Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, May 11, 1962, 8:58 p.m.

6037. Subject: Talks on Congo with UK and Belgium. Purpose of consultations with British and Belgians is to develop a joint plan based on UN mediation for overcoming the present impasse in the Adoula-Tshombe negotiations and for bringing about prompt reintegration of Katanga. We would assume that US would take the lead in concerting with UN and in backing Gardiner’s overture to Adoula, while UK and Belgium would take on task of persuading Tshombe.

Our three governments are worried about the possible recurrence of fighting and the effect it might have on UMHK and other foreign properties. However, grave damage would be done the West if the present drift continues. USG is concerned that Tshombe (basing himself upon erroneous information conveyed by Struelens and others), the companies, and other interested parties are operating upon a serious miscalculation regarding USG determination to see Congo reunited promptly so as to assure continued control of GOC by moderates. USG will fully support UN action even at risk of incurring hostilities and none of the parties concerned should operate under any different assumption. It is our hope that, by concerting frankly with the British and Belgian Governments at this time and making clear to them USG’s appraisal of the situation and determination to see it resolved promptly they will join with us in supporting UN mediation effort and the pressures which will be required to make it effective

Pouching detailed briefing and background papers on questions expected to arise in Congo talks. Following are basic ideas reflected in our papers and approach to be taken in talks:

1) Congo situation can any moment seriously deteriorate to such extent that immediate action might become necessary to forestall highly undesirable military and political developments. Desirable therefore that delegations first agree to explore in initial go-round in provisional way points listed in agenda so as to obtain indications in what direction positive achievements might be found and to define areas of agreement and lack of agreement. Discussions then could be concentrated on most promising areas of action so that we can work out rapidly constructive approach in at least several areas.

2) Useful to begin with review of present situation and assessment of probable developments if reintegration Katanga not achieved shortly in order create common understanding of urgency of situation and pave way for coordinated policies. (Deptel 5846)²

3) Discussion of possible principles for Congo constitution, and arrangements which might be agreed upon pending adoption of new constitution, should pool ideas on realistic Adoula-Tshombe accommodation which could be submitted to UN to aid it in its mediation effort and lead to creation of very broadly constructed yardstick to facilitate evaluation of possible proposals for which Gardiner might request US and other international support and to define nature of settlement we would press on Tshombe. With key mediatory role necessarily played by UN we must avoid laying down our views on constitutional questions in any but the broadest and most flexible fashion to avoid hampering Gardiner’s efforts. Nevertheless it clearly understood that we cannot give Gardiner carte blanche but will review any proposal submitted to us before deciding whether to support it.

4) Under heading Tactics we would explore all possible ways which might be used by three governments directly or indirectly to support UN mediation effort and create atmosphere conducive to agreement. We have explored in past all possibilities we could think of and applied everything available except UN support of GOC exchange and tax authority in Katanga. In particular we tried diplomatic and political pressures on both sides, made attempts to ensure cooperation of UMHK in escrow plan, etc. Nevertheless view shortness of time now remaining for settlement of Katanga issue by negotiation we may now be able find new avenues not explored or hereto considered impracticable and we have open mind on any suggestions from other parties.

5) Offer of substantial aid to Congo suggested by Spaak, while desirable, does not appear effective means for our immediate purposes since on one hand it is unlikely Tshombe will find it persuasive enough to induce him to give up any of the powers he now exercises and secondly because such offer could be made only after substantial measure of agreement reached between three governments and UN on major aspects of program, in particular readiness to commit very substantial amounts of funds beyond those of any three Governments now giving to Congo. We would welcome Belgian and UK proposals for longer range efforts in this area and will make additional arrangements to discuss them in detail.

6) While our common objective is to find an alternative to measures which might lead to the re-opening of hostilities, we believe that Tshombe is unwilling to take irrevocable integration steps as long as he feels that UN is blocked from recourse to forceful measures. It is his conviction that the UN is so blocked that causes him to persist in his present delaying tactics. There may well come a point in the negotiations when Adoula has accepted a mediation scheme which we all consider reasonable but which Tshombe declines. In order to make Tshombe go the last mile we envisage Gardiner at this point informing Tshombe that unless he reconsiders within a reasonably short time the UN would be prepared to back the central government in asserting its foreign exchange and tax collection authority in Katanga. While the actual implementation of this scheme entails a risk of a renewal of hostilities, we hope knowledge its existence would have deterrent effect on Tshombe and that the initiative for any such hostilities would have to come from Tshombe. We believe Tshombe is a realistic politician and lacking in suicidal tendencies and would avoid recourse to violence to attempt forestall this measure. Rather we would expect him at that point to accept a reasonable formula for reintegration.

In any case we believe that this risk is a lesser one than the alternative which as we see it would have highly undesirable consequences for the West; in particular, a GOC request for strengthened UN mandate which could split the West, civil war in Congo, loss of moderate control of GOC, expropriation of foreign enterprise, etc.

7) We recognize that the Belgian and even the British Government might not be able openly to approve exchange and tax collection program, although we hope to achieve such support in our talks with them. The talks should at least achieve their understanding of the possible need for such a program and, if events should develop unfavorably, their acquiescence in it as the lesser of evils. We recall Spaak reaction when December fighting broke out when he expressed hope that UN would pull it off fast enough so that it would not create political difficulty for his Government.

8) While mediation proposal must not deprive Tshombe of ability retain reasonable autonomy for Katanga, we must avoid giving our support to interim solution which failed contain irrevocable steps of integration. We must not risk setting up an arrangement under which in exchange for few political gestures and payment of more or less substantial sums of money Tshombe would be permitted to retain effective military, political, and economic control of Katanga. In such case the only assurance for eventual compliance with the constitution negotiated through appropriate processes would be the continued presence of UN military in substantial numbers in Katanga. To hinge the future peace of the Congo on such presence would be politically unwise and unrealistic taking into account the difficulties of finding the necessary funds and the desire of India and other nations to withdraw their troops soon. Accordingly, we must insist that the interim solution contains enough irreversible elements of integration so that the process could not be reversed even in case negotiations on the constitution should run into difficulties.

Bruce should report currently to USUN so Stevenson can be in continuous communication with UN New York, and to Léopoldville so that Guillon can be in constant contact with Gardiner.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–1162. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Buffum and Eisenberg; cleared in draft by Fredericks, Wallner, Burdett, and Ford and in substance by Edmond C. Hutchinson, Assistant Administrator for Africa and Europe at the Agency for International Development; and approved by McGhee. Repeated to Brussels, Léopoldville, New Delhi, Paris, and USUN.
2. Tosec 43 (Document 226) was repeated to London as telegram 5846.