112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo1
Washington,
September 15, 1961, 10:47 p.m.
423. To Ambassador from Secretary. President and I deeply concerned over current course of events in Congo. You should make every effort ensure SYG, and in your discretion Adoula, aware US interest and views along following lines:
- 1.
- Necessity to bring Katanga situation urgently from present fighting stage to period of negotiation, if at all possible using Tshombe. You should press SYG as strongly as is necessary to make certain he accepts and follows through on this philosophy. While we understand depth of feeling bound to be generated among Congolese and UN personnel at Katanga reaction to recent UN moves, believe it essential you do what you can to substitute statesmanship on their part for present emotions.
- 2.
- Dept much relieved hear SYG feels as we do re Bocheley-Davidson. However, in view importance this question not only for Katanga but for American support UN Congo operation—subject to increasing domestic political criticism—hope you will continue press SYG hard along lines Deptel 512.2
- 3.
- You should reiterate our dismay that UN should have taken such a serious step, jeopardizing everything we have attempted to accomplish in Katanga and Congo, without adequate consultation. While we recognize that UN had warned us that energetic action might be required in Katanga, we consider timing most unfortunate and we would certainly have counseled against at this time. Objection to timing is simply that we had hopes of securing Tshombe’s agreement to see SYG in Léopoldville.
Rusk
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–1561. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Vance and cleared in draft by Cleveland and Rusk. Repeated to USUN, Brussels, Paris, and London.↩
- The reference should be to telegram 512 to USUN, September 13, which expressed concern at the Bocheley-Davidson appointment and urged that if the Congolese Government did not replace him, the United Nations should not permit him to treat Katanga like a “conquered territory” but should keep administration in U.N. hands until quiet was restored and the provincial Parliament reconvened. (Ibid., 770G.00/9–1361)↩