Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

95. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Nehru⁰

Washington, January 18, 1962.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I appreciate your writing me at length and in personal vein on the Goan matter.¹ Your letter, incidentally, was delayed in transmittal and it reached my desk only in the last few days.

You have my sympathy on the colonial aspects of this issue. There is, I am sure, a feeling in your part of the world that this is a matter we do not quite understand. I believe we do understand. Sometimes, perhaps, we are inclined to talk a little too unctuously about the colonial origins of the United States, now nearly two centuries in the past. But, like many others, I grew up in a community where the people were barely a generation away from colonial rule. And I can claim the company of most historians in saying that the colonialism to which my immediate ancestors were subject was more sterile, oppressive, and even cruel than that of India. The legacy of Clive was on the whole more tolerable than that of Cromwell.

But I should like to say a word about the more immediate issue, that of the effect of the Goan episode on the relations between our two countries. It has not been good, but there may be useful lessons from the experience.

One difficulty was, of course, that the action followed so soon after your visit. I had naturally hoped that the candor of our exchange might have extended to all of the problems with which we were mutually concerned. I confess to a feeling that we should have discussed this problem; it is at least possible that if we had talked about it, our efforts to help prevent a solution by force could have been more helpful.

I have also been disturbed by the chain effect of this action on other parts of the world. Public opinion does not easily differentiate between the use of troops for good and bad purposes. And all countries, including of course the United States, have a great capacity for convincing themselves of the full righteousness of their particular cause. No country ever uses force for reasons it considers unjust.

Probably we should be glad of the existence of this adverse reaction, discriminating or otherwise, to the setting of armies in motion. We both want a world in which disputes are settled and oppression is ended by alternative means; it is good that on this matter opinion is with us. I fear that the episode in Goa will make it harder to hold the line for peace in other places.

But my major concern was and continues to be the effect of the action on our joint tasks, especially in terms of its impact on American opinion. Unfortunately the hard, obvious fact for our people was the resort to force—and by India. This was a shock to the majority who have admired your country’s ardent advocacy of peaceful methods, and a reinforcement to those who did not enjoy what they called “irresponsible lectures.” Moreover, the action occurred at a time when our joint efforts in the Congo were subject to especially harsh criticism here and it added a new dimension of criticism. Critics asked how we could claim to work with you for peace in the Congo while force was being used by you in Goa. The action brought also some setback for our efforts to develop the strength of the United Nations and confidence in its effectiveness. In the next few weeks, as we seek authorization by the Congress to purchase the bonds of the United Nations, I fear we shall hear a good deal about the failure to find a non-violent solution in Goa. Yet the finances of the UN depend upon this action in our Congress.

There is also the problem of aid appropriations. This, I should make clear, is not a question of strings; nothing could be farther from my thought than to make our assistance to India Contingent on her acceptance of our particular wishes in foreign or domestic policy We seek to help develop independence, and independence exists to be used. Still we must both weigh the effects of action by one country on public opinion and political action in the other. We both lead countries that are not easily governed. You are justified in asking that American action be considerate of the problems of Indian democracy. I should not willingly do anything to make your problems more difficult—shall hope, when something bears on Indian public opinion, to consider this closely, and to be informed if I am ever indifferent. Similarly I think it is reasonable that American public opinion should be a subject of concern to you. Each year our appropriations to help, not India alone, but also the other developing countries of the world, involve our most difficult political battle. This aid is of prime importance—to help countries to independence, to show compassion for the less fortunate, to ease the strains and passions that arise from poverty. I hope that you will agree that we have a common concern in maintaining the political atmosphere and the public attitudes that are sympathetic to this effort. If India had large-scale aid programs to other countries, would you not face a similar problem if one of those countries should adopt a course of armed action? And what is worse is that these difficulties spread out and affect not just one country, but the whole principle of disinterested aid.

You and I stand for cooperation and understanding, but not all our countrymen agree with us—and some of them would like nothing better than to see our hopes disappointed. It is not an accident that the men who are taking most advantage of the Goa matter here are the same men who are already attacking our aid programs and our support of the UN. They are also the men who would noisily advocate certain armed adventures by the United States. I hate to see our common purposes impeded in this way.

I feel, Mr. Prime Minister, that you would wish me to write you candidly of matters as I see them. I do so in no mood of self-righteousness, and with no feeling that our own policy is above reproach. Indeed, I trust that you will continue to make clear in equal candor your views on matters of common concern. Meanwhile, you can count on me to do all that I can to ensure that any damage to our common interests is temporary. Good and fruitful relations with India have been a matter of great concern to me for many years, and I have taken satisfaction in the progress we were making together before this episode. I believe we can and must get back on this high road, and I shall work steadily toward this end.²

Sincerely,

JFK³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Nehru Correspondence, 1/15/62-3/31/62. No classification marking.
1. See footnote 1, Document 77.
2. Nehru responded on January 30 with a letter in which he reiterated his position with respect to Goa. He wrote that his government had weighed many of the considerations put forward in Kennedy’s letter of January 18 and had taken a necessary action which was “the lesser of two evils.” Nehru’s letter was delivered to the White House on February 6, under the cover of a note from the Indian Ambassador. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries Series, India, Security 1962)
3. Kennedy’s initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original.