300. Memorandum for the Record0
PRESENT
- The President
- Mr. P. Talbot
- Mr. R.W. Komer
- Minister T.T. Krishnamachari
- Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai
- Ambassador B.K. Nehru
Conversation Between the President and Indian Defense Coordination Minister T.T. Krishnamachari
TTK began by expressing India’s thanks for the spontaneous US response to India’s appeal when it was attacked. He also brought personal regards to the President from Prime Minister Nehru.
The President inquired why the Chinese had attacked. What was the Indian estimate? In response TTK gave him a written brief1 prepared by M.J. Desai which the President read and said was extremely good. As TTK saw it, Chinese hostility toward India was a matter of long standing but the exact time of the Chinese attack was related to Cuba. The Chinese probably anticipated a “free ride” if Cuba flared up. TTK went on to describe other evidences of Chinese infiltration since the cease-fire. He pointed out that there were a number of Chinese in Nagaland disguised as mule drivers. In North Burma there were 40-60,000 Chinese settlers.
The President asked TTK what he thought was the objective of the Chinese Communists in Asia. TTK responded as far as India was concerned the Chinese probably sought to create a number of small satellite states around India’s borders, e.g. Nepal, an independent Assam, Burma. Chou En-lai had implied this objective to Bhutto and Ali Sabri when they were in Peiping. Burma in TTK’s opinion was “too far gone.” Ne Win, however well-intentioned, could not control Tin Pe and the Commerce Minister who were making over Burma into a Communist state.
The President asked about the Indian view of the future of non-alignment. TTK rejoined that India hoped to remain non-aligned; basically, it didn’t like to expand the area of conflict with China. Rather, the Indians wanted to localize this conflict and to deal with it themselves, “rather than to drag our friends into the fray.” Second, the Indians hoped through this policy to stay on the right side of the Soviets, and not push [Page 602] them back into helping Peiping. TTK did not expect any further Soviet military aid to India, but hoped that Indian policy could forestall such aid to China as well.
The President switched to the question of Kashmir. He said we had heard gloomy news about the prospects for settlement. This was one of our problems, as was that of Pakistani fears of India. However, apparently there was some feeling in India that in pushing Kashmir “we were taking advantage of a friend in her hour of need.” This was not so, but we had real problems with the Paks. We had important intelligence relations with them, and we did not want the Paks in a “moment of violence” to destroy CENTO and SEATO. Also there was much sentiment in Congress that Nehru could easily settle Kashmir if he chose. But the President felt that we must go ahead with India regardless of these differences. The question was how we should go along from here. He saw value in sending some US/UK air squadrons on training exercises, though we’d have problems here too. We should get Commonwealth participation. Then we could put in the necessary radar and communications. This arrangement could be superseded later, but in the meantime it would deter Chinese Communists. After all we had deterred the Chinese Communists from attacking Quemoy and Matsu for some time. So we should both consider the air squadrons. TTK felt that the best way to introduce them was a part of a training scheme. The President agreed, indicating to do so would be quite helpful. It would also make clear to the Chinese Communists our intention to help India if attacked.
The President then asked about the apparent US/Indian disagreement over the size of the Indian force buildup. TTK said that they hadn’t gotten very far into this yet. He had explained the need for supersonic fighters and the US had explained some of its difficulties, but this was where the matter rested. On transport aircraft the C-119s might not be adequate, so perhaps a squadron of C-130s was needed too. There was some discussion of when we planned to withdraw the US squadron from India. The President was sure that if needed we would keep the C-130s there. TTK then commented on the size of the force Mountbatten had said India would need, i.e. 1,020,000 men in 17 divisions. India’s own estimate was 1,019,000 men in 21 divisions, so there was little difference. Anyway, it would be 18 months from now before the Indians got to the problem of recruiting and equipping those divisions beyond 16, so there was no need to decide this yet. He went on to say that the third matter discussed had been defense production. India could not keep importing ammunition. He understood a surplus ammunition plant was available. Fourth, there was some difference over the proper Indian air force strength. The Indians were considering whether they should add a new Canberra squadron or one of heavy bombers. J.R.D. Tata was here working on the problem.
