Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, December 14, 1961, 9:23 p.m.

1028. You will have seen by separate telegram unclassified message President has received from Tshombe offering apparently without conditions negotiate with Adoula together with President’s reply informing Tshombe he is urgently exploring possibilities and would again communicate soonest.²

Hoffacker should deliver following message to Tshombe³ from President Kennedy when you obtain Adoula’s concurrence. Understand Adoula has already told Bunche he would meet Tshombe in Kitona. Accordingly, President is confident he will concur in effort face Tshombe with opportunity demonstrate preparedness negotiate immediately and reasonably.

Believe Tshombe offer should be looked upon as having been motivated by firm policy UN has been following with full support USG and GOC. Recognize that acceptance by Adoula would call for large measure of statesmanship but believe circumstances which have led Tshombe to make this offer should permit Adoula take this action without undue political risk.

Begin text.

I have received your message, and have been in touch with Acting SYG U Thant and Prime Minister Adoula about it.

I am glad that you are prepared to enter immediate talks with Prime Minister Adoula.

I have designated Ambassador Edmund Gullion to act for me in facilitating rapid arrangements to this end. Secretary General U Thant is making Dr. Ralph Bunche and Mr. Robert Gardiner available to participate on behalf of the United Nations.

My hope is that you can proceed to Kitona for this purpose within a matter of hours.

I am asking Ambassador Gullion to fly to Elisabethville in a United States plane to escort you to Kitona and return you safely to Elisabethville. I am assured that your personal safety at Kitona and throughout the trip will be guaranteed both by the United Nations and by the Central Government. I have full confidence in these assurances.

End text.

For Hoffacker: In delivering message you can make clear privately to Tshombe that UN would be willing to have a truce in the fighting just as soon as Tshombe sets off for talk with Adoula. FYI. In short, U Thant’s view is that while UN will not offer truce in exchange for talks result of beginning of talks would be cease fire. In these circumstances, Thant has assured us privately that truce would result. End FYI.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1461. Official Use Only; Niact. Drafted and approved by Ball. Also sent to Elisabethville and repeated to USUN, Paris for Rusk, Brussels, and London.
2. Telegram 461 to Elisabethville, December 14, transmitted Tshombe’s message, which offered to negotiate with Adoula and requested Kennedy’s intervention “to designate a suitable negotiator and to stop at once useless bloodshed.” The telegram also instructed Hoffacker to inform Tshombe that the President was exploring possibilities. (Ibid.) Tshombe’s message, in French, is in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. The text of a translation is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 863. Bundy told Ball of the message’s arrival in a telephone conversation at 2:50 p.m. that afternoon. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Congo)
3. Notes of Ball’s telephone conversations on December 14 with Bundy, Stevenson, and the President reflect discussions in New York with U Thant about the reply that should be sent to Tshombe. Kennedy initially wanted to name Bunche as negotiator and wanted Thant to announce a 48-hour cease-fire. (Ibid.)