Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

60. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 7, 1961.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Secretary of State
• Ambassador J.K. Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to India
• Mr. Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
• Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot
• Prime Minister Nehru
• Foreign Secretary Desai
• Ambassador B.K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador to U.S.

President Kennedy welomed Prime Minister Nehru and his party on November 6 in Newport, Rhode Island. The visit continued in Washington November 7-9. Battle’s memorandum noted that Galbraith was the only Department of State official present during or informed of the other meetings during the visit between Kennedy and Nehru, and indicated that Galbraith would prepare memoranda regarding those meetings. No such memoranda have been found.

[Here follows discussion of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union over Berlin.]

Turning to another subject, the President acknowledged the importance India places in its geographic situation in relation to its foreign policy. He also recalled that the United States had been neutralist for a long time. Nevertheless he wanted to say that we would like India to oppose us on issues when we were wrong and to support us on those occasions when we might be right. The Prime Minister welcomed the opportunity afforded by this comment to explain the Indian approach to international issues. Indians naturally seek to act on the merit of each matter, the Prime Minister said, but he attaches importance to the manner of approach as well. He wants to create the feeling that India wants to be friendly and wants to cooperate with other nations even though it does not necessarily agree with each of them on a particular point. It is not a question of finding a midway position between the United States and the Soviet Union; that would have no meaning, really. The worst of the cold war is that it makes everyone rigid in mind and in spirit and so it becomes difficult for either side to deal with the other side. If the way to war is obstructed, then a feeling will come that matters can be dealt with in other ways, and the approach becomes easier.

The President described the foreign policy of the United States as, of course, to support countries with democratic systems, but even more basically to support national sovereignty. Sometimes this means, unhappily, that we support governments not fully supported by their own people. Yet it is not always easy to withdraw. In some places we believe that if we should withdraw communism might take over by subversion. This is the problem that faces us; we don’t object when communists take over by electoral means as Jagan did in British Guiana.

The Prime Minister asked why communism has an appeal to many people. Mainly, he felt, it develops in poor and underdeveloped countries. The President pointed out that in many areas communism takes over by force and subversion. The Prime Minister agreed that no one would view with approval terroristic tactics, adding, however, that military actions bring unfortunate results. The very act of meeting a situation militarily may make it worse. For example, with the help of United States forces a situation may be cleared but it is very likely that the position of the leaders then becomes weaker because of their dependence on an outside power. Thus the problem is not settled.

President Kennedy explained that we are faced with a situation in which we are making efforts to settle the Laos problem but at the same time there are serious attacks on South Vietnam, some of them via Laos. If these should succeed, it would look as if by our willingness to negotiate on Laos we had lost both Laos and Vietnam. That would discredit our efforts and make it impossible for us to negotiate on other issues, including Berlin.

Ambassador Galbraith interjected that several members of this Administration have had the view that truly neutral countries offer opportunities for us to help economically to build them up. If in Laos or in any other country neutralism becomes merely a stage which precedes a communist takeover then the whole concept of neutralism will become a stench in the nostrils. The question is what India and other countries can do about this.

Agreeing that there is a question of what to do, Prime Minister Nehru observed that the whole idea in the Geneva Conference of 1954 was to create international commissions to meet this situation. To some extent it has been the failure to live up to these commitments that has led to later difficulties. If the commissions had not been there he was convinced that trouble would have come much sooner in Vietnam. In Laos, indeed, trouble did come after the commission was closed down. These things don’t always happen according to plans or our decision. We can affect them sometimes but not always. The Prime Minister said he realized the position of the United States is difficult because the United States is tied up in many matters from which it is difficult to come out.

On Laos the President said that the United States will try to persuade the three Princes to come together promptly, in this month of November. But, he added, we don’t want our efforts in Laos to end in a collapse in South Vietnam.

Turning to the question of nuclear testing, President Kennedy began by assuring the Prime Minister that the United States had not prepared for testing during the test ban negotiations. Since those negotiations broke down we have had about three small underground tests. This is in sharp contrast to what the Soviets have done. We are now faced with what to do in the future. A few days earlier he had announced that we would now prepare for testing in the atmosphere. This does not mean we will necessarily conduct tests in the atmosphere. We will examine the Soviet tests. If they have done something that would really change the balance of power—such as making a genuine anti-missile missile or a way of disrupting radar—we could not ignore that. Obviously, however, the President would prefer not to have tests. The U.S. will not have them unless we must. The President wished that the Soviets would agree to ban atmospheric testing. If they do not agree either to that or to inspection, we will face a difficult decision. It is hard to be optimistic when after three years of negotiations the Soviets will not agree to the kind of inspection the British and we think necessary. In fact, Secretary Rusk added, they have interjected the troika concept into the inspection process. We cannot accept the veto inherent in that.

The Prime Minister, agreeing that these are difficulties, asked how then are we to deal with these problems? Presumably the present drift can land the world in a nuclear war. This is a terrible prospect. The moratorium by itself does stop the testing. That could allow the treaty to come in. The treaty has been discussed for three years; it need not require too much further discussion.

