280. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
In assessing the motives behind Nehru letter1 I’d put less weight on Galbraith’s hard sell or introduction of US/UK “elements” than on the likelihood that these and other steps simply made Nehru at long last face up to what we wanted on Kashmir. Nehru tends to avoid facing up to unpleasant decisions as long as possible, and we know that he personally is the chief roadblock to a forthcoming Indian position on Kashmir.
Thus Ken’s pressure and the “elements” seem more precipitant than cause of Nehru’s reaction. Nonetheless we may have pushed him harder and more precisely than was wise, particularly Ken. As he told me when there and indicated in private messages, he was already airing to TTK and others the “package deal” he proposed to Washington in Delhi 3693, 25 March,2 of trading assurance of substantial US aid for Indian agreement to a substantial Pak position in the Vale.
Despite the clear warnings from here that such a concrete proposal was premature and the joint US/UK instruction3 on building up to the fifth round by seeking Indo-Pak agreement to the “elements” of a settlement (approved by you on 1 April), Ken was already so far down his own track that he apparently decided to go ahead. He felt (1) the only way to pin the elusive Nehru down was with a concrete proposition; (2) to switch back to the “elements” alone was bad; and (3) his proposal was fully consistent with the “elements.” In effect, Ken was disgusted with what he regarded as US/UK shilly-shallying, and anxious to settle the affair before he left Delhi. His cables show he was quite aware of the risk that he’d precipitate a Nehru turndown. Of course, fear of just such an impasse was precisely why State proposed stepping up US/UK intervention by means of a vague set of principles (which could apply to partition or internationalization) rather than going Ken’s route. The expected occurred; in two rough sessions with Nehru on 15 and 20 April Ken got nowhere, and Nehru’s visible irritation was ample omen of the fireworks to come.
Just at this point Nehru got the “elements” paper, regrettably first given in writing to the Indians via our Embassy in Karachi. Nehru’s complaint about them goes less to their substance than to his fear they were a product of US-Pak collusion. There is little doubt that Galbraith’s delay in giving them to the Indians was a tactical error. We told them to the Paks [Page 554] on April 11th, and then McConaughy (assuming Ken had also told them to Indians) gave a copy to the Indian HICOM in Karachi on the 18th at the latter’s request. Nehru and others must have immediately jumped to the conclusion we had cleared them with the Paks first, so over-read them as meaning more concessions and reacted emotionally. Up to this point they probably felt we were genuinely trying to tone down Pak claims; now they felt we were again peddling Pak wares. True, Ken and then Gore-Booth had mentioned the “elements” to Gundevia, Desai, and even Nehru, but in such low key it apparently didn’t register. In fact, Nehru asked Ken on the 20th why he hadn’t brought the “elements” into the discussion sooner, and Ken replied that he was more interested in hard specifics.
It is in the above light that one must read Nehru’s complaint that he’d understood from Galbraith the US felt only the “northwest corner” of the Vale (down to Wular Lake) need be given to the Paks. This was indeed our original idea, and Ken admits he told Indians (Delhi 4101).4 Then we decided to up the ante somewhat by moving our proposed line down toward Srinagar, but the Indians presumably didn’t know this and Ken claims he’d already switched to talking about a line “somewhere between Wular Lake and Srinagar.” Nonetheless the Indians must have learned about this change, and regarded it as upping the ante on them. Nehru’s letter amply indicates that he interpreted the “elements” as being just this.
The moral of this story is that one can’t effectively stage-manage a difficult negotiation when the two parties are getting different signals from us, and when each is prone to assume the worst. Ken’s decision to handle things his own way was done with his eyes open. He took a chance in order to move the ball forward, and it backfired.
But as Ken himself agrees, at some point we would probably have hit this stone wall anyway. Nehru in fact turned Ken down twice on partition (on the 15th and 20th) before seizing on the “elements” to cover his intransigence. The reasons for this basic attitude are many, e.g. Nehru is a Kashmiri himself, his concern lest he appear to be yielding to US/UK pressure, his emotional reaction to the badly chosen Pak pressure tactics, less sense of urgency over the Chicom threat.
We should shift tactics now and see if he’ll buy something other than partition. But the odds are that between Nehru’s emotional reluctance and Ayub’s insistence on more than half a loaf we aren’t going to get a Kashmir settlement. Hence the issue may soon become one of whether, and how far, we go ahead regardless on aid to India.
- Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda Series, R. Komer Security. Secret.↩
- Document 279.↩
- Document 269.↩
- See the second attachment to Document 270.↩
- Telegram 4101, April 22, transmitted Galbraith’s assessment of Nehru’s April 21 letter. Galbraith concluded that the Indian Government saw in the “elements” paper a welcome opportunity to “get off the hook on specific and concrete concessions in the valley.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK)↩