The chief risk is a tough Pakistani reaction, unless we handle the
transaction with skill. But we cannot afford to give the Pakistani a veto on
our Indian policy, when we have a major opportunity to move India closer to
us. Moreover, to mollify the Paks we would
plan on a similar long-term MAP commitment
to them, if they undertook to behave themselves vis-à-vis Peiping.
This thoughtful paper speaks for itself; we urge that you approve it. In
fact, we’d go somewhat further than cautious State and DOD—perhaps to as high as $65 million MAP a year including high performance
[Page 697]
aircraft, if needed as an added
sweetener to get the Indian response Bowles hopes to get. We propose a meeting to discuss this
enterprise with you at 11:00 Thursday.1
Attachment2
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT
- Next Steps on Military Aid to India and Pakistan
Proposal for India
Ambassador Bowles proposes that we
make a five-year military assistance commitment to India in exchange for
Indian decisions to limit their force levels, hold down procurement of
military equipment from the Soviet Bloc, hold to a minimum diversion of
foreign exchange from economic development, exercise restraint in
relations with Pakistan, and cooperate with us in the containment of
Communist China. He believes that there is a reasonable chance that
India will make these decisions, if our offer is good enough. (See
Enclosure 1.)3
The Departments of State and Defense and AID agree that if we could reach some such understanding
with India, it would be well worthwhile. A steady long-term policy of
military cooperation with India would do much to stabilize our
relationship and serve our long-term political aim of pulling India
closer to the United States. Indian decisions to settle on moderate
force levels would hold down Indo-Pak
[Page 698]
tensions. We would achieve some
preclusion in fact, and excessive Soviet penetration of the Indian
military would be prevented. Major diversions of foreign exchange from
economic development, to which we are so heavily committed, would be
avoided. (Over the past three years India has spent an average of $95
million of its own foreign exchange for defense; estimates indicate this
figure may go as high as $160 million for Indian FY 1964. This would put real pressure on the Indian
development program.) Since we will probably provide substantial MAP to India over the next several years
anyway, we ought to maximize the leverage we get from it by proceeding
along the above lines.
We believe, however, that we should stop somewhere short of as explicit a
commitment as Ambassador Bowles
suggests, and should approach it more cautiously, rather than laying all
our cards on the table at the outset. Such tactics would leave us
greater freedom of action to gauge the likely Pakistani reaction, and to
find out whether the Indians would indeed be sufficiently responsive,
before deciding how much of our own plans to divulge. Nonetheless, we
would go ahead now with the preparation of a five-year MAP program for India in the $50-$60
million annual range, so that we would be prepared, if the timing were
ripe and the Indian response to our initial probes satisfactory, to
divulge our longer term plans.
Proposal for Pakistan
In the years since 1954, we have established a pattern of military
assistance to Pakistan which in many respects resembles the one which we
are now suggesting for India. We have agreed to modernize and maintain
five and a half divisions and to modernize the Pakistan air force. The
latter has come to mean that eventually we will replace the obsolescent
F-86 squadrons with supersonic aircraft. (Pakistan already has one
squadron of F-104s which we delivered in 1961.) We have told the
Pakistanis from time to time of the quantities of certain types of
equipment we were planning to deliver to meet our commitments. By
providing this level of support, we were able to make it possible for
the Pakistanis to limit their over-all force goals and the diversion of
their foreign exchange to military expenditures.
One reason for caution about moving ahead too fast in revealing to India
our longer term MAP plans is that these
might leak prematurely to Pakistan and cause a violent reaction before
we had laid the necessary groundwork. To mitigate the Pakistani reaction
we might provide them too, at roughly the same time, with an indication
of our longer term MAP intentions,
perhaps for the next three years. To this end, we should also prepare a
three-five year MAP program for Pakistan
for use if and when the timing seems ripe. We’ve been planning on around
$40 million annually in continuing MAP.
As with India, we would also attach conditions
[Page 699]
to this program, particularly that it is
predicated upon our clear understanding that Pakistan will not go too
far with China.
Unfortunately Chou En-lai’s coming visit to Pakistan leads me to believe
that now is the wrong time to talk with Ayub about longer term MAP. However, as we chart our course in the troubled waters
of U.S.-Pakistan relations during the months ahead, I believe it
important that we be prepared to give Ayub a clear signal of our continued willingness to
support Pakistan unless its conduct impairs our ability to do so.
General Taylor in his
forthcoming visit to Pakistan will be prepared to reiterate our
assurances in the course of his review of our military relationship.
