Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium¹

Washington, September 16, 1961, 6:20 p.m.

661. For the President Hyannis Port priority. Léopoldville pass Elisabethville as Dept’s 274. At midnight last night Bunche called Assistant Secretary Cleveland to pass on urgent request from SYG in Léopoldville. Bunche informed Cleveland UNOC wants re-inforce its military operation in Katanga by bringing battalion Ethiopian troops from Stanleyville to Elisabethville. UN requested US loan 3 or 4 US Air Force Globemasters. For this operation UN would make exception to standing policy not to use US or other national military airlift in internal operations of Congo. Bunche explained that this show of force would be designed induce Katangans accede to pressure being exerted by UN for cease-fire. During night Operations Center ascertained that USAF could make such lift in two or three days if this necessary and if decision made that US should provide such assistance.

Secretary and staff met with UK early Saturday a.m. and decided that following five points should be conveyed to UN immediately. In telephone call from Cleveland to Bunche following transmitted as present US position on this matter.

1. In our judgment we do not believe this is feasible military operation in light information we have been receiving that Kamina Air Base, and possibly Elisabethville under attack, including strafing and (in case of Kamina) napalm bombing. Security of operation therefore doubtful.

2. We strongly believe SYG should make every effort to get fighting stopped immediately.

3. While we are not at this time saying we will not provide the assistance requested, we could provide such assistance only if (a) we know clearly what SYG intends to do and what his plans are; and (b) that we agree with these plans. It was emphasized that this was key point to our position.

4. Cleveland inquired whether we could provide any medical supplies or if there was any kind of a mercy mission that we could undertake if casualties are considerable on behalf of the UN.

5. We asked if there is any rescue operation which the US should consider undertaking alone or in concert with the UK, pursuant to UN request; for example in connection with Irish troops said to be surrounded at Jadotville.

Bunche responded that he would convey immediately the above to the SYG and would be in touch with us during course of the day. During course above conversation Bunche also made following principal points:

1. With respect to operation being undertaken by UN its purpose is to root out the remaining mercenaries. He maintained that the UN could not have predicted kind of military resistance which has taken place, particularly in light of the fact that similar operation was successfully carried out August 28.

2. Bunche emphasized that resistance could not have taken place without white mercenary leadership.

3. He said military action undertaken pursuant to SC resolution which gave UN mandate to remove mercenaries.

4. He also said purpose of UN operation was to avert serious civil war which undoubtedly would have taken place since alternative to present UN action was imminent movement by ANC against Katanga forces.

5. The objective of getting Ethiopians to Kamina quickly is to give UN greater strength immediately so that lesser number are killed and so that problem can be moved into political context. Bunche insisted this was not a general action against Katanga, and that this military move was directed against those Katanga gendarmerie who are resisting largely because of white leadership.

6. Bunche emphasized that UN and Hammarskjöld have consistently sought to use peaceful means and that SYG is directing present efforts to achieve immediate cease-fire. Bunche said situation confronting UN had developed to a point where UN could fulfill its SC mandate or would have to get out. In these circumstances major civil war was likely. Moreover, Bunche stressed that if Katanga not brought under control this would increase pressure on Adoula to point where there would be real danger of Gizenga take-over. In his judgment importance of supporting UN lies in fact that this will strengthen Adoula and central government and help maintain moderate leadership within Congo.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/9–1661. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Vance and Fredericks, and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to Léopoldville, London, Paris, and USUN.