161. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1
1489. Department for President. London for Ambassador. Paris for Secretary and Ambassador. Brussels for Ambassador. USUN for Ambassador.
- 1.
- Following telecon with President2 returned to
late evening sessions with Prime Minister Adoula, Bunche and Linner, then adjourned to Linner’s house further conference
with latter two. Discussions under three heads upon which I
understood President wished clarifications:
(A) Prospects negotiation between Tshombe and Adoula; (B) Command arrangements to ensure civil control and prevent excess by certain elements UN forces; and (C) Scope of UN operational objectives.
- 2.
- Discussion with Adoula largely confined to prospect of negotiations. To influence him I drew more from Presidential guidance than was explicit in telecon. Told him that support of UN action to benefit of GOC was enormous political decision; that certain quarters in Washington could well have doubts with respect to readiness of GOC to assume reasonable negotiating posture, post-hostilities. Insisted it imperative that Adoula government at long last formulate and declare its political objectives in conciliatory and constructive sense; Adoula grateful for US support and stated desire to cooperate with US and maintain reputation for flexibility and moderation. He promised to proclaim in radio discourse tomorrow night these “aims” to include reservation voice for Katanga in all local councils and of Katangan institutions and provincial [Page 314] assembly. (President of Chamber of Deputies who sat with Adoula showed some concern lest post-hostilities cease-fire be premature but Adoula checked him.) Followed this conversation with Bunche and Linner who agreed completely and promised to pursue in discussions with Adoula tomorrow.
- 3.
- I then discussed UN attitude on negotiations separately with Bunche and Linner with special reference to so-called British-Belgian draft memorandum. Bunche stated purpose of UN was provide environment for meeting Adoula –Tshombe and for useful negotiations. His view of UN role is however limited. He does not consider that UN should or could provide detailed formula. Claimed he was unable comment in detail on UK, Belgian draft, which he said was seeing for first time and which to his knowledge had never been submitted U Thant. Remarked that formula for various modus vivendi too detailed and thus inappropriate for UN comment. Very importantly, however, Bunche indicated Gardiner, also U Thant emissary, was making progress with Adoula. Latter had previously rejected proposal brought by Gardiner for nomination of an Africa “conciliator.” Today Adoula had withdrawn an earlier letter rejecting mediator and promised new constructive reply. Bunche assured US that UN’s ears attuned for earliest overture from Tshombe, he appreciated importance of parallel thought and action on negotiation while operations in progress. However, neither he nor Linner think prospect good unless military operations quickly successful. In this connection Bunche remaining in Léopoldville two or more days and also indicated Gardiner would remain.
- 4.
- We emphasized US concern for command arrangements. Bunche confirmed that General MacEoin (Irish) leaves 2 a.m. this morning to take over Elisabethville operations, with Raja (India) in command. Bunche telephone MacEoin as we were leaving at 1 a.m. to pass our concern along. We expressed worry about revenge-minded Indians (who, however, best combat troops) and need for keeping them under control as well as keeping all responsive to civilian authority. He deplored declaration made earlier by Urquhart that responsibility was being passed military command. We expressed hope that civilian authority and MacEoin supreme command would be made clear in kick-off press conference and in any published command arrangements.
- 5.
- I have also discussed role of ANC with Bunche during last two days. He understands American revulsion at any large scale or joint operation. Situation now is that no ANC would take part except upon granting by UN of GOC request which could be delayed. There would be no joint action but very small select group with Stanleyville troops might be placed under UN command; these would be officered by UN. Further it is UN’s private view that this would be means for heading off large scale Gizenga participation and would take heat off Adoula. [Page 315] Bunche did say that ANC has some excellent armored cars which are in short supply in UN forces.
With respect to campaign objectives, Bunche categorically confirmed these were limited in sense U Thant declaration. We do not believe that UN plans a wide sweep of province or beat up of population moreover, UN interprets objectives not so much in terms of geography as in relation to SC resolution, especially re mercenaries. Adoula is pressing UN to eschew any cease-fire until mercenary problem is settled. UN believes, however, that if tomorrow’s operations successful the eventual deal with Tshombe would include undertakings by him with respect to mercenaries which would be more practical than UN man-hunt. However UN does envisage setting up some kind of council to consider who is mercenary.
In sum, following conversations tonight am relatively satisfied insofar as unknowns can be calculated, that UN will try to carry out President’s wishes. Regret exceedingly that neither UN nor GOC seem able to make adequate operational plans for political objectives, and propaganda, psychological warfare. Nevertheless President’s conversation has given us opportunity to make strong pitch which we hope will be able to bear some fruit. I can at least say that UN–GOC both disposed to constructive political approach as soon as city of Elisabethville secured.
Military action will as far as possible be confined to military objectives.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1461. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, and USUN.↩
- See Document 160.↩