Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

56. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State⁰

Kabul, November 3, 1961, 3 p.m.

331. From Merchant. I shall certainly bend every effort to keep Kabul door open (Deptel 17 November 2)¹ but for reasons developed below I doubt useful purpose Presidential message to Ayub at this juncture though naturally I will make no final recommendation till text received.

Kabul’s next telegram digests my talk with Prince Naim shortly after arrival from Pindi November 2.² I also talked to him at Ambassador’s dinner same evening but nothing new developed. He was gracious but unwilling to discuss transit or in fact any topic more recent than a millenium ago. He confirmed my appointment with him Saturday morning but in reply my expression eager willingness meet with him or any colleague November 3 he replied being holiday he foresaw no such need. From Ambassador’s he left for weekly meeting of Royal Family at Palace and of course it is possible new attitude will emerge from that conclave.

At moment my judgment which Ambassador Byroade shares is that however illogical in terms of simplified transit procedures and Afghan own national interest in avoidance greatly increased dependence on Soviets, RGA at this point in time are unwilling lift finger to enable transit shipments to enter Afghan via Pakistan unless and until Pakistanis agree reopening Afghan consulates or as possible final fall back trade agencies. It is only barely conceivable Ayub might agree to latter.

Naim’s reaction November 2 to my draft statement (“does not meet RGA position”) agreement see me November 4 “as matter of form” and no provision of opportunity to see Daud or King foreshadows confirmation flat rejection with thanks my efforts on November 4. Less likely possibility is counterproposal emerging from Palace meeting last night.

If latter occurs I will of course in consultation with Ambassadors Byroade and Rountree consider best tactics and my present travel plans together with Department’s guidance already received.

If first alternative is confirmed November 4 as carefully considered RGA position, I intend:

1. Refuse take “no” as final answer and insist Afghans keep my formula under study assuring them no intention to publish or give any public indication good offices have failed or assign blame as between two parties for lack success so far in arrival at modus vivendi for transit resumption.

(2) Tell Naim here and Pakistanis in Karachi (where both Ayub and Qadir will be over weekend though heavily engaged in ceremonial opening new bank building with foreign dignitaries) that owing need my return to Ottawa and fact my stay in area already considerably longer than originally contemplated, I plan to depart Karachi for Washington November 6, where I will report my conversations and present status proposal to the President whose good offices will continue to be exercised through Ambassadors Byroade and Rountree.

(3) Assure both Paks and Afghans of President’s deep continuing personal interest in this matter and my genuine personal confidence that by exercise ingenuity and passage of time way will be found, though I am realistically cognizant that US aid program to Afghan cannot continue in present form and dimension very much longer if US supplies continue to pile up as result paralysis Pakistan transit route.

My own view is that time rather than ingenuity is more important ingredient in any solution. I consider Afghans for reasons of fate [face?] and very possibly overconfidence in own ability hold Soviets off short of national disaster are entirely capable of continuing for some time to mutilate their own nose. Despite Ambassador Byroade’s and my efforts they may understimate difficulties USG would face in restarting any suspended or sharply reduced country aid program. In this connection, I am satisfied that a significant US aid program with substantial though less effective presence of US advisors and technicians could and should be maintained in Afghan even if (as might be unavoidably decided by Washington) end came to projects dependent on bulk imports delivery of which possible currently only though Karachi. Not all the reasons for Afghan stubborness are openly stated or acknowledged.

Pakistan position likewise not entirely on top of table. Ayub frankly has told me my good offices mission prematurely timed. Reopening transit traffic promptly would no doubt in his view relieve very pressure on Afghans which his hard policy is designed to apply. Accordingly I believe his present purpose vis-a-vis US is to give enough to avoid our being able exclusively to blame him for intransigeance but not enough in any formula to enable Afghans in their pride to accept.

My consequent conclusion is that it is best to leave matter as it stands (assuming I can prevent final and flat Afghan “no”) and personally to depart area making every effort by my departure statement (which when drafted I will cable) that no legitimate basis will exist for public assumption good offices effort has failed or ended. To try to push Ayub further right now by any means I believe would be unproductive. We must bear in mind his importance as an ally and recognize he has in fact already made some distasteful concessions in my present formula in order to meet part way our concern and sense urgency which he decidedly does not share. Similarly I do not believe non-US influence (such as by sympathetic third country ambassadors in Kabul) will help with Afghans at this point. Ambassador Byroade can and will work unrelentingly on Royal Family and other personalities in Kabul, but basically I think passage of time with (1) more evident disastrous effect on trade and economic development from loss German as well as US imports resulting from what is substantially self-imposed blockade of Pakistan route and (2) increasing feeling of nakedness with Russians must do its essential work before any formula falling short of their currently stated demands will prove acceptable. On this point Ambassador Byroade is far from convinced of validity my estimate Afghan reaction to pressures of time will be rational.

Foregoing paragraphs are premised on no change in present Afghan attitude as stated to me November 2 before I depart for Karachi.

I wish to repeat that formula I brought here from Pindi in my judgment would enable immediate movement immobilized freight in Pak with prospect of longer term arrangements logistically more sensible and do so with barely sufficient facesaving elements to permit Afghan acceptance. Ambassador Byroade believes RGA could survive acceptance formula in present form though it might entail or require Daud’s departure from present office.

Incidentially Ambassador Byroade believes and I now agree that dangling invitation to King for official visit to US 1962 would not at this time be of utility, although he continues believe early visit to US unrelated to good offices on transit would valuably contribute to relationship.

Finally, all tactics and my travel plans will need new look if Afghans in next day or two indicate any flexibility in their position. I believe this message responds to all points in recent Deptels including 174³ and 176 to Kabul. I also want to say Ambassadors Byroade and Rountree have been invaluable in their wise advice which in each case has reflected broad and not parochial interests. Spengler has been indispensable.

Needless to say I regret deeply fact my efforts so far have produced no tangible result.

I have just received word Naim desires postpone my November 4 appointment from morning to afternoon which may well presage some shift Afghan position. I have, of course, agreed.

Byroade

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/11-361. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Karachi.
1. In telegram 176 to Kabul, the Department instructed Merchant to make every effort to keep the door open in Kabul. If, however, the Afghan Government found the watered down version of Merchant’s formula unacceptable, the Department felt that Merchant should “have another go at Ayub.” (Ibid., 689.90D/11-261)
2. In telegram 332 from Kabul, November 3, Merchant reported that he had presented his revised draft formula to Foreign Minister Naim, but since it did not meet the minimum Afghan requirement of reopening the consulates and trade agencies, Naim saw no possibility that his government would agree to it. He agreed to review the proposal with his colleagues “as a matter of routine,” and would meet again with Merchant on November 4 with their response, but he anticipated that the meeting would only be a “matter of form.” (Ibid., 689.90D/11-361) Merchant’s meeting with Naim on November 4 bore out Naim’s prediction. The Afghan Government’s conditions for an acceptable settlement constituted essentially the status quo ante. (Telegram 338 from Kabul, November 5; ibid., 689.90D/11-561)
3. In telegram 174 to Kabul, October 31, the Department of State relayed various suggestions for consideration in the event that Merchant’s proposed formula was not adopted by the two sides in the course of the second round of discussions. If there was some hope that a revised formula might eventually be accepted, the Department asked Merchant not to rule out a third round of discussions. Assuming a third round materialized and the Afghan Government remained to be convinced, the Department suggested that Ambassadors of other Moslem countries might provide useful support. Finally, the Department suggested that, if an immediate solution was not in prospect after the second round, the problem be left as fluid as possible. (Ibid., 689.90D/10-3161)