Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

54. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State⁰

Karachi, October 27, 1961, 5 p.m.

772. For Ambassador Byroade from Merchant. I returned by air from Kabul evening October 25, having spent two days there consulting with Ambassador Byroade and talking to King, Daud and Naim.¹ I also had opportunity on social occasions to talk to four or five Afghan Cabinet Ministers. October 20 I had spent in Rawalpindi in company Ambassador Rountree after devoting day of arrival to consulting with him and having extended talk with Foreign Secretary Dehlavi in External Affairs Karachi. In Rawalpindi I talked with Ayub twice and had extended discussion with Qadir² supplemented by less formal contact with several other Ministers. Between Rawalpindi and Kabul I spent Sunday³ in Peshawar inspecting railroad yards, storage facilities and condition US wheat and other US aid shipments. I also viewed Afghan border and rail line from top of Khyber Pass (see Peshawar’s airgram A-28, October 25).⁴ Foregoing completed my first round exploratory talks during which I floated no possible formulae for settlement transit problem but sought frank expression each government’s policies and attitudes while taking occasion myself to underline the President’s deep personal interest this matter and elements in situation which led US to see urgency in arrival at some arrangement under which transit traffic would again move. Reception and atmosphere both capitals cordial. Pakistanis, while showering me with good wishes, did not conceal their belief timing good offices premature and hence seriously in error tactically. Afghans repeatedly stated appreciation my presence even if mission failed.

As you are aware from my earlier reports each government maintained with no significant modification or even nuance public positions already taken with same intensity of feeling as reported in detail in past weeks by Ambassador Rountree and Byroade respectively.

Ayub stated he desired friendly relations with Afghans and restoration diplomatic relations. He furthermore reaffirmed in precise terms Pakistani intent to abide by 1958 transit agreement and desire to see traffic resume, attaching however as conditions (A) no reopening Afghan consulates in Pakistan, and (B) no venturing Pakistani trucks and drivers across Afghan border in view Pakistan inability protect them against mistreatment.

Afghan Government, notably Daud who excelled Naim in frankness, stated Afghans desired friendly relations with Pakistan and resumption diplomatic relations. He denied Afghans in effect blockaded themselves on transit route through Pakistan but stated flatly reopening of Afghan consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan was sine qua non for freight to move once more on transit route.

In effect Ayub hoped I would “beat some sense into bloody minds of Afghan Royal Family”, while Daud quite plainly said Pakistanis were people to whom I should talk since they had unilaterally blocked transit and Afghans the injured party.

First round my talks confirmed public positions two governments are diametrically opposed with little in common save reciprocal professions of desire to improve relations. Despite my emphasis in both capitals on limited terms my mission, greater part my listening time was spent on Pushtunistan, which is black background of their relations with each other and makes extremely difficult devising solution to transit problem, resumption of which is of such vital importance to Afghan and of some economic benefit to Pakistanis in Peshawar region. Being now on the ground, I feel even greater urgency attached to effort restore transit traffic. Every week which passes will I believe increase Afghan’s already substantial economic dependence on Soviet Union and lead ultimately to its total loss of freedom. Delay in reopening Karachi route will make it daily more difficult for us to justify to ourselves continuing forward programming and procurement for present US economic aid program to Afghan. On latter, however, I recommend no negative decisions be taken in Washington at least until outcome my mission clear.

I have in mind a formula to present early next week separately to both governments. In essence it would entail successive unilateral declarations by Pakistan and Afghan Governments in that order which would include statement intention of each to appoint liaison officer provided for under transit agreement but never appointed. Afghan liaison officer with “additional liaison officers” (latter posted in Peshawar, Chaman and Karachi respectively) would operate with appropriate facilities and immunities in Pakistan to facilitate transit services. This would be portrayed in presentation by me hopefully as first in series of steps, last of which would be renewal diplomatic relations and thereafter negotiation re establishment such consulates in each country as might then be agreed as necessary to meet legitimate needs.

