Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

199. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, November 17, 1962, 7 p.m.

1853. Policy. Pass Defense for OASD/ISA and JCS. London’s 1864 to Department.¹ The London papers are a valuable guide to policy with which, so far as they go, we are in agreement. Unfortunately issues on which decision will be needed are rapidly carrying us beyond the scope of this guidance. Specifically:

(1) The London decisions essentially assume borderline ambitions by the Chinese capable of being contained by five divisions. As noted, if anything more ambitious is attempted (Annex A, paragraph 1)² a radical reassessment will be necessary.

(2) However the Indians are assuming something much more ambitious by the Chinese. So, on balance, are we here. (Embtel 1727)³ As this is written the Chinese seem to have reacted in something close to division strength in the dangerous Walong area.

(3) Even if the Chinese have no forward ambitions and even though they negotiate a settlement, no Indian Government can soon assume their peaceful intentions. Public opinion has now taken hold on this issue with the greatest firmness. Any Indian Government must be prepared for the contingency, of a long-continuing forward Chinese military policy in NEFA, the border countries, UP, Kashmir and it must assume that this will be combined with flexible claims as to what is Chinese territory.

(4) In light of our past lecturing on the aggressive designs of the ChiComs, we cannot now reverse the field and tell them to confine their preparations as we will confine our help in accordance with the assumption that the Chinese are basically lambs.

(5) It follows that beyond the equipment for five divisions for the next few months the Indians must have a policy of procuring weapons for regaining ground or holding open terrain, basic transport including transport aircraft, plant for arms manufacture, raw materials for the foregoing, and air power.

(6) We must have a policy on assisting this for they are already asking us for help. There are many reasons for taking a deliberate view of this assistance. But we cannot decline it on the grounds that we do not believe the Chinese are a serious threat to India.

(7) The issue is an urgent one for the Indians are now coming forward with requests of very large magnitude. Some of these I have persuaded them to withhold on the legitimate ground that they are not well considered and that first things be put first and the first thing is ready infantry equipment. But this is not substitute for a policy.

I turn now to recommendations.

(1) The Indians must clearly realize, as they are only now dimly realizing, that our decision to help them beyond the ready combat requirements of the next few months involves political and financial issues of the highest order. This help in the magnitude contemplated will not be easy for us to provide.

(2) This means that very senior Indian Minister should go to Washington (and London) to negotiate the arrangements including political understandings.

(3) Our help must be related to a sense-making defense plan which reflects the realities of the military situation, does not commit the Indians to impossible tasks (e.g. the recovery of all the Aksai Chin), involves a realistic view of the weaponry and is related to actual as distinct from our imagined capacity to assist.

(4) There must be a clear understanding that India (not the US) will take up the Pakistan problem. Pakistan in the past has been regarded as an American problem. Now it is serious Indian business. Our ability to help India is circumscribed while tension continues. India has an exposed flank and is handicapped in helping herself. We can help by restraining the Pak appetite but leadership in the task of making the subcontinent secure and unified belongs to India.

(5) Given the foregoing, we should, I believe, help the Indians on a very substantial scale to organize their continuing defenses and build the supporting industry so far as this is clearly within their capacity. We shall, as the London decisions make clear, have to work with them patiently and with understanding. The major responsibility must remain in their hands. But we shall have to be severe on all wasteful nonsense.

(6) We should be as tolerant as our own political climate allows to obeisances to nonalignment. These will probably disappear in the next few weeks or months. The Indians now want, in fact, an intimate and confidential relationship with the United States. Sophisticated concern is already turning to whether we will insist on nonalignment.

(7) We stand on the edge of great opportunity here—reconciliation between India and Pakistan, security for the whole subcontinent, a decisive reverse for communism in its area of its greatest opportunity. We could lose the chance by not helping the Indians defend themselves according to their view of the Chinese danger. We could lose it by rushing in indiscriminately either with help or with unreal conditions. But given patient work and some luck with the Pakistanis and firm bargaining on essentials we can bring it off.

In light of foregoing considerations, which we know to be much in the mind of the British High Commission New Delhi, we strongly urge that London decisions, especially those in Annex A, be not communicated now to the Indian or Pakistan Governments and we have in mind visit of Duncan Sandys. Instead we urge prompt consideration which obviously must be at highest levels reflecting the foregoing considerations and resulting guidance.

Strictly FYI except for reference to Sandys, foregoing conveyed very informally to British Deputy HICOM.

Galbraith

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11-1762. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Karachi.
1. Telegram 1864, November 14, indicated that the next numbered telegram to Washington would transmit the agreed text of the recommendations of the U.S.-U.K. group established to outline Anglo-American objectives and courses of action arising out of the Sino-Indian conflict. (Ibid., 791.56/11-1462) Telegram 1865 from London, November 14, is summarized in Document 198.
2. The reference is to the agreed set of recommendations contained in telegram 1865 from London.
3. Dated November 10. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/11/62-11/13/62)