[Page 603]The President asked what TTK thought of Pakistani fears that a change in the “arms balance” would be a threat to Pakistan. TTK’s response was that it all depended on Indian intent. “We are not going to attack,” he said. “In fact, we have moved all of our troops away from the Pakistan frontier.” He mentioned inter alia that most of the cantonments for the Indian army were normally in the Punjab, so their previous deployments were not really against the Paks. TTK could not understand why the Paks would think India would ever attack. In fact, a substantial group of Indian politicians favored a settlement with Pakistan. India was much interested in the stability of East Pakistan, which had a major bearing on Indian ability to meet an attack through Burma. India wished Ayub well for this reason. It favored a “no war” declaration to resolve Pak fears. TTK told the President “you can underwrite India’s good behavior. We won’t attack Pakistan.” But no Indian leader could afford to make snap decisions on a Kashmir settlement.
The President asked how strong the group in India favoring settlement was. TTK did not answer directly but said it was essential to have a politically palatable settlement. One couldn’t have 100,000 refugees coming down from Kashmir and upsetting the 45 million Moslems in India, who were now integrated into Indian body politic and happy with their role. At present, India had gone as far as it could, but gradually people were coming to realize that “Pakistan is a problem, not an enemy.” TTK said that he personally would have advised Nehru to take Black as a mediator in 1961.
TTK then commented that India had two problems. First, it must convince the Southeast Asians that India couldn’t be licked. This was important for their morale. Second, it must seek a solution of Kashmir. But the GOI couldn’t tell the Kashmiris what to do. They had autonomy in local affairs; the GOI, for example, couldn’t instruct Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed to let Sheikh Abdullah out of jail. Let Pakistan create a similar autonomous state in its part of Kashmir and then we could have free movement between the two areas and develop other ties. Perhaps this way a settlement could be reached. Nehru had told Galbraith he would rather have a plebiscite than give up the Valley via a political decision.
The President dwelt on the problems which Kashmir dispute created with Pakistan. If we could settle these it would be in India’s interest as well as ours. It would make it easier for us to be of help. We wanted to help in any case but in ways causing the least trouble with the Paks. We should go ahead with radar, we should keep the C-130s there if necessary. We would consider what we could do toward providing equipment for 16 divisions and defense production aid. We would also try to get the Commonwealth to come along on the air squadrons; if they didn’t it wouldn’t in the last analysis deter us, but we would try to get the Australians or someone in if the UK was reluctant.
[Page 604]TTK thought it was best for the US to keep in touch with the Paks so they wouldn’t go too far. India would agree to mediation and would like to solve the Kashmir problem if only “to avoid embarrassment to our friends.” He assured the President that Prime Minister Nehru was completely sure of “U.S. good will toward India.” The President said “maybe no satisfactory solution can be reached on Kashmir but let’s keep people on both sides working.” He said the British thought that there was real danger of a Pak blowup. TTK responded that the UK attitude had an historical basis. They had “other interests” which affected their position. So the Indians hoped that US help would not be completely tied to that of the Commonwealth. He said the Canadians and Australians wanted to help India but they were small countries. The President thought that Australia ought to do more. It was only spending 3% of its GNP on defense. TTK said that the British had yet other problems; “The Hong Kong lobby is a strong one in the City of London.” The President replied that it was not very strong here.
Commenting that the Indian Consortium prospects did not “look good,” the President urged TTK on his trip to Western Europe to try to get more money for the Consortium. The Germans ought to do more, the Canadians were not doing enough, so the Indians should work harder on them. The President said “India has a lot of friends; I am one of them. Let’s be clear that we are going to help India. We have a lot of problems, but we will go forward in ways which will best deter the Chinese Communists.”
TTK stressed the possibility that if China attacked again, air might come into play. The Indians would use air but this might bring an attack on Indian cities. If India were unable to cope with this attack, it would have a disastrous effect on Indian morale. TTK thanked the President for his sympathy and understanding of Indian problems. As the visitors left, the President again complimented TTK on his memorandum explaining the motives behind the Chinese attack on India. He asked to keep it, saying that he wanted to send it to various key Congressmen such as Mansfield and Fulbright (TTK gladly agreed).