Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

313. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, July 30, 1963, 10 p.m.

474. Mediation Proposal. The problem of Kashmir and the timing of the mediation proposal have been much on my mind since I arrived here, and as Department is aware I have been endeavoring to get a more intimate feel for this situation.

Prospect for mediation must be viewed in the light of current developments which in terms of US-Indian relations are now highly colored by uncertainty over VOA agreement, speculation on possible effects of such a reversal on US support for Bokaro, and current Chicom threat with possible Pak support which is now being highly publicized in Delhi press. The atmosphere here is profoundly unsettled, to put it mildly.

Before attempting to inject a mediation proposal into such an environment, we should be clear with regard to our intentions and expectations. The hard core question is this: do we seriously expect within a reasonable time to bring India and Pakistan into meaningful negotiations to resolve their difference over Kashmir, or are we simply playing out to its logical conclusion a theme we initiated several months ago? Put another way, does anyone believe that there are any predispositions on the part of the Indians and Pakistanis to reach a settlement at this time, or indeed to do anything more than attempt to secure a tactical advantage enabling one to embarrass the other?

My conversations with Indians, with country team in New Delhi, and also with my British colleague, plus my own assessment of the possible effectiveness of a mediation proposal from us at this time, lead me to conclude that it would be futile for us to proceed with this venture now. The following factors are relevant:

1. FonSec told me informally on 26th that in his view any mediation proposal made in this highly charged period would hinder the future prospects for a settlement of the Pak problem rather than help them. Although Desai agreed on the value of mediation per se, and stressed that the suggestion had originated with GOI, he pointed out relations with Pakistan had sharply deteriorated since the original proposal as a result of Bhutto’s speeches hinting at Sino-Pak mutual defense agreement, and that many sober Indians were now seriously persuaded Paks would join Chicoms should latter renew aggressive action against India. In short, Desai, a reasonable man, was as adamant as Gundevia on this question.

2. Gore-Booth, for whom I have the highest regard, is resigned to playing out our previous theme if this is deemed necessary by his Govt for some tactical reason, though in a frank discussion this morning he emphasized that at this juncture we are probably up against a stone wall.

3. In my opinion US interest would best be served by our reaching the following conclusions:

A. If we were unable to force a Kashmir settlement under the relatively improved circumstances of last year, we are even less likely to succeed now.

B. Under the best of circumstances our association with the British on this question gravely undercuts whatever effectiveness we might otherwise have on this issue and our capacity to shape Indian views will be limited until we operate more independently. The depth of suspicion which the GOI feels toward the British Govt in regard to Kashmir is not fully understood.

C. A serious effort to ease the Pak-India conflict must start with the key element of timing, and this is definitely not the moment. Indeed to press forward now is likely to destroy our chances of reaching an agreement on such a proposal later.

4. We must also consider the likely effects of an unsuccessful mediation effort at this time on US attitudes, especially congressional, towards both India and Pakistan. A further demonstration of the inability of these two countries to reach a settlement would damage the image on both, and create even greater difficulties for the Administration in implementing its aid policies.

5. I realize that one argument for pressing the mediation proposal now is the hope that this might dissuade the Paks from another effort to revive the fruitless discussion of Kashmir in the UN. However at best this only postpones the issue as far as the Paks are concerned. It does not move the problem closer to a solution.

Finally may I add that to place me at this stage in the position of whipping a horse which although presently unconscious may be revived with sensitive care is to decrease my effectiveness on other issues on which I may be able to move our interest forward and to jeopardize whatever chance I may have to produce a fresh approach to the Kashmir question at a later date.

Therefore I strongly urge the Department to resist pressures from the UK on this subject and to table plans for mediation until a more propitious moment, when it can be said that both sides are to some extent predisposed seriously to discuss their differences.¹

Bowles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Karachi.
1. Rusk responded on August 1 with a cable sent personal for Bowles. He indicated that he did not underestimate the difficulties involved in pressing forward with the mediation proposal, and he recognized that circumstances affecting the probable success of the proposal grew less propitious every day. Nonetheless, because Kashmir was the central issue affecting the security of the subcontinent, Rusk concluded that it was a matter of overriding U.S. interest to move ahead with the proposal. (Telegram 275 to New Delhi; ibid.)