President Kennedy observed that it seems obvious the Soviet Union made the decision to resume testing some months ago, perhaps last February or March. This Government made a major effort to get an agreement with the Soviet Union and he is very disappointed that it has not been achieved. He quite agreed that the drift goes on. The Chinese are going to start testing. The French already have done so. In the absence of an agreement, testing will be started by one country after another.

How then to stop this, the Prime Minister asked. It will be a very dangerous situation if the Chinese start testing. In India people rather pooh poohed that prospect but the Chinese are proceeding with it, probably more for prestige reasons than otherwise. The hope in the situation lies in the fact that it is to the advantage of the Soviet Union not to have war. If some treaty can be obtained fairly soon it may be possible for the Soviet Union to forestall testing by China.

President Kennedy suggested that perhaps the Soviet Union resists a test ban either because it feels that China would not agree to this or because it really does not want an inspection process operating within its borders. Secretary Rusk commented that if Khrushchev believes secrecy of the Soviet system to be of very large strategic value then it is very difficult to see how we can proceed into another moratorium without running the risk of being duped. Prime Minister Nehru agreed that the Secretary had correctly described the Soviet position on secrecy. The problem will remain as long as there is a danger of using nuclear weapons. If an assurance can be obtained that they will not be used then the fear does not arise. If disarmament can go that far there is some hope. Anyhow the big question is how one can deal with the situation with its risks of accidents and all.

President Kennedy observed that the records of the 1914 war, the second world war and the Korean war, each of which started in quite distinct circumstances, make it rather hard to see which course will succeed in preventing a future war. Possibly the best course is to indicate with precision where our vital interests lie—and then (he added with a smile) hope that India can be effective as a peacemaker.

President Kennedy went on to say that one matter that had been discussed with President Ayub when he was in Washington was the problem of Kashmir. The danger to the peace is obviously of deep concern to us and to others. We hope our role can be as helpful as possible. In this spirit, the President wondered whether the Prime Minister could see any line of settlement that would be acceptable both to India and to Pakistan.

Responding, the Prime Minister noted that the Kashmir case is now in its fourteenth year. The matter arose in October 1947. At the end of 1948 after fifteen months of fighting a cease-fire was arranged. Since then, apart from occasional troubles, the cease-fire has functioned. Naturally, he said, India’s desire has been to settle the issue. India has discussed the problem directly with Pakistan and there have been several UN mediators—good people—but without result.

Recalling in some detail the history of the Kashmir case, the Prime Minister added that basically the Indian position is that no settlement is possible except on the basis of the situation as it now exists—with minor modifications. India cannot accept the Pakistani theory that because the majority of the people in Kashmir are Muslims, Kashmir should go to Pakistan. That theory would crack up India which has 45,000,000 Muslims and is the third largest Muslim state in the world. Without any fault of theirs, the 45,000,000 Muslims in India have become associated with the religious argument that Pakistan puts forward, and would suffer.

The Prime Minister noted that in Kashmir there had been two general elections and economic progress and land reform. Nothing like this had occurred on the other side. Probably if India allowed people from the other side to come into Kashmir, there would be considerable inward migration.

The Prime Minister observed that one Pakistani Prime Minister, before General Ayub, had accepted the idea of the status quo in Kashmir. This man had thought it better to let the Kashmir issue simmer down while India and Pakistan were solving their other problems. Toward this end there had been resolution of the canal waters issue, with India contributing many tens of millions of dollars. Various frontier matters had also been settled. In the last year or so, however, there had been renewed agitation over Kashmir. This was a matter of surprise to India, which thought the Kashmir situation settling down.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the partition of India left tens of thousands of families with members on both sides and many emotional ties between people in the two countries. It is a most extraordinary situation, which now needs to be allowed to quiet down. Perhaps later the two countries could have some form of confederation or something else. Kashmir is not a matter of the territory—actually, the territory is a burden on India—so much as it is a matter of life. The Prime Minister recalled that his own ancestors had come down from Kashmir nearly 300 years ago and that Kashmir has been one of the biggest centers of Indian culture for the past 2000-3000 years; thus the Kashmir question is a largely emotional issue. As a practical matter, raising the Kashmir issue now would uproot all the Indians have done. In three months India is going to have general elections (something Pakistan does not have) and if this problem is touched off now there will be huge troubles. People would be migrating with all their bitterness. That would not be a solution—just more upheavals. With Pakistan developing a conservative Muslim outlook (although Ayub is not a religious figure, but a Sandhurst product) practically speaking the present situation cannot be changed. No government of India could function, certainly not his government, if this were to happen. Possibly a narrow vindictive government might then function, but only that kind. It would be a difficult enough matter to get the Indian Parliament and people to accept the status quo. They certainly would not accept a revision of boundaries to India’s detriment.

Ambassador Galbraith asked whether, while the two parts of Kashmir remained, a much more relaxed access could be arranged from one side of Kashmir to the other. Could this be a possible alternative to the narrow territorial debate? The Prime Minister responded that if the territorial claims were dropped all other questions could be resolved easily. He then recapitulated the history of the military action in Kashmir, concluding that India is now again threatened by tribal invasion. Although nothing is officially stated, there are reports of 100,000 tribesmen coming. That is a very difficult situation.