(See Enclosure 2.)4
Recommendations
In order to permit us to move ahead with both India and Pakistan, but
with appropriate tactical flexibility, I recommend with the concurrence
of Bob McNamara and Dave Bell that you make the following decisions:
India
- 1.
- That we develop an internal plan, not to be disclosed to the
Indians as yet, for a program of military assistance in support of
Indian forces to meet the Chinese threat to be accomplished over a
period of five years. The JCS
determined on November 23 that India required 12 divisions and two
independent brigades together with supporting units and 35
squadrons, including three squadrons of night/all-weather fighters
to meet this threat. (We are now supporting the conversion of six
divisions into effective mountain divisions and have told the
Indians that we will convert two more if funds are
available.)
- 2.
- That the above program include helping convert those Indian ground
forces which are required to meet the threat from China into
effective mountain divisions with supporting elements; that we
continue to assist India develop its logistic capacity to support
these forces along the China border; and that we continue to help
India meet a part of its defensive needs against China through
domestic production.
- 3.
- That the program include continued support to the Indian Air
Force, including radar, communications and air transport. However,
we would leave open the question of supersonics and postpone for the
present a decision on supplying these to India or Pakistan.
- 4.
- That the above plans be developed within a range of $50-60 million
in MAP annually, leaving for
subsequent decision the precise five-year program level.
- 5.
- That our willingness to extend and thereafter continue such
long-range assistance will rest upon a satisfactory understanding
that the Government of India will: limit its over-all forces to
reasonable levels; limit procurement of arms from the Soviet Union;
avoid excessive diversion of foreign exchange to defense
expenditure; and exercise restraint in its relations with Pakistan.
Such United States action would also rest on continued United
States-Indian agreement on the political and military implications
of the Chinese threat.
- 6.
- That, as to the tactics with India, we proceed on the following
careful, step-by-step basis:
- a.
- At this point, we would only authorize Ambassador
Bowles to say
that we were considering longer term plans for military aid
to India. Before we could firm these up we needed a better
understanding of proposed Indian defense plans, force
ceilings, resource allocations, procurement from third
countries, etc., over the next several years. We need to
tell the Pakistanis nothing at this point.
- b.
- General Taylor
would reinforce this line during his visit to India (16-18
December) and probe Indian intentions. (See Enclosure
3.)5
- c.
-
Depending upon Indian responsiveness, we would be
prepared at an appropriate time to divulge to India our
longer term MAP
intentions. Exactly what we say at that time would
depend on our program conclusions and the extent of the
understandings the Indians were prepared to reach with
us along the lines of paragraph 5 above. We would in no
case, of course, make a firm commitment but only state
our intentions, the carrying out of which would be
dependent on Indian performance and United States
appropriations. We would simultaneously inform
Pakistan.
Pakistan
- 7.
- That we similarly develop an internal U.S. plan for a possible
three-five year MAP package for
Pakistan within the context of our present commitments. This plan
should include the provision of two more squadrons of supersonic
aircraft.
- 8.
- That we not divulge this until we are further satisfied as to
Pakistani intentions vis-a-vis their alliance obligations; but that
we be prepared, if circumstances seem ripe, to divulge this program
at such time as we divulge our long-term Indian program.
- 9.
- That any three-five year Pakistan MAP program be predicated on clear understandings that
Pakistan will place acceptable limits on the development of its
relations with Communist China and will fulfill the basic
requirements of its alliance relationship with us.
Since we plan to move ahead with India in stages, I hope to be able to
recommend to you that we move toward longer range military delivery
[Page 701]
schedules for Pakistan before
or when we disclose the full dimensions of our Indian package to
Nehru. Max
Taylor will drive home to Ayub the dangers of his present course with China when
he is in Karachi on 19-20 December. Upon his return we shall take
another look at the whole problem of containing Communist aggression on
the subcontinent. Since Pakistan sees its so far limited relations with
Communist China as serving its national interest, just as India sees
relations with the U.S.S.R. as serving its interests, it is perhaps too
much to hope that we can develop unlimited security relationships with
either country. Yet if we can move ahead, albeit somewhat jerkily in
each country, I believe these proposals for military assistance to India
and Pakistan will advance our strategic objective of resisting Communist
pressure in the area without placing intolerable strains on our
relations with either country. Moreover, the course we propose, though
not ideal, seems best calculated to reduce the possibility that the
Sino-Soviet dispute will be fought out in the subcontinent.
