Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

153. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy¹

Washington, December 9, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Courses for the United States in View of Fighting in Katanga

Our objective, like that of the United Nations, remains the restoration and maintenance of law and order and the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo. Following Katangan military attacks against UN forces, the latter are taking action to defend themselves, to place the UN in a position of military superiority and thereby bring about conditions conducive to reconciliation between Tshombe and Adoula.

Our action is directed along these lines:

a) Assure the UN of our support, political and material, for its operation in Katanga;

b) Encourage the UN to keep its military operation limited as indicated above;

c) Reassure the British, Belgians and French of UN intentions and ours in order to obtain the maximum cooperation from them for the UN operation;

d) Continue to exercise pressure on Tshombe to bring him to negotiate and discourage a last ditch fight by the Katangan army;

e) Ensure that efforts at conciliation go forward to the extent possible parallel with military action.

Ambassador Stevenson conferred on Wednesday² with UN Secretary General U Thant³ and assured him of our support for UN objectives and operations within the framework of our course of action as outlined above. The Secretary General was appreciative of our support and defined UN objectives in the present operation as a change in the relative power position of the UN and Katanga which would induce the latter toward negotiations. The Secretary General stated his belief that the current military activity must be paralleled by conciliation. He has sent a special representative to Léopoldville to make a second approach to Adoula to consider negotiating with Tshombe. To achieve the necessary position of strength, the UN has undertaken operations designed to achieve quickly control of the key points in Elisabethville, retain control of Kamina and deny the Katangan air force use of Kolwezi, Kipushi and Jadotville air strips. The Secretary General said the UN will take steps to prevent the reinforcement of Katangan troops in Elisabethville and that the UN should also control communication centers, power stations, small air fields, etc. They also recognize the need to protect the industrial centers of Kolwezi, Jadotville and Kipushi in the interest of the Congo’s economic future. Finally, the Secretary General assured us that he was working out a comprehensive plan which would assure coordination of the measures taken or envisaged toward achievement of the UN objectives in Katanga.

The Department of Defense believes the UN has the military capability for the tasks outlined above if:

1) it is determined and has the will to succeed,

2) there is a comprehensive UN military plan,

3) the UN military commander has full support from UN headquarters, and

4) the UN command knows its efforts have U.S. support.

(See Enclosure A for details of Defense views.)⁴

Given the present situation in Katanga, we are convinced that there are no satisfactory alternatives to the actions outlined above. We cannot urge the UN to cease its military activities in Katanga. To try to force the UN to let Katangan military opposition again prevent it from implementing its mandate would destroy for good the image of the U.S. as a supporter of the UN’s collective efforts and would open the door to communism in central Africa by destroying all possibility for continued moderate control in the government in Léopoldville. Nor would such a policy assure the security of the European population in Katanga or its industries since a defeat of the UN effort would be likely to result in a left-wing extremist takeover in Léopoldville or the breakdown of the Congo into three or more parts. In either case, the extremists, with the help of the Soviet and Casablanca Blocs, would continue warfare until Katanga was brought under their control. Their efforts could eventually result in a direct military confrontation of East and West in the Congo.

At the same time, there can be no question of urging the UN to apply its entire military means in an all-out effort to occupy Katanga and destroy the Tshombe regime. Such a policy could result in serious damage to the industrial potential of the province, gravely risk the lives of the European and African populations, and might require considerable time and troop reinforcement on the UN side. The UK, France and Belgium would certainly oppose such action.

We should attempt to persuade certain friendly governments to join with us in taking the following actions:

a) Prevent effectively the use of their territories as bases for military, governmental or diplomatic operations by the Katanga government;

b) Apply such economic pressures as can speedily be put into effect and prepare other measures along these lines;

c) Advise Tshombe of the economic and political measures they are undertaking and impress upon him that negotiations with Adoula in good faith offer his only prospect of survival as a political leader and of peace and stability for Katanga;

d) Announce that their nationals involved in the fighting in Katanga will be denied any protection, lose their passports and face repatriation.

The Western powers should urge the UN to continue its present policy of striving to bring about conciliation between Adoula and Tshombe so long as Tshombe does not resort to all-out war against the UN and so long as he retains such measure of political power as is required to make him a legitimate party to such negotiations. The Western powers should emphasize to the UN the dangers of destroying the provincial authorities of Katanga and the Conakat party, in view of their role in maintaining law and order and the desirability of balanced political representation of Katanga. We should continue to keep in close contact with our Western allies on Congo policies and give fullest attention to ideas on conciliation methods as well as on elements of a possible solution they might produce.

In the contingency of a breakdown of the Tshombe government, there would appear to be no alternative but for the UN to assume responsibility for continued administration wherever necessary and exhort the Belgian technicians remaining in Katanga to cooperate with the UN. We will also urge the UN to make every effort to protect the political rights of the population until peace and order have been re-established and the stage set for new elections.

We must be ready to urge Adoula to give serious consideration to any reasonable approach which would permit conciliation and to work out the integration of Katanga in a peaceful way.

Dean Rusk⁵

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. Confidential. Drafted by Eisenberg and Canup, according to the Department of State copy. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.00/12–961) A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Bundy has original.”
2. December 6.
3. Gullion, Williams, Yost, Bunche, and Narasimhan were also present. The conversation was reported in telegram 1995 from USUN, December 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–661)
4. The enclosure, not printed, summarized the U.N. operations in Katanga and Department of Defense views.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.