Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

233. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 65–62

Washington, May 16, 1962.

THE KATANGA INTEGRATION PROBLEM

The Problem

To estimate the prospects for early agreement on reintegration of Katanga into the Congo and the likely consequences of the failure of current efforts to secure such agreement.

Conclusions

1. Katanga separatism is regarded by the Central Government, other Africans, and the neutrals as a successful effort by Western commercial interests to retain a “neocolonial” position in Katanga and thus to prevent the full independence of the Congo. Adoula is under considerable pressure to show progress toward the integration of Katanga under the Central Government. Adoula wants a wide measure of authority over Katanga. However, his minimum needs would probably be satisfied by recognition of the formal civil and military authority of the Central Government and assured access to Katanga revenues.² ³(Paras. 5, 9, 20)

2. Although Tshombe recognizes the many outside forces opposed to his maintaining Katanga as a near-independent state, he is under no significant pressure from within Katanga to reach any accommodation with Adoula. On the contrary, the tribal elements of southern Katanga, and Belgian and British commercial interests and residents in Katanga, as well as the Europeans in neighboring countries (Northern Rhodesia in particular), support his present position. In any agreement with Adoula, Tshombe’s minimum requirements would include a considerable degree of provincial autonomy plus a guaranteed share of Katanga revenues. (Paras. 15, 20)

3. Negotiations between Adoula and Tshombe are unlikely to achieve any early accommodation unless both sides are subjected to stepped up pressures and inducements by outside forces, particularly by the Belgian and UK Governments and economic interests, the UN, and the US. We do not believe that their minimum needs are so inconsistent as to make agreement impossible. If some movement on the issue is not evident in a relatively short time, Adoula or a successor may take more radical and intransigent initiatives, including acceptance of military aid from Afro-Asian or Bloc states. It cannot be excluded that the Central Government will attempt to subdue Katanga by force. (Paras. 20–21, 25)

4. We do not believe that any attempt to subdue Katanga militarily, by either UN or Congolese Army forces, would be promising. Such action would be likely to bring about conditions of such disorder that the prospects for unity and an orderly political and economic development of the Congo would be further reduced. (Para. 23)

[Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate, comprising paragraphs 5–25.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. According to a note on the title page, it was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 16. A note on the reverse of the title page listed the organizations that participated in the preparation of the estimate (CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the three military services, and the Joint Staff), all the directors of which concurred. The AEC and FBI representatives to the USIB abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
2. SNIE 65–2–61, “Possible Developments in Katanga,” dated 7 December 1961, remains essentially valid. [Footnote in the source text. See Document 152.]

3. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, would prefer that this sentence read as follows:

   In order to preserve his own political position in Léopoldville, he must have, as an absolute minimum, recognition by Tshombe of the formal civil and military authority of the Central Government and assured access to Katanga revenues. [Footnote in the source text.]