The President asked whether in the Prime Minister’s judgment it would then not be feasible to anticipate a solution to the problem that both India and Pakistan could accept. The Prime Minister replied that he had felt a little before Ayub came in that the two countries would settle on the basis of the status quo, with some modifications of the cease-fire line to make it a proper international frontier. However the difficulties remain. Another difficulty is that in part of Kashmir, Ladakh, the Chinese have committed their aggression. To annoy India, the Pakistanis started to flirt with the Chinese on this matter.

Returning once more to the question, the President observed that there would be a somewhat better use of resources if India and Pakistan were at peace and asked whether there is anything the United States can do to help the situation. Responding, the Prime Minister said that even now the bitterness of partition is dying down. While it can again be whipped up by exploiting religion he felt and hoped it would settle down. The Prime Minister noted some important differences between the leaders of India and Pakistan. When independence came the Indian group had been leaders and they came naturally into the government and then stayed on through elections. Pakistan, however, was a negative proposition based on hatred of India and the feeling of landlords to exploit Islam. Its only policy was hatred of India. Persons who came to the front had actually opposed freedom. They all came from top landlord families. A nation could not be built, however, just on hatred of India and Pakistan found that out. When Ayub came to power he had some following at the beginning because he got rid of the unpopular people who had been in charge. Once that was done Ayub, with his rather limited military mind, could think of nothing but cleaning up the streets of Karachi under martial law. Ayub is no stranger to Indians. Every senior officer in the Indian Army knows Ayub well and has his judgment of him.

The Prime Minister added that throughout he himself has been popular with people in Pakistan, even though some of his closest friends have been jailed for their political activities there. The situation is such a pity.

Ambassador Galbraith observed that the Prime Minister was being somewhat severe in describing Pakistani policy as only hatred of India. The Ambassador had worked with their planning people and Pakistani planning, while not up to the standard of India, has been quite good. The Prime Minister agreed that of course there are some people interested in helping the country.

President Kennedy then turned to the question of American aid to India and Pakistan. Many Americans, he said, believe that we would do better to give actual funds to Pakistan and let them decide what they want to spend on military aid and what on economic aid. The difficulty is that it is easier to get funds from Congress for military assistance than for economic assistance. The military assistance enables the Pentagon to sell second-hand equipment to other countries and in effect to use the proceeds to get new equipment. Nevertheless, if giving only economic assistance to Pakistan is the right thing to do, we should look into ways to do it.

Ambassador Galbraith added military assistance to Pakistan still makes big headlines in India. The United States gave India a half billion dollars for economic aid and gave Pakistan twelve airplanes. There were twelve times as many questions in the Indian Parliament about the planes as about the aid. The Prime Minister responded that no one in India except communists want to run down the United States. Indians do not doubt the intentions of Americans, but Pakistan is still a military dictatorship and Indians doubt what it might do.

Mr. Rostow intervened to suggest to the Prime Minister that in talking of “minor border adjustments” in Kashmir the Prime Minister had used the same phrase that President Ayub had used when he discussed the Kashmir issue with President Kennedy. President Kennedy observed, however, that we did not know exactly what President Ayub had had in mind when he spoke of “minor border adjustments.”

The President then asked the Prime Minister what, as a student of personality, is his estimate of Nkrumah in Ghana. Does the Prime Minister think Ghana is a good investment for the United States?

Ghana itself is a good investment, the Prime Minister responded. However, Nkrumah is rather paranoic and does think of himself as the leader of Africa. He asked Indian help in training their Air Force. The Indian officers did go and ultimately he turned them out and handed the job to the British. Now he has turned them out. Some Israelis have had experience there too. The Prime Minister himself had not been to Ghana nor indeed to Africa, except Egypt and Sudan.

The President said he had also wanted to ask the Prime Minister about Tito, i.e. does the Prime Minister think Tito is likely to tie into the Soviet Union more closely? The Prime Minister responded that the Yugoslavs have done rather well. He does not think they will change their basic policies. In foreign policy the Yugoslavs are basically anti-German. Thus they will agree with the Soviet Union on German questions though not really on others. He must admit that he was rather surprised at the Soviet position at the Belgrade Conference. There were many countries there. Non-aligned countries are so non-aligned that they do not agree even among themselves. Africa, of course, is in a state of turmoil. This is a fascinating and dangerous time. There are many Indians in Africa and the Prime Minister advises them to be friendly and helpful. In spite of everything Africa is a confident nation, full of vitality.

Returning to Tito, the President explained that our ambition has been to see Tito’s Yugoslavia succeed as a national communist state which we have felt does not constitute a threat to the free world. Our task has, however, been made more difficult by the Belgrade Conference and the Yugoslav position there.

On this note the day’s session closed.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/21/61-11/31/61. Secret. Drafted by Talbot; approved in S on November 26; and approved in the White House by Rostow according to a note on a November 29 covering memorandum from Battle to Bundy. The meeting was held at the White House.