use of force, if necessary, by UN to bring about Katanga reintegration; (B) support by Union Miniere and Tanganyika Concessions of policies designed to achieve such reintegration; I must report almost complete failure.
2.
I spoke repeatedly about the great importance USG attaches to these points, and also discussed them frankly in private with Lord Dundee and with Rothschild.
3.
As to (A), Lord Dundee stated that he was instructed by his Government to oppose any measure suggested that might be expected in their judgment to involve a resumption of hostilities. If a resolution were presented in the UN, or action undertaken by it under its existing mandate, of a nature considered by HMG dangerous in sense of threatening renewal of fighting in Congo, HMG would vote against such resolution, and in either case would probably withdraw its backing for UN operations in Congo including its financial contributions.
4.
Rothschild was not as explicit in stating what might be, in such regards, decision of his own Government, beyond saying he was sure Spaak would view with alarm and disapproval any actions that might lead to hostilities.
5.
On (B), viz., position of private companies, neither British nor Belgians offered either expectation or desire to try further to influence them, and spoke of their lack of ability to do so even if they wished. Rothschild did, however, present some personal views that will be reported in summary of discussions,3 that might be helpful in connection with securing portion of Katanga mining revenues for central government.
6.
I was impressed by mobility and helpfulness, within limits, of Belgian position as compared with that of British. Pragmatism of latter [Page 453] was evident as usual, resolution to let sleeping dogs lie, not to engage in hypothetical or advance planning, to procrastinate. Equally, British assessment of dangers inherent in present situation is markedly tepid and different from that of Belgians which much resemble our own.
7.
I would suspect that after Prime Minister has been informed of our views re being prepared to pursue courses which could involve use of force by the UN the President will have a personal message from him.
8.
I do not believe there is, or will be, any difference of opinion between the three Governments on the advisability and necessity of achieving Katangan reintegration. When it comes to methods we are far apart from British who are pinning their hopes on Gardiner’s efforts at conciliation.
Bruce
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–1662. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, USUN, and Léopoldville.↩
  2. The talks were held May 15 and 16.↩
  3. See Document 235. The discussions on May 15 were reported in telegrams 4204 and 4205, May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–1562)↩