241. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
We are at another crossroads on Afghan policy. State has firmed up its own proposals (attached);1 which I hope you can read this evening; I suggest we use your 4:30 Friday meeting with Steeves to get your views. Dave Bell, McGhee, Talbot, Gaud and I will be present.
For years we’ve been fighting an uphill battle to maintain a competitive presence in Afghanistan vis-à-vis the Soviets. This job has been made doubly difficult by the recurrent Pak-Afghan clashes over Pushtunistan, e.g. border closings which force us to use the expensive Iranian route.
We’ve been in effect delaying many of our aid projects until the Pakistan route was opened. Since this has failed to move the Afghans, State and AID now propose that we go ahead with what we can within presently planned levels, but deduct from these any additional charges from use of the Iran route. Thus we’ll maintain some pressure on the Afghans, [Page 477] but at the same time convince them we’ll still try to help them (e.g. by building a new $15 million road from Herat to Iran).
In effect, this policy seeks to buy more time, in the hope that something will give. State agrees that our investment is not big enough to reverse the adverse trend from creeping Soviet infiltration (at best it only slows this down). But it’s just big enough to give the Afghans renewed hope that we will continue to back them regardless of their policy toward Pakistan. Here’s the rub—I for one simply doubt that we can help the Afghans enough to maintain an already precarious independence unless they’re willing to help themselves by composing their quarrel with Pakistan. We’ve seen few signs of this; in fact, the Afghans just rejected Ayub’s latest offer (true, it was a pull-back from the Naim-Mohammed Ali formula).
So long as the Afghans think we’ll do all we can to help them regardless of their Pushtun policy, they’ll have no incentive to yield. Therefore, if past pressures haven’t worked, how about a yet tougher line? Steeves could go back and say, more in sorrow than in anger, that we want to help but simply can’t do so effectively while the border impasse continues. Therefore, while we’ll finish existing projects insofar as possible, we can’t start any new ones (e.g. Herat road) pending a border opening.
Steeves doubts that this would move the Afghans. But what State proposes seems even less likely to move them. And until the Afghans change their own policy, we’ll continue slowly to lose ground. A shift may require Daud’s removal, but this seems more likely to occur if we don’t indulge him than if we do. In short, while I grant that it is more prudent to continue playing for time, I believe you should consider the alternative case.
- Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda Series, R. Komer Security. Secret.↩
- See the enclosure to Document 240.↩