252. Letter From the Ambassador to Pakistan (McConaughy) to President Ayub0
Dear Mr. President: President Kennedy has asked me to transmit to you the following message under the date of February 6, 1963:
“Dear Mr. President:
“I hasten to reply to your letter of January 26,1
“[1 paragraph (3-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
“[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Indeed any settlement achievable at this juncture must in some way get around the basic irreconcilability of the present Indian and Pakistani positions on the Valley.
“However difficult this may be, I must say in all candor that I doubt there will ever be a better opportunity than this one. Whether or not the Chinese Communist attack on India is over for the time being, the threat remains and has had a profoundly sobering effect on India. It has led the Indian Government to realize the importance of a reconciliation with Pakistan and to embark upon talks to this end. While the Indians have not yet shown their hand there are indications that they genuinely desire a compromise settlement.
“India’s desire for US-UK military aid is also an incentive, since we have made clear to the Indians that their attitude toward Pakistan must inevitably be a factor in our long-term military aid plans. However, if the threat increases or Sino-Indian fighting flares up once more, we may again be faced with the problem of providing India with substantial help.
“If India is forthcoming in further talks, it would appear to be greatly in your interest to respond in the same sense. I recall your prescient remark to Governor Harriman that any settlement will be highly unpalatable to many on both sides. For either side to fail to recognize this essential fact would simply foreclose the possibility of fruitful negotiations, and it is difficult to see how or when they could be reopened under as favorable circumstances. Certainly recourse again to the UN would accomplish little. Thus, however I look at the problem, I am driven to the conclusion that Pakistan should make every possible effort to achieve a compromise settlement now.
[Page 493]“I can assure you that the United States will do everything it can, within the limits of what we conceive to be helpful in bringing about such a settlement. We have, as you know, not been idle up to this point. But, after surveying the matter [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], we do not believe the current circumstances are such that a direct U.S. role in the talks would be productive. I think we can be more helpful behind the scenes.
“My sincere hope is that during the next round of talks in Karachi both parties will get down to considering the possibilities for an international boundary running through Kashmir. This can only be achieved through substantial compromises of present positions. Even if this goal proves impossible to achieve in the third round, it would seem essential at a minimum to fix an agreed date in the near future for a fourth round of talks lest the crucial momentum of the negotiation be lost.
“You are quite right about my deep personal interest in resolving this thorny and long standing dispute. Yet I fear that you overstate my influence if you think that it alone can be decisive. The United States and the United Kingdom cannot force a solution on either India or Pakistan. Our influence can only help weight the balance if statesmanship on both sides has brought matters to the point where the gap remaining between the two parties is sufficiently narrow that third-party efforts have some hope of success. We are far from that point as yet, but I am hopeful that it will be possible from the current talks to bring about the settlement which we all desire.
“Mrs. Kennedy and I send you our very warmest regards.
“Sincerely, (signed) John F. Kennedy”
With assurances of my high regard, Mr. President, I have the honor to be, with great respect,
Very cordially and sincerely yours,
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Karachi Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814, Item 63, 361.1 Kennedy-Ayub, Secret, 1962-1963. Secret.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 250.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