Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

70. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, December 12, 1961, 1 p.m.

1690. Department pass Defense-Army, Navy, Air. Embassy telegram 1681¹ and Department’s telegram 1980.² In view of the overnight developments, I decided to make one more effort this morning to persuade India against armed action on Goa. I accordingly delivered letter quoted next following telegram to Nehru and M.J. Desai this morning.³ To be at all persuasive you will understand it was essential to suggest sympathy for anti-colonial aspect and some alternative. Hence The New York Times extract which avoids official commitment and the reference to UN and world support. Portugal will not like but presumably will appreciate armed action less.

He still felt, however, that there was some possibility that Nehru was undecided or capable of changing his mind. (Ibid., 753D.00/12-1261)

I had a long and urgent talk with Desai afterwards impressing on him the stake which India had in the avoidance of armed solution. He noted the shooting on border and adjoining waters. I also said they surely realized the world would not believe that Portugal was attacking India and that what India was calling a naval concentration consisted of a couple of antique gunboats. I have a feeling that Desai admitted the force of my argument but he made it clear that the matter was passing rapidly beyond his hands. At the end of the discussion he said specifically that unless the Portuguese made some major concession within the next couple of days, he believed action would go forward. My estimate of the likelihood of such action is now getting rather high. Some vague indication of U.S. acquiescence to action was picked up by B.K. Nehru in Washington. I told Desai this had no standing.

Galbraith

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12-1261. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Paris for Secretary Rusk and USRO, London, Lisbon, and USUN.
1. In telegram 1681 from New Delhi, December 12, Galbraith reported that information available to the Embassy indicated an increased likelihood of Indian action against Goa. He still felt, however, that there was some possibility that Nehru was undecided or capable of changing his mind. (Ibid., 753D.00/12-1261)
2. Telegram 1980 to New Delhi, December 9, reported that the Department had received information that a journalist in India had filed a story alleging that an Indian attack upon Goa was imminent, and that India had been assured that if the attack took place the United States would not support Portugal. The Department emphasized that no such assurance had been given and reiterated its opposition to the use of force in the Goan dispute. The Embassy was instructed to make the same points clear to the reporter who filed the story. (Ibid., 753D.00/12-961)
3. In his letter, Galbraith pointed out that India’s leading role as a champion for the peaceful settlement of international disputes would be seriously compromised by armed action against Goa, and a dangerous precedent set for similar action in disputes festering elsewhere. He cited The New York Times editorial that noted that colonialism was dying in Africa and Asia and U.N. resolutions calling for an end to colonialism, as evidence that India was not without resources in seeking a peaceful settlement to the dispute over Goa. (Telegram 1691 from New Delhi, December 12; ibid., 753D.00/12-1261)