Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan⁰

Washington, January 26, 1962, 2:46 p.m.

1495. Following based on uncleared memcon:

During call on President Jan 24 Amb Ahmed expressed Pakistan’s heightened fears of India’s aggressive intentions against Pakistan-held portions Kashmir and Pakistan itself. Citing recent statements by Jha, Menon, Reddy, Nehru and in GOI booklet “Kashmir and United Nations,” Amb argued GOI believes that prospective Soviet veto would protect it against adverse Security Council action and that Allies would be fearful of coming to Pakistan’s aid if latter attacked lest general nuclear war result. Emphasized that Pakistan has always felt India to be aggressive. President, questioning validity of these views, pointed out that for India Pakistan is very different matter from Goa. Goa action over in 24 hours; no one thinks India could deal with Pakistan that way.

Speaking along lines of aide-memoire presented Dept January 3 (Deptel 1294 to Karachi),¹Amb said Pakistan asking USG to consider how GOI can be deterred from aggressiveness.

Pak had suggested (1) US terminate 1951 military sales agreement with India, since India violated agreement by Goa aggression; (2) US review quantum of aid to India, which at present levels (along with aid from other Western countries) frees India’s entire foreign exchange earnings for military purchases and other domestic needs outside development program; (3) public restatement of past assurances that US would come to Pakistan’s aid if it attacked; and (4) stepped up military assistance to strengthen Pakistan against Indian threat. Amplifying these requests, Amb said Pak would not oppose future US military aid to India if USG convinced India sincerely proposing oppose ChiComs but Paks doubt India seriously intend take on ChiComs. He urged importance of deterrent actions because any new fighting over Kashmir would not be localized. To contrary, it would become total war between India and Pakistan involving not only armed forces but massacres of Muslim minority in India and doubtless reprisals against Hindu minority in Pakistan. Ambassador said Pak recognizes subcontinent will stand or fall as whole since neither India nor Pakistan can withstand Sino-Soviet Bloc pressures alone. Pak does not regard itself as unduly pessimistic in appraising apparent Indian intentions since it is going by what Indian leaders themselves say.

President replied he not persuaded that likelihood of an attack by India was demonstrated by Goa action or by statements cited by Amb, even though we all know Krishna Menon and what he is like. Our concern with Indo-Pak dispute has led us, however, to suggest that Eugene Black might make helpful contribution. If both countries accept him, we hopeful of results though unlikely Black could do much till after Indian elections. Amb responded that Pakistan welcomes this suggestion though not very optimistic about its success because of India’s apparent lack of desire to settle Kashmir issue.

Amb told President Pakistan public has noticed that USG has repeatedly given public assurance to India of American support if Pakistan should attack India but has given no comparable public assurances to Pakistan. Talbot intervened to explain assurances to India based on condition that if US aid to Pakistan is misused and directed against another country in aggression US would take appropriate action to thwart such aggression. Amb agreed this initial official USG statement but said some US spokesman in years past had omitted that condition and given India full assurances. He added Pakistan knows USG acting from highest motives and that Pakistan and US desires are the same, but believed public assurances to Pakistan now would have helpfully deterrent effect on Indian leadership.

President expressed our deep concern that full effects US aid siphoned off into disputes between two countries. Said we feel our aid goes down drain; that is why we suggested Black mission. Added we have no evidence that Indo-Pak situation now likely to degenerate into war.

President referred Pakistan consortium meeting. Said he had received Ayub’s letter² and answered it.³USG bringing maximum effort to bear on other contributors to consortium as he hoped Pakistan aware; but USG would not make up any deficiency in their contributions. Other donors have their problems, so does USG. Amb acknowledged that Pakistan aware of and grateful for USG efforts in this consortium.

President commented further on dimensions our aid programs in India and Pakistan, which larger than whole Alliance for Progress this year. This true even though whole development assistance effort this hemisphere falls on US: no European nations contribute as they do to aid programs in subcontinent. Thus extremely important our aid be well used. US extremely disappointed at Indo-Pak troubles. We know how Krishna Menon, for example, exploits them, but from the point of view of the world as well as the two countries a last great effort should be made to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Otherwise, we could see that the fighting that might occur in the subcontinent would be except for a nuclear war the worst kind of war involving millions of people.

Ambassador expressed concern at reports that USG “would not take sides” on Kashmir issue. Said Pakistan not asking USG to take sides but only to support right of self-determination of peoples and let that right be exercised in Kashmir. Pakistan fully aware of the need to settle disputes with India and anxious to do so. Pakistani people uneasy, how-ever, because impression been given that US reaction to Goa was a directive to New Delhi saying that because India vital to US there will be no change in US policy toward India. Pak public also worried by reports US pressing Pakistan not go to Security Council. President said he is not aware of any special directive but of course we wish to continue friendly relationship with India as well as with Pakistan. As for Security Council hearing of the Kashmir case the Pakistan Govt knows our attitude full well.

On self-determination of peoples President commented that we don’t have power to enforce UN resolutions unilaterally nor would Pakistan expect us to. On Goa, he said, US opinion is clear and will have an effect on our relationship with India for a long time. He thought Goa action could affect our entire aid program. Ambassador commented that consequences of Goa not merely economic, though that could be important Graver situation is fact that bulk of both India and Pakistan’s armies are concentrated against each other and consequently immobilized against greater threat from north.

President noted that Ambassador had been somewhat critical of USG policies, at least by implication, but he sure Ambassador recognizes we are not always able to persuade others to do the things we wish, as for example our difficulty in persuading Pakistan of the rightness of our views on such matters as Red China, Afghanistan and Security Council action. Amb answered that on Chinese representation Pakistan had virtually eaten its words, despite promises to support Chinese Communist admission this year. Ayub had instructed Pakistan delegation at our request to vote for Chinese representation as “important issue.” President said he was thinking specifically of over-all issue of Chinese representation, but in generally merely wanted to point out that even its friends do not always see eye to eye with US, though US and Pakistan do pretty well together. Expressed his pleasure that Amb had come to see him and said he would consider Amb’s comments though he thought Amb now pretty well understood his feelings.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1-2662. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot, cleared by Kaysen, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to New Delhi.
1. See footnote 1, Document 87.
2. In a message delivered to Kennedy on January 16 through the Pakistani Embassy, Ayub referred to his discussions with Kennedy concerning economic assistance during his visit to Washington in July 1961. He recalled the understanding reached at the January 1962 meeting of the Pakistan consortium that the U.S. contribution would be a minimum of $500 million. Ayub noted that Pakistan had used what influence it had with the other members of the consortium to try to ensure that they would collectively provide the remaining $445 million, which he considered essential to Pakistan’s economic development plans for fiscal years 1962-1963. If those contributions fell short of that amount, Ayub requested U.S. assistance in bringing the combined contributions to a total of $945 million. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, Subjects, Ayub Correspondence, 1/30/61-1/16/62)
3. On January 20, the Embassy in Karachi was instructed to inform Ayub, in response to his January 16 message, that Kennedy had instructed U.S. officials to make every effort to assure a successful consortium meeting, but the United States could not make up any shortfall in contributions from other members of the consortium. (Telegram 1440 to Karachi, January 20; Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/1-1662)