At Chaman Afghan trucks would enter Pakistan for distance necessary to load at storage area located at present rail head. In Peshawar Pakistani trucks would carry goods from storage areas to border point on Pakistan side Tor Kham (at foot Khyber Pass) and transfer loads to Afghan vehicles. Pakistanis would start promptly construction necessary storage and related facilities at Tor Kham. As interim measure pending provision minimum facilities at border Afghan trucks would be admitted to Peshawar to load food, medicine and diplomatic shipments now there. Pakistan and Afghan liaison officers would be charged to undertake urgent study repairing present rail line in Khyber area to actual border, thereby in long term future enabling shipments from Karachi direct to Afghan customs on both border crossing points. Finally, each government’s declaration would contain certain preambular recitals of desire restore good neighborly relations, and suitable reference to US good offices, to convention high seas, to transit agreement of 1958 and hopefully some innocuous salad dressing mixed to recipe of each party. I would also seek Pakistan agreement promptly to ratify and deposit instrument high seas convention dealing with rights of land-locked countries, which conventions both countries have signed but only Afghan ratified.

I will reduce foregoing formula with more precision and detail to draft declarations. My plan thereafter is to return Rawalpindi and Kabul in that order first of next week. In this second, and I assume final pair of visits, I will explain these are not negotiating documents in usual sense but represent my best effort find road out of impasse. Naturally, I will consider any constructive counter-proposals or amendments not affecting key elements but I believe it would be great mistake for me to become entangled in protracted talks placing us in the middle. I will use my best efforts at persuasion and as agreed before my departure will hold out no hope of reward or threat of reprisal to either party. I will, however, be franker than by design I was during first round in delineating consequences which I foresee would follow failure achieve early resumption transit traffic.

I am deeply impressed with dangers inherent in present situation to Afghanistan’s continued freedom and non-alignment. I am also aware emotional depth of Pak commitment to policy of firmness on northwest frontier. The latter attitude renders it dangerous to our own national interest to apply what Paks would regard as excessive pressure on them, with resultant harm to our relations with an ally which is staunch and now cooperates in area vital to our own security. Realistically, I believe odds are against successful achievement purpose my mission, but I am by no means devoid of hope. One more week I judge will determine success or failure and thereafter I believe it would be unwise for me to remain in area.

This is my own message. Ambassador Rountree, however, has read it and concurs in assessment, formula and tactics. Ambassador Byroade’s comments to me repeated to Department are urgently requested.⁵

Department please repeat to other posts including Tehran as it determines.

Rountree

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10-2761. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Also sent to Kabul.
1. The Embassy in Kabul reported on Merchant’s conversations with Zahir, Daud, and Naim in telegrams 314, 317, and 318, October 24, 25, and 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10-2461, 689.90D/10-2561, and 689.90D/10-2661) Memoranda of the conversations were transmitted in despatch 282 from Karachi, October 27. (Ibid., 689.90D/10-2761)
2. The Embassy in Karachi reported on Merchant’s conversation with Qadir and the first of his conversations with Ayub in telegrams 737 and 738, October 21. (Ibid., 120.1590/10-2161 and 689.90D/10-2161) Merchant reported on the second of his conversations with Ayub in telegram 768, October 26. (Ibid., 120.1590/10-2661) A memorandum of the conversation reported in telegram 768 was transmitted in despatch 281 from Karachi, October 26. (Ibid., 689.90D/10-2661)
3. October 22.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10-2561)
5. In telegram 179 from Kabul to Karachi, October 28, repeated to the Department, Byroade stated that he was concerned that the formula outlined in telegram 772 would not be accepted by the Afghan Government as it contained no specific proposal for the restoration of the consulates. Byroade suggested that, if the restoration of the consulates was impossible, the reopening of the trade agencies, with different personnel and assurances concerning their activities, might provide an acceptable middle ground. (Ibid., 689.90D/10-2861)