Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

290. Notes by Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, May 5, 1963.

Notes on Karachi-New Delhi Visit

1. There is little evidence of a desire in either Pakistan or India to work hard toward a general reconciliation which would involve major concessions on Kashmir. There seems to be somewhat more readiness in Karachi than in New Delhi to make substantial moves away from starting positions, but it is also Karachi which gains from changes in the status quo.

2. It is most unlikely that a Kashmir settlement can be negotiated which would not cause serious difficulties for both governments internally. It would help if such an agreement could be cushioned by far-reaching agreements on other matters in order that the pain of Kashmir could be outweighed by obvious advantages which one or the other might find elsewhere. Nothing less than a Franco-German type of reconciliation is likely to work. India is more ready for this than Pakistan; the latter appears most reluctant to ease pressures on Kashmir by discussing or agreeing on other questions prior to a Kashmir settlement. Further, the absence of such a settlement leaves the two parties in an atmosphere of unreasoning hostility which militates against good results on other issues. This adds up to a difficult, but not insuperable, problem of diplomatic procedure.

3. There is a wide gap between India and Pakistan on the nature of the threat which each faces. Each undoubtedly holds its point of view in good faith, but each also exaggerates for our benefit. India wants large-scale military assistance on the ground that it is being encircled by China: along their common borders, in Nepal and Bhutan, in Burma, in Southeast Asia, and to a degree through the animosity of Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, sees a minimum of threat from China to the subcontinent and thinks that India is determined in the long run to absorb its smaller neighbors: Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma and Ceylon. Pakistan adds that this kind of expansionist India would either join the communist bloc or work intimately with it against Western interests.

4. Pakistan pretends to be convinced that India has never accepted partition and seeks the disappearance of Pakistan. This fear is given some support by Nehru’s repeated rejection of Jinnah’s “two-nation theory,” that is, a rejection of a religious base for statehood. This is easily converted in Pakistan into a rejection by India of the fact of two states in the subcontinent. I spoke to Nehru about this confusion and urged him to take further steps to clarify that he accepts partition as a permanent solution.

5. The United States should clarify its own thinking about the purposes of substantial military assistance to India. The following elements have been mentioned but need refinement and realistic appraisal:

a. to deter or meet renewed Chinese offensives along the northern frontiers.

b. to prepare for a military threat from the direction of Burma.

c. to obtain a de facto ally against the Chinese in the event of increased Chinese threats to Southeast Asia or other areas.

d. to consolidate the changes in Indian political attitudes which have been produced by the Chinese attacks of late 1962.

6. The consequences of the types and scale of military assistance to India should be carefully assessed, including the irresponsible courses of action which Pakistan might well adopt. Unfortunately, we cannot rely upon Pakistan to act rationally and in what we might think would be in its own interest.

7. Our military assistance to India might be governed by the following approach:

a. In the event of a renewed Chinese attack, we should provide prompt and substantial emergency assistance. We should consider ways and means of rendering this assistance promptly through possible pre-stocking of key items such as ammunition nearer the scene. Pakistan accepts additional emergency assistance for India in the event of a new Chinese attack.

b. We should proceed promptly to prepare the setting for an introduction of U.S. and Commonwealth fighter squadrons into India. This would mean the installation of radar and communications facilities, any modifications of air fields to be used, arrangements for housing, POL, etc., and joint training, including fly-through visitations by such squadrons from time to time. Pakistan approves such a role for U.S. and Commonwealth squadrons in lieu of a comparable build-up of the Indian Air Force.

c. We should press the British hard to bring British-supplied equipment in Indian hands up to maximum operational effectiveness, especially with regard to spare parts for Indian military aircraft. Pakistan would not like this, but could not object to actions inherent in existing or past arrangements between India and Britain.

d. We should help India on improvements in road, rail and communications facilities required to support forces facing the Chinese—facilities which could yield an economic return if not needed for military purposes. This could make a solid contribution to India’s strength and would not be inflammatory to the Pakistanis.

e. The Indian armed forces need modernized training for their senior officers involved in war plans, higher command echelons, the employment of combined air and ground forces, logistics, etc. Present Indian military leadership has had little practical experience beyond the brigade level. We and the British ought to get at this as high priority assistance.

f. If we agree that the Indian armed forces require some strengthening in more sophisticated modern weapons of a sort which would unduly excite the Pakistanis, we should let the Indians use their own foreign exchange to purchase such equipment rather than provide it as military assistance. They have for years made such purchases, indirectly supported by our support for their total requirements through economic assistance. Perhaps defense production should be handled in the same way.

g. We should press to assure ourselves that our present emergency assistance is being properly used and is, in fact, adding to the capability of Indian forces in the field.

8. The views indicated above are related to the period of Mr. Nehru’s leadership in India. Despite the fact that he is slowing down somewhat, he still dominates the scene on the more important policy questions. I am not sanguine about a Kashmir settlement while he is Prime Minister. Nor do I believe that a heavy investment in Indian defense would cause him to accept defense responsibilities outside India, with the possible exception of Burma. He will remain “unaligned” in an effort to obtain some help from the Soviet Union against China; if this fails the chances are that he would go to considerable lengths to make peace with China. I could be wrong. Post-Nehru, the situation in India could be quite different, both in respect to Pakistan and in East-West relations.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-INDIA. Secret. The notes were not signed or initialed by Rusk, but a notation on the source text indicates that he drafted them. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 4/28/63-5/5/63. A May 7 memorandum from Komer to McGeorge Bundy indicates that Rusk prepared the notes for the President. (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer, 3/63-5/63)