84. Memorandum of Conversation0


  • Post-Goa Situation: Pakistan’s Fears of Indian Intentions


  • The Secretary
  • H.E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
  • Mr. Mohammad Masood, Minister, Embassy of Pakistan
  • Mr. Salman Ali, Counselor, Embassy of Pakistan
  • SOA-T. Eliot Weil
  • NEA-Mr. Phillips Talbot

At the beginning of the conversation the Secretary informed the Ambassador that he had just received a message from Ambassador Rountree stating that he had informed the Pakistan Foreign Minister of Ambassador Galbraith’s report that the Indians planned to approach the Pakistanis with a view to arranging bilateral talks on the subject of Kashmir, and that President Ayub had appeared receptive to the idea.

[Page 172]

The Ambassador mentioned his Government’s plans to raise the Kashmir question in the Security Council later in the month and said President Ayub had appointed him a Special Representative to visit Venezuela and Chile [whose representatives are scheduled to preside over the Security Council in March and April].1 The Ambassador said he was planning to depart on the evening of January 9 but [if this new development resulted in postponement of Pakistan action in the Security Council] he might now be able to delay his departure.

The Secretary remarked that no serious talks were likely to occur during the Indian elections, but that India and Pakistan had two almost legendary debaters who would probably clash if the Kashmir matter were brought to the Security Council. Smiling, the Ambassador said he did not know whether Sir Zafrullah would like being compared with Krishna Menon, but his Government had no desire to embarrass Nehru during the Indian elections.

The Ambassador then said his Government had instructed him to discuss with the Secretary the post-Goa picture in South Asia as set forth in an aide-memoire which he handed to the Secretary (copy attached).2 The Ambassador offered “a few words in explanation” of certain portions of the aide-memoire. He emphasized India’s inconsistency in using one justification for its occupation of Junagadh and another justification for claiming all of Kashmir and for occupying Hyderabad. He stressed his belief that India had no intention of fighting Communist China and asked why, if India does intend to fight Communist China, it does not settle its differences with Pakistan and seek Pakistan’s assistance. With reference to the United States military sales agreement with India, the Ambassador said Pakistan did not want to take an obstructionist position, and that Pakistan would go along with the United States provided the United States and Pakistan were satisfied with the bona fides of India’s requests for military supplies and with India’s foreign policy. He said his Government believed there might be a reconsideration of the quantum of aid if India is diverting most of its foreign exchange for arms and is not making a proper effort to develop its economy. He said India must be deterred from foreign adventures. He then referred to the two requests in the aide-mémoire—for a public statement by the United States, and for steps to increase Pakistan’s strength—and added that there might be “other courses”.

The Secretary asked the Ambassador whether he could comment further on his impressions of agitation in India to take over Pakistan. The Ambassador said “numerous statements” had been made and that [Page 173]extremist organizations, such as the Jan Sangh, were gathering strength as Congress strength declined.

The Secretary said he would like to comment in a very preliminary way on the very important questions raised by the aide-mémoire. He said Goa and a possible attack on Pakistan were two quite different things. He said if the question of Goa had been taken into the General Assembly we would have almost certainly have failed to succeed in our objective. As Ambassador Stevenson had pointed out, it was true that the case involved “a double standard.” It was a muddled issue, involving the question of colonialism, the U.K.’s commonwealth tie with India and alliance with Portugal, and the obvious unwillingness of any UN members to fight India over Goa. The Secretary pointed out that the case of Pakistan was quite different. There was no colonial issue, Pakistan had allies, and there was a United States military presence in Pakistan. The situations were as different as night and day.

The Ambassador said that in the case of Goa, where the use of force was the issue, India was able to get the sympathy of the Afro-Asian group. In the case of Kashmir, the Soviets had said Kashmir belonged to India. The Pakistanis feared they were no match for the Indians in the propaganda field, and that the Indians could even make a case for an attack on Pakistan. He said that in 1950 Indian troops were “poised for an attack on East Pakistan” and it might have been just providential that the attack did not materialize; but that when the Indians wanted “to make propaganda” they told the Hindus in East Pakistan to move out as refugees, and the Hindus followed these orders.

The Secretary said he could not imagine that the Government of India would try to confuse people on the issue of an attack on Pakistan, or that the Afro-Asian bloc would support India in this matter. The Secretary also pointed out that the U.S.S.R. attitude on Goa had nothing to do with the United States position. The Ambassador replied that if India decided to attack Kashmir or Pakistan, the U.S.S.R. would welcome the confusion and would presumably encourage India.

In this connection the Secretary observed that the Goan development might well mean that India would be forced to consider how to work things out with Pakistan. He asked the Ambassador to let him give the aide-memoire some study and said he would see the Ambassador again.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Weil and approved in S on January 15.
  2. All brackets are in the source text.
  3. The aide-mémoire is summarized in Document 88, but not printed.