Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

154. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State¹

Paris, December 11, 1961, 10 p.m.

Secto 9. Congo discussed December 11 tripartite meeting.² British expressed strong dismay with course of events in Congo contrasting U Thant statement³ with that made by Linner who interprets his role as duty to get rid of Tshombe and has so stated to Swedish journalist. Desire for revenge particularly on part of Indians is another factor. Stressed problem UK confronted within today’s Commons debate. Said UK believes UN must take an initiative to obtain a cease-fire and then its role must be re-defined. If fighting continues and spreads into heart of Elisabethville, UK may have to withdraw its suport of UN effort. He added UK will suspend delivery of bombs until it assured U Thant in control of situation.

Home expressed hope three could approve now taking some sort of action, perhaps in Security Council or perhaps through approach to U Thant which would give UK Government better posture in Commons. Suggested possibility drafting of resolution for Security Council which, even if vetoed by Soviets, would set forth Western position. Elements of resolution could include: Unification of Congo, recognition of Kasavubu authority, cease-fire, and re-definition UN role.

Secretary replied it difficult make determination on this point in Paris, as we not aware all elements of problem and latest developments. Three delegations in New York could study matter.

Couve reserved on French action in UN stating French delegation could not vote for a resolution but could express views and be helpful.

During lengthy discussion of Congo Secretary stressed necessity supporting Adoula and limiting possibilities for Gizenga to profit. We do not believe UN should or can take on extensive military mission. Future calls for cease-fire and contacts between Adoula and Tshombe with aim of unified Congo with provincial autonomy but Central Government in effective enough control to prevent shift to Gizenga government. Question before us is what sort of pressures can be put on Tshombe and who can apply them.

Home replied Welensky might be induced to persuade Tshombe to meet with Adoula if cease-fire obtained and UN role re-defined. Home doubted Union Miniere could exact [exert?] pressure in view its fear of nationalization.

Couve said West faces real dilemma in Katanga. Should UN be defeated, would be most difficult to come to terms with Tshombe and very process of fighting can create nation in Katanga. If Tshombe defeated, only result may be extension chaos. Perhaps loss of face UN would suffer through cease-fire is least costly.

Possibility of a discreet approach to U Thant was discussed. Hope would be for general cease-fire. Secretary said some sort of parallel approach to Tshombe would also be needed.

Agreed to discuss subject further after Secretary had opportunity talk to Department.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1161. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN, Léopoldville, London, and Brussels. Rusk was in Paris December 10–15 for quadripartite Foreign Ministers meetings and a NATO Ministerial Meeting. Documentation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2002 and 2003.
2. A memorandum of the meeting among Secretary Rusk, Lord Home, and Couve de Murville is ibid., Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1161.
3. Reference is to a statement issued on December 10. For text, see Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. VI, pp. 57–59, or American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 860